Drafting a Federal Balanced Budget Amendment That Does What It Is Supposed to Do (And No More) by Seto, Theodore P
Drafting a Federal Balanced Budget Amendment




I. WHAT IS THE AMENDMENT SUPPOSED TO Do? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1457
A. Why a Balanced Budget? ......................... 1457
1. Institutional Responsibilit ...................... 1458
2. Intergenerational Equity ......................... 1460
3. Economic Prudence .......................... 1463
4. Reconciling Competing Values ................... 1464
B. Why a Constitutional Amendment? ................... 1464
C. Other Nonnative Issues ........................... 1469
1. Enforceability .............................. 1469
2. Flexibility . ................................. 1471
3. Political Neutrality ........................... 1475
4. Constitutional Nondisruption .................... 1477
II. DEFINING THE BUDGETARY TARGET ..................... 1478
A. Accounting for Spending and Income ................. 1479
1. Treatment of Unpaid Obligations ................. 1483
2. Treatment of Capital Expenditures and Receipts ....... 1485
3. What is Cash? .............................. 1488
4. What is Debt? .............................. 1489
5. Constitutional Implications of a Choice of Accounting
M ethods .................................. 1492
B. Scope of the Amendment .......................... 1493
C. When to Test .................................. 1501
Associate Professor, Loyola Law School. Los Angeles. The author .,ould likc to thank Bryan
Adamson, Keith Aoki, Ellen Aprill, Bill Araiza. Michael Asimo%. David Burcham. Robert Chang. Bill
Dauster, Catherine Fisk, Victor Gold, Jodi Grant. Chris Kamos. Michael Knoll. David Leonard. Karl
Manheim, Chris May, Ed McCaffery, Maria Ontiveros. Katie Pratt. Scan Scott. Dr. Eugene Steuerte. Paul
Treusch, and Georgene Vairo for their comments on preliminary drafts and Lynnettc Avaness. Vickie
Cameron, and John Yang for their dedicated and able research assistance.
1449
1450 The Yale Law Journal [Vol. 106: 1449
D. Accommodating Fiscal Policy ...................... 1504
III. HOW TO GET THERE ............................... 1506
A. Setting Annual Targets and Deciding Whether They Have Been
M et ........................................ 1511
B. Imposing a Remedy ............................. 1515
1. Debt Ceiling Limitations ....................... 1516
2. Predefined Default Solutions .................... 1519
3. Process-Based Solutions ....................... 1523
4. Incentive-Based Solutions ...................... 1525
5. Who Should Decide? ......................... 1526
C. Waiving the Amendment: Who, When, and How? ......... 1530
IV. CONCLUSION ..................................... 1534
A PPENDIX .......................................... 1536
1997] Balanced Budget Amendment 1451
"[I]n constitutional matters, as in others, the devil is in the details."'
Efforts to propose and ratify a constitutional amendment to balance the
federal budget have been ongoing for almost twenty years,2 culminating in the
I. Laurence H. Tribe, How to Violate the Constitution Without Really Trying: Lessons from the Repeal
of Prohibition to the Balanced Budget Amendment, 12 CONST. COMME.NTARY 217. 218 (1995).
2. See, e.g., S. REP. No. 104-5 (1995) (recommending adoption of balanced budget constitutional
amendment); H.R. REP. No. 104-3 (1995) (same); S. REP. No. 103-163 (1993) (same): S. REP. No. 102-
103 (1991) (same); S. REP. No. 101-391 (1990) (same); S. REP. No. 99-163 (1985) (same): S. REP. No.
98-628 (1984) (recommending adoption of balanced budget/tax limitation constitutional amendment)- S.
REP. No. 97-151 (1981) (same); STAFF OF HOUSE COMM. ON THE BUDGET, 104TH CONG.. IT'S NOT THE
MONEY, IT'S THE PRINCIPLE: RESTORING THE RIGHT DEBATE ABOUT A BALANCED BUDGET A.mENDME.NT
(Comm. Print 1995) (same); see also The Balanced Budget Amendment. Hearings Before the Joint
Economic Comm., 104th Cong., Parts I & 11 (1995) [hereinafter 1995 Joint Hearings; Balanced Budget
Constitutional Amendment: Hearings on H.J. Res. I Before the Subcomm. on the Constitution of the House
Comm. on the Judiciary, 104th Cong. (1995) [hereinafter 1995 House Hearings); Balanced Budget
Amendment to the Constitution: Hearing on S.J. Res. 41 Before the Subcomm. on the Constitution of the
Sen. Comm. on the Judiciary, 103d Cong. (1995) (hearing held in 1994) [hereinafter 1994 Senate Judiciary
Comm. Hearings]; Balanced Budget Amendment: Hearings on S.J. Res. 41 Before the Senate Comm. on
Appropriations, 103d Cong. (1994) [hereinafter 1994 Senate Appropriations Comm. Hearings).
Constitutional Amendment to Balance the Budget: Hearings Before the Sen. Comm. on the Budget. 102d
Cong. (1992) [hereinafter 1992 Senate Hearings]; Balanced Budget Constittional Amendment. Hearing
on S.J. Res. 13 Before the Subcomm. on the Constitution of the Sen. Comm. an the Judictary. 99th Cong
(1985) [hereinafter 1985 Senate Hearings]; The Balanced Budget Amendment: Hearing Before the Joint
Economic Comm., 98th Cong. (1985) (hearing held in 1984) [hereinafter 1984 Joint Hearing]: Proposed
Balanced BudgetlTax Limitation Constitutional Amendment: Hearing on SJ. Res. 5 Before the Subcomm.
on the Constitution of the Sen. Commn. on the Judiciary. 98th Cong. (1984) (hearings held in 1983 and
1984) [hereinafter 1983-84 Senate Hearing]; Constitutional Amendments Seeking to Balance the Budget
and Limit Federal Spending: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Monopolies and Commercial Law of the
House Comm. on the Judiciary, 97th Cong. (1983) (hearings held in 1981 and 1982) [hereinafter 1981-82
House Hearings]; Balancing the Budget: Hearing on S.J. Res. 58 Before the Subcomm on the Constitution
of the Sen. Comm. on the Judiciary, 97th Cong. (1982) (hearing held in 1981) [hereinafter 1981 Second
Senate Hearing]; Balanced Budget-Tax Limitation Constitutional Amendment. Hearings on S.J Res. 9.
S.J. Res. 43, and S.J. Res. 58 Before the Subcomm. on the Constitution of the Sen. Comn. on the Judiciarn,
97th Cong. (1981) [hereinafter 1981 First Senate Hearings]; Constitutional Amendments to Balance the
Federal Budget. Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Monopolies and Commercial Law of the House Comm.
on the Judiciary, 96th Cong. (1980) (hearings held in 1979 and 1980) [hereinafter 1979-40 House
Hearings]; CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET OFFICE. BALANCING THE FEDERAL BUDGET AND Lt.tmNG FEDERAL
SPENDING: CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY APPROACHES (Sept. 1982).
Indeed, the Senate considered a balanced budget amendment as far back as 50 years ago. See S REP
No. 80-154 (1947) (recommending proposal of balanced budget constitutional amendment) For a more
complete history of congressional efforts to propose a balanced budget amendment. see JAMES V
SATURNO, A BALANCED BUDGET CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT: BACKGROUND AND CONGRESSIONAL
OPTIONS 13-23 (Congressional Research Serv., Dec. 1994). and David E. Kyvig. Refining or Resisting
Modem Government? The Balanced Budget Amendment to the U.S. Constituion, 28 AKRON L REV 97
(1995) (documenting history of balanced budget amendment attempts). In addition to congressional efforts.
a majority of state legislatures have either requested that Congress propose a balanced budget amendment.
or applied for Congress to convene a constitutional convention for this purpose. See S. REP. No 97-151.
at 12-13; RUSSELL L. CAPLAN, CONSTITUTIONAL BRINKSMANSHIP: AMENDING THE CONSTrITvTON BY
NATIONAL CONVENTION 78-89 (1988) (reviewing history of calls for convention to propose balanced
budget amendment); WILBUR EDEI, A CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION: THREAT OR CIHALLE.%GE' 69-76
(1981) (reviewing history of calls for convention to propose balanced budget amendment and concluding
that Congress should establish regulations for such convention); SATURNO. supra. at 21-23. PAUL J WE ER
& BARBARA A. PERRY, UNFOUNDED FEARS: MYTHS AND REALTIES OF A CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION
127-40 (1989) (reviewing arguments for and against balanced budget amendment and concluding that
convention route is safe and appropriate); E. Donald Elliott. Constitutional Conventions and the Deficit.
1985 DUKE LJ. 1077 (arguing that convention is appropnate vehicle to address balanced budget problem)
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repeated narrow defeat of Senate Joint Resolution 1 (the "1995-96 Senate
Draft")3 in March 1995 and June 1996. History suggests that the same draft,
or one very similar, will be introduced again. Recent shifts in the makeup of
Congress have increased the likelihood of passage.4 In any event, proposals
for a federal balanced budget amendment are likely to remain politically
central for the foreseeable future.
Most of the public debate on this issue has centered around whether such
an amendment, in the abstract, is a good idea;5 little has been written about
the formidable technical problems involved in drafting a balanced budget
amendment that does what it is supposed to do.6 This is, perhaps,
A political history of the balanced budget issue can be found in JAMES D. SAVAGE, BALANCED BUDGETS
& AMERICAN POLITICS (1988) (describing history of budgetary balance as political issue).
3. S.J. Res. 1, 104th Cong. (1995). The text of the resolution, as finally amended, is attached to this
Article as an Appendix. In March 1995, the resolution failed in the Senate on a vote of 65 to 35 in favor
of passage. See 141 CONG. REC. S3314 (daily ed. Mar. 2, 1995). A favorable vote of 67 is required to
submit the proposed amendment to the states for ratification. See U.S. CONST. art. V. Because Senator
Robert Dole voted against the resolution only to preserve the option of moving for reconsideration later
in the session, see 141 CONG. REC. S3827, S3829 (daily ed. Mar. 13, 1995), the vote was effectively 66
to 34. In June 1996, the resolution failed again on a vote of 64 to 35. See 142 CONG. REC. S5873, S5903
(daily ed. June 6, 1996).
4. See, e.g., Alan Fram, Balanced Budget Foes Not Giving Up, CHARLESTON GAZETrE & DAILY MAIL,
Nov. 17, 1996, at 3A (suggesting that two-thirds majorities to adopt amendment probably exist).
5. See, e.g., 141 CONG. REC. S3340-41 (daily ed. Mar. 2, 1995) (statement of Sen. Craig) (entering
into record article that reports over 200 economists support amendment); id. at S2119 (daily ed. Feb. 3,
1995) (statement of Sen. Moynihan) (asserting that more than 450 economists, including seven Nobel
Laureates, oppose amendment); RICHARD E. WAGNER ET AL., BALANCED BUDGETS, FISCAL
RESPONSIBILITY, AND THE CONSTITUTION (1982) (arguing for constitutional amendment); A Sense of
Balance, ECONOMIST (London), Mar. II, 1995, at 18 (opposing amendment as inviting judicial intervention
in economy); Marc Breslow, Balanced-Budget Amendment Is a Disaster Waiting to Happen, BUFF. NEWS,
Feb. 28, 1995, at B3 (economist and editor of Dollars and Sense magazine arguing against amendment);
Daphne Greenwood, What if Congress Had Passed Balanced-Budget Amendment?, DENY. POST, May 27,
1995, at B I I (economist and former legislator evaluating pros and cons of amendment); Robert T. Nelson,
Balanced-Budget Amendment Would Have Big Impact Here, SEATrLE TIMES, Mar. 2, 1995, at Al
(assessing likely impact of amendment in Washington State); Jane Bryant Quinn, Balanced-Budget
Amendment Served as Smoke Screen for Weak Politicians, BUFF. NEws, Mar. II, 1995, at B I I (economist-
columnist opposing amendment as sham); William Safire, Balance That Budget, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 27, 1995,
at A 15 (columnist supporting amendment); Shalikashvili Warns Against Balanced Budget Amendment, 173
AEROSPACE DAILY 312 (1995) (conveying Chair of Joint Chiefs of Staff's warning that amendment will
lead to reduced defense budget). For representative essays on this question, see BALANCING ACT-DEBT,
DEFICITS, AND TAXES (John H. Makin et al. eds., 1990). For essays on balanced budgets generally and
balanced budget amendments, see A NATION IN DEBT. ECONOMISTS DEBATE THE FEDERAL BUDGET
DEFICIT (Richard H. Fink & Jack C. High eds., 1987), and THE FEDERAL DEFICIT (Andrew C. Kimmens
ed., 1985).
6. The scholarly legal literature is surprisingly sparse, given the topic's importance and the length or
time it has been a serious political issue. The literature that does exist focuses primarily either on the
question of judicial enforcement or on arguments for or against adoption. See James W. Bowen, Enforcing
the Balanced Budget Amendment, 4 SETON HALL CONT. L.J. 565 (1994) (arguing that amendment would
be susceptible to judicial enforcement); David Dreier & William Craig Stubblebine, The Balanced
Budget/Tax Limitation Amendment, 10 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 809 (1983) (arguing in favor of amendment);
Peter W. Rodino, Jr., The Proposed Balanced Budget/Tax Limitation Constitutional Amendment: No
Balance, No Limits, 10 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 785 (1983) (Chair, House Committee on the Judiciary,
arguing against amendment); Donald B. Tobin, The Balanced Budget Amendment: Will Judges Become
Accountants? A Look at State Experiences, 12 J.L. & POL. 153, 155-71 (1996) (reviewing state court
decisions construing state balanced budget provisions); Gay Aynesworth Crosthwait, Note, Article IIl
Problems in Enforcing the Balanced Budget Amendment, 83 COLUM. L. REV. 1065 (1983) (noting that
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understandable. The scholarly community tends to defer technical analysis until
after an amendment clears Congress. Proposals for a federal balanced budget
amendment present further problems. First, they implicate two fields not
usually linked: constitutional law and accounting. Few constitutional scholars
feel comfortable tackling accounting issues;' accountants, in turn, do not often
write about the Constitution. Second, there is a dearth of satisfactory models
from which to work: Amendment proponents perceive the Gramm-Rudman-
Hollings Act' and other legislative approaches 9 as inadequate,'" and the
amendment raises justiciability problems); David Lubecky. Comment. The Proposed Federal Balanced
Budget Amendment: An Inquiry into Appropriateness. 55 U. CIN. L. REv. 563 (1986) (describing state
experience with judicial enforcement); Lavinia L Mears. Note, The Truth About the Balanced Budget
Amendment, 20 SETON HALL LEGIS. J. 592 (1996) (arguing against amendment); Note. The Balanced
Budget Amendment: The Lesson from State Experience. 96 ARe. L REv. 1600 t1983) (claiming that
amendment is inappropriate) [hereinafter State Erpenence]. A number of constitutional scholars have
testified in hearings on such an amendment, but almost exclusively on constitutional issues. See, e.g., 1994
Senate Appropriations Comm. Hearings, supra note 2, at 81-92 (statement of Professor Charles Fried); id.
at 131-48 (statement of Walter Dellinger, Assistant Attorney General); id. at 149-62 (statement of Professor
Archibald Cox); id. at 162-76 (statement of Nicholas Katzenbach. former Attorney General. Johnson
Administration); id. at 177-93 (statement of Professor Kathleen Sullivan): id. at 193-207 (statement of
Professor Burke Marshall); 1994 Senate JudicirO" Comm. Hearings. supra note 2. at 74-78 (statement of
Stewart E. Sterk); 1992 Senate Hearings, supra note 2. at 5-48 (statement of Professor Laurence H. Tribe);
id. at 73-93 (statement of Professor Walter Dellinger): 1983-84 Senate Hearing. supra note 2. at 29-35
(statement of Professor John T. Noonan, Jr.); id. at 79-85 (statement of Professor Robert D. Goldstein),
Preliminary discussion of some of the technical issues raised in this Article appears in SAT'URSO. supra note
2, at 29-41 (discussing use of estimates, supermajority requirements, impoundment poser, off-budget
activity, waivers, definition of debt, tax or expenditure limitations, judicial re,.iew and item 'cto). and
WAGNER, supra note 5, at 29-35 (discussing off-budget activity. capital budgets, and annual targets)
7. The 1995-96 Senate Draft was drafted primarily by the staffs of the House and Senate Judiciary
committees, without significant input from the staffs of the respecti'e Budget committees. Interv tew with
William Dauster, Minority Staff Director, Senate Budget Committee. in Washington. D C (Jan 5. 1997)
8. Balanced Budget and Emergency Deficit Control Act of 1985. Pub. L No 99.177. 99 Stat, 1038.
as amended by Balanced Budget and Emergency Deficit Reduction Reaffirmation Act of 1987. Pub L No
100-119, 101 Stat. 754. For analyses of Gramm-Rudman-Hollings. see EDWARD DAvts & ROBERT KEIt.
DEBT-LIMiT INCREASE AND 1985 BALANCED BUDGET AcT REAFFIRMATION: SUMMARY OF PLBIuc LAW
100-119 (H.J. RES. 324) (1987), and Kate Stith. Rewriting the Fiscal Constitution: The Case of Gramm-
Rudman-Hollings, 76 CAL. L. REv. 593 (1988).
9. A history of other legislative approaches to the deficit control problem can be found in SATt. RNO.
supra note 2, at 25-28.
10. See, e.g., 141 CONG. REc. H628-29 (daily ed. Jan. 25. 1995) (statement of Rep Hyde) ("In the
past 10 years, three major legislative efforts have sought to revercs the Gosemment's chronic deficit
pattern. Two of them have failed and the third is destined to do so."); Joseph Biden. %V11% I S1%itched. N Y
TtMEs, Feb. 25, 1995, § I. at 23 (asserting that Gramm-Rudman-Hollings failed). Robert Dole, Whs We
Need a Balanced-Budget Amendment, WASH. TIMES, Feb. 28. 1995. at A21 (stating that % c need to "rein
in big government"); Chip Drury, Editorial. Balanced-Budget Amendment Ill Counter "Fatal Attraction'"
of Profligacy, WASH. TIMES, Feb. 28. 1995. at A20 (arguing that failure of Act requircs balanced budget
amendment); Safire. supra note 5, at 4 (asserting that "budget-balancing statutes are hot air-). Dick
Thornburgh, Out of Balance. Still America Needs a Balanced-Budget Amendment to Prostde Fiscal
Discipline, Prrr. POST-GAZETTE, June II, 1996, at AI5 (refemng to Gramm-Rudman-Hollings as "now-
defunct"). Assessments of the efficacy of the Gramm-Rudman-Hollings Act in the scholarly legal literature
have been mixed. See, e.g., Pete V. Domenici, The Gramm-Rudman-Hollings Budget Process An Act of
Legislative Futility?, 25 HARV. J. ON LEGiS. 537 (1988) (arguing that Act's record is good); Thomas J
Downey, The Futility of Gramm-Rudman-Hollings. 25 HARV. J. ON LEGis. 545. 552 (1988) (concluding
that Act cannot work); John W. Ellwood, The Politics of the Enzactiient and Implementation of Gramm-
Rudman-Hollings: Why Congress Cannot Address the Deficit Dilemma. 25 HARV. J. Os LEGIS 553. 574
(1988) (arguing that "design of [Act] also illustrates the difficulty of designing a credible semi-autonomous
doomsday machine"); Robert W. Kasten, Jr.. Gramm-Rudman-Hollimgs: An Imperfect Law That Morki. 25
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experiences of states with similar constitutional provisions remain
controversial." Finally, analysis of balanced budget amendment drafts has been
hampered by the differing motives of its proponents. For some, the goal is
simply to require a balanced federal budget. For others, the goal appears to be
to limit the size and power of the federal government-to enact, in effect, an
"antifederalist" amendment to the United States Constitution. 2 These
HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 577, 577 (1988) (arguing Act "has imposed a measure of fiscal discipline"); Dan
Quayle, Is Gramm-Rudman-Hollings an Exercise in Legislative Futility?, 25 HARV. J. ON LEGis. 587 (1988)
(asserting that to date, Act has succeeded); Randall Strahan, Governing in the Post-Liberal Era: Gramm.
Rudman-Hollings and the Politics of the Federal Deficit, 25 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 593, 607 (1988) (noting
that it is impossible to predict whether Congress will meet future Act targets); Dick Thornburgh, Gramm-
Rudman-Hollings and the Balanced Budget Amendment: A Page of History, 25 HARV. J. ON LEalS. 611,
611 (1988) (arguing that Act will probably fail and constitutional amendment is needed); Howard
Levkowitz, Note, The Gramm-Rudman-Hollings Act: A Styrofoam Damocles' Sword?, 2 S. CAL. INTERDISC.
L.J. 367, 392 (1993) (assessing legislation passed since Act and concluding that while Act has had some
impact, it is now of "decreased importance"); Gary A. Loxley & Thomas F. Mitola, Comment, The
Congressional Budget and Impoundment Control Act of 1974: Gramm.Rudman and Beyond, 14 OHIO N.U.
L. REv. 329, 330 (1987) (calling 1974 Congressional Budget and Impoundment Control Act "a dismal
failure" and asserting that Gramm-Rudman-Hollings "has not been successful").
11. Compare CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET OFFICE, supra note 2, at 117-28 (arguing that notwithstanding
state constitutional limitations, state borrowing increased more rapidly than federal debt over prior 20 years
and concluding that: "State experience offers meager support for the expectation that constitutional
restrictions will constrain governmental borrowing."), and A. JAMES HEINS, CONSTITUTIONAL RIsrtCTIONS
AGAINST STATE DEBT at vii, 27 (1963) (concluding that state legislatures are generally able to circumvent
constitutional debt restrictions), and B.U. RATCHFORD, AMERICAN STATE DEBTS 7-8 (1941) (noting
frequent attempts by states to evade constitutional debt limits), and D. Roderick Kiewiet & Kristin Szakaly,
Constitutional Limitations on Borrowing: An Analysis of State Bonded Indebtedness, 12 J.L. ECON. & ORG.
62, 62 (1996) ("[Ciurrent proposals for constitutional limitations on borrowing at the federal level would
have much less impact on total government borrowing than their proponents anticipate."), and C. Robert
Morris, Jr., Evading Debt Limitations with Public Building Authorities: The Costly Subversion of State
Constitutions, 68 YALE L.J. 234 (1958) (reviewing methods of circumvention), with S. REP. No. 104-5, at
11 (1995) (asserting that state experience has been successful), and W. Mark Crain & James C. Miller Ill,
Budget Process and Spending Growth, 31 WM. & MARY L. REv. 1021, 1044 (1990) (noting that
constitutional balanced budget requirements "significantly slow spending growth" in states where budget
is initiated in legislature, but not in states where budget is initiated by executive), and Stewart E. Sterk &
Elizabeth S. Goldman, Controlling Legislative Shortsightedness: The Effectiveness of Constitutional Debt
Limitations, 1991 WIS. L. REv. 1301, 1302 (arguing that "constitutional debt limits, even if often
underenforced, have served effectively to protect against the worst sorts of legislative abuse"). Although
states have generally met the formal requirements of their respective constitutional provisions, it also
appears that state spending not subject to those provisions has grown very substantially. Whether a formally
respected but routinely circumvented provision should be viewed as successful is questionable. A collateral
cost of ineffective debt limitation provisions is sometimes to raise interest and other transaction costs to
the governmental borrower. See CHARLES N. HENNING ET AL., FINANCIAL MARKETS AND THE ECONOMY
256-57 (3d ed. 1981). In such event, the net effect of the provisions is to increase, not decrease, the state's
overall deficit.
12. See, e.g., 1995 House Hearings, supra note 2, at 93 (statement of William P. Barr, Former
Attorney General, Department of Justice) (asserting that balanced budget amendment is needed to reduce
size of federal government); id. at 107 (statement of William A. Niskanen, Chairman, Cato Institute)
(arguing that balanced budget amendment limits federal powers, consistent with original purpose of
Constitution); id. at 226 (statement of Rep. Solomon) (arguing that balanced budget amendment is needed
to reduce size of federal government); 1995 Joint Hearings Part I, supra note 2, at 17-18 (statement of
Sen. Grams) (same); id. at 25 (statement of Lewis K. Uhler, President, National Tax Limitation Committee)
(same); id at 64 (statement of Professor Milton Friedman, Economist) (same); 1995 Joint Hearings Part
11, supra note 2, at 65 (statement of Rep. Mica) (same); 1994 Senate Judiciary Comm. Hearings, supra note
2, at 24 (statement of Martin A. Regalia, Vice President and Chief Economist, U.S. Chamber of Commerce)
(same); id. at 30-33 (statement of David M. Stanley, President, National Taxpayers Union) (same);
1983-84 Senate Hearing, supra note 2, at 32-35 (statement of Professor John T. Noonan, Jr.) (same); id.
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different goals raise different technical problems and invite technical
imprecision.
In any event, balanced budget amendment drafts have not evidenced
adequate attention to technical detail. The 1995-96 Senate Draft, for example,
seems to have been written with primarily political, not technical,
considerations in mind. Not surprisingly, close analysis reveals serious
technical flaws. Without greater attention to technical detail, future proposals
are likely to perpetuate those flaws. This would be unfortunate. A poorly
drafted amendment might facilitate nominal compliance-that is, literal
compliance with an inadequate numerical test-while failing to require
adherence to the underlying values that the amendment is supposed to protect.
Nominal compliance with a poorly drafted amendment might, in turn, provide
political cover for continued budgetary irresponsibility. A poorly drafted
amendment might also trigger or exacerbate economic instability. At worst,
such an amendment might even cause a meltdown of the world's financial
system. In sum, a poorly drafted amendment could trigger a series of economic
and constitutional crises while leaving unsolved the problem it was ostensibly
intended to address.1
3
This Article will not attempt to address whether either a balanced budget
or a constitutional amendment to require one is a good idea." Nor will it
explore the technical problems that would need to be resolved by a well-
at 255-56 (statement of American Farm Bureau Federation) (same); id. at 312-16 (statement of Professor
Milton Friedman, Senior Research Fellow, Hoover Institution) (same): 1981-82 Houe Heunngs. supra note
2, at 320-21 (statement of Hon. Donald T. Regan, Secretary of the Treasury): 1979--O House Hearings.
supra note 2, at 71 (statement of James Dale Davidson. Chairman. National Taxpayers Union) (same); id.
at 275 (statement of Allen Schick, Congressional Research Service) ("1Tlhe proposed spending limitations
mask their real purpose, a radical transformation in the character, reach, and purpose of the United States
Government."); id. at 364 (statement of Rep. Gingrich) (arguing that balanced budget amendment is needed
to reduce size of federal government); S. REP. No. 104-5. at 5 (1995) (stating that existing constitutional
provisions have "failed to limit the voracious appetite of Congress to legislate into every area of pn'ate
concern, to invade the traditional bailiwick of the States, and. consequently, to spend and spend to fund
these measures until the Federal Government has become functionally insolvent and the economy is placed
in jeopardy"); S. RFP. No. 97-151, at 38 (1981) (-[T]he Federal government has grown to become the
dominant economic institution in the United States.").
13. For example, as I discuss later, a cash method amendment might lead legislators to bid for votes
by committing the government to unfunded future expenditures, see infra Subsection II.A.1. bias legislative
decisionmaking in favor of short-term solutions, see infra Subsection II.A.2; tempt Congress to authorize
the creation of quasicash, see infra Subsection II.A.3; or lead to more extensive use of informal debt. see
infra Subsection II.A.4. An amendment that failed to control the use of off-budget entities might lead to
a proliferation of government programs not subject to the appropriations process. See infra Section II.B.
An amendment that failed to limit congressional action directly might continue to permit legislative
irresponsibility, leaving others to pick up the pieces. See infra Section II.C. An amendment that failed to
take economic conditions into account might exaggerate the business cycle and worsen economic
downturns. See infra Section lI.D. An amendment enforced by a debt ceiling limitation mechanism might
lead to default on the national debt, which might in turn lead to economic collapse. see infra Subsection
III.B.I; alternatively, it might lead to effective unenforceability and a further decline in public confidence
in American government, see id.
14. For the existing scholarly legal literature on this question, see supra note 6.
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drafted antifederalist amendment.' 5 Instead, it will focus on the technical
problems presented in drafting, implementing, and interpreting an amendment,
the goal of which is simply to require a balanced federal budget. At first
glance, these problems may appear ministerial: details that members of
Congress and constitutional scholars may be tempted to leave to others. Their
resolution, however, has profound implications for the success of the
amendment and the structure of American government. Even the broadest
issues cannot be understood or thoughtfully addressed without attention to
technical detail.
There is, of course, no single technically correct approach to most complex
policy issues. Technical competence must serve broader goals. In Part I, I will
explore what a balanced budget amendment is supposed to do. I will first
examine why we want balanced budgets at all; the answers, I suggest, should
influence how we define our budgetary target. Second, I will review current
theories as to why a constitutional amendment may be necessary; again,
identification of perceived procedural or other defects in current
decisionmaking processes may shed light on the procedural or other
enforcement mechanisms an effective amendment might need to institute.
Finally, I will posit four additional normative characteristics of any well-
drafted federal balanced budget amendment: (1) a balanced budget amendment
should be enforceable; (2) it should nevertheless permit carefully delimited
degrees of flexibility in its application; (3) it should be politically neutral-that
is, it should not change or distort political decisionmaking, intentionally or
inadvertently, except to require a balanced budget; and (4) it should not disrupt
our existing constitutional system except as is absolutely necessary to
accomplish its purposes. Some will disagree with these premises. My goal in
Part I is not necessarily to persuade the reader that I am right. It is rather to
urge greater attention to normative premises, to challenge those who disagree
to be explicit in their disagreement and in their analysis of the implications of
different normative assumptions for technical structure.
In Part II, I will then address a first set of technical problems, those
involved in defining the budgetary target. I will examine four issues: choice
of accounting methods; scope of the amendment; when in the budgetary
process the amendment should test compliance; and how well the amendment
accommodates fiscal policy. Failure of an amendment to address the first three
thoughtfully, I will argue, may permit Congress to comply nominally while
largely frustrating the amendment's ultimate purposes. Failure to accommodate
fiscal policy adequately may result in economic destabilization and possibly
economic catastrophe. I will conclude that the solution adopted in the 1995-96
Senate Draft is deficient in both these respects.
15. A preliminary examination of technical questions raised by tax and spending limitation provisions
appears in SATURNO, supra note 2, at 37-40.
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Finally, in Part III, I will examine three major procedural problems in
enforcement: who interprets and defines the budgetary target and determines
whether it has been met, how a violation of the requirements of the
amendment is remedied, and how and in what circumstances the requirements
of the amendment may be waived. First, I will conclude that if the amendment
is to be effective, the rules used to define the target and decide whether the
target has been met must be subject to outside review by an independent
scorekeeper. Second, I will review possible solutions to the problem of
remedy, with special attention to those incorporated in the 1995-96 Senate
Draft, and conclude that there is currently no fully satisfactory solution to the
problem. Finally, I will argue that waiver of the amendment should be
permitted by supermajority legislative vote, but without the exceptions some
have suggested for economic emergencies. I will conclude that the solutions
to important enforcement issues adopted in the 1995-96 Senate Draft are
flawed in important respects.
I do not claim to have all the answers. I do bring an unusual perspective
to the problem: For most of my professional life I have worked with financial
anticircumvention rules-the rules of the Internal Revenue Code-and with the
analytic methods of tax policy, which, like a balanced budget amendment,
often attempts to induce behavioral change along one axis without distorting
behavior along others. Viewed from this perspective, some balanced budget
amendment issues are currently susceptible to sound technical resolution.
Others require further work. I conclude, however, that any broadly acceptable,
technically sound balanced budget amendment would differ significantly from
the 1995-96 Senate Draft in ways that neither proponents nor opponents have
yet fully considered.
I. WHAT IS THE AMENDMENT SUPPOSED TO DO?
A. Why a Balanced Budget?
I do not propose to undertake a critical examination of the arguments for
or against a balanced budget. My purpose here is much more limited.
Assuming that we as a nation decide to mandate balanced federal budgets, we
should identify our reasons clearly, so as to permit the drafting of a budgetary
target consistent with those reasons. Proponents make many arguments in favor
of a balanced budget. Ultimately, I suggest, they reflect three principal values,
with sometimes inconsistent implications for the definition of budgetary
targets.1
6
16. Some proponents appear to support a balanced budget amendment as an indirect technique for
constraining federal spending. See supra note 12. The technical problems of proposals to constrain federal
spending are beyond the scope of this Article. Section L.A therefore focuses on arguments in favor of
budgetary balance itself, not in favor of budgetary balance as an indirect means to a different political cnd
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1. Institutional Responsibility
One of the most common arguments in favor of a balanced budget is to
avoid national "bankruptcy."' 7 Technically, of course, national governments
cannot declare bankruptcy, which generally denotes a procedure through which
governments absolve private debtors of their debts.' 8  The term
"insolvency"'19 is no more helpful. If "insolvency" means an excess of
liabilities over assets, the United States Government is deeply insolvent and
has been so since before 1960.20 The relationship between a national
government's nominal assets and liabilities, however, has little practical
significance; a government's assets are not generally available to satisfy its
liabilities.2 ' A second common meaning of "insolvency" is an inability to pay
debts as they come due. Since the United States has not publicly defaulted on
its debts for over two centuries,2 under this measure the United States is not
now and is unlikely ever to become insolvent-unless, of course, Congress
renders it unable to pay its debts by refusing to increase the debt limit.
Those worried about national "bankruptcy," however, probably do not
intend to invoke a technical meaning. At some point, high levels of debt and
debt service threaten the viability of all financial organizations, including
17. See, e.g., 1995 House Hearings, supra note 2, at 240-46 (statement of James D. Davidson,
Chairman, National Taxpayers Union) (arguing that balanced budget is needed to avoid national
"bankruptcy"); 1984 Joint Hearing, supra note 2, at I (statement of Sen. Jepsen) ("Without some kind of
institutional reform to limit tax and spending growth, this situation will drive us into national bankruptcy");
James Dale Davidson, Amendment for the Info Age, INVESTOR'S Bus. DAILY, Jan. 27, 1995, at A2 ("The
only question is whether the deficits will be curtailed by constitutional remedy, bankruptcy or revolution.");
Mike DeWine, The Balanced Budget Amendment Is America's Last Chance for Fiscal Security, DAYTON
DAILY NEws, Feb. 28, 1995, at IIA (stating that five trillion dollar debt "threatens our children's
generation with bankruptcy"); Rick Santorum, Sen. Hatfield, as a Committee Chairman, Was Obliged to
Vote with His Party, PITT. POST-GAZErra, Apr. 2, 1995, at F2 (arguing that balanced budget amendment
is necessary to curb "insatiable need to spend our future into bankruptcy"). But see Paul W. McCracken,
Falling Dollar? Blame the Deficit, WALL ST. J. EUR., Apr. 21, 1995, at 6 ("[O]ne extreme ... is the view
that the public debt will mount to the point where there is some sort of national bankruptcy that leaves the
whole economy disintegrated and on the trash heap.... At the other extreme there is the view that budget
and debt worries are vastly overblown .... ).
18. See RICHARD ROSE & GUY PETERS, CAN GOVERNMENT Go BANKRUPT? 7-8 (1978).
19. See, e.g., S. REP. No. 104-5, at 3 (1995) (describing America as "functionally insolvent"); America
the Insolvent: Reconsidering a Balanced Budget Amendment, SAN DIEGO UNION-TRIB., June 5, 1996, at
B6 (arguing in favor of balanced budget amendment); Robert J. Caldwell, Tax and Spend Win a Pyrrhic
Victory Over Republicans, SAN DIEGO UNION-TRIB., Mar. 5, 1995, at G1 ("No nation valuing its
solvency ... could afford such a massive accumulation of debt.").
20. See DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY, BUDGET OF THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT, FISCAL
YEAR 1997, ANALYTICAL PERSPECTIVES 18 (1996).
21. A more pertinent inquiry might be whether the nation's external debt exceeds current assets
available to service and redeem that debt. A nation insolvent in this regard faces a real and immediate
threat to its independence. Such an inquiry, however, is not directly relevant to the definition of a balanced
budget target. A significant portion of the United States's external debt is privately issued; the federal
deficit is therefore only one, and probably not the most important, determinant of the amount of that debt.
22. See James J. Angel, Looking Back at Debt Defaults in U.S. History, CHI. TRiB., Feb. 1, 1996, at
21 (observing that last governmental default on principal occurred in 1787, although paperwork problems
and computer failures led to late payments in 1979).
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national governments. Some historians believe that the French23 and
Russian24 revolutions were triggered in part by unsustainable national debt
levels,2 in each case leading to a radical reshaping of Western civilization. The
Weimar Republic in Germany, the collapse of which permitted Adolf Hitler's
rise to power, suffered from the same problem. 6 In the modem world,
national "bankruptcy" of smaller economies commonly leads to a partial loss
of sovereignty when international assistance is conditioned on changes in
domestic policy.2 7 Excessive debt levels cause problems for government,
however, long before collapse or loss of sovereignty. A government so
burdened is less able to address the concerns of its citizens.2' This, in turn,
adversely affects its ability to govern and its perceived legitimacy. A
government struggling under the burden of excessive debt may come to be
viewed as ineffective. 9
It is not clear what level of debt would cause significant problems for the
23. See, e.g.. ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE. THE OLD REGIt- AND TIHE FRLCii RL%,OLLTIOr% 177-79
(Stuart Gilbert trans., 1955) (citing government debt as major cause of French Resolution). EJ
HOBSBAWM, THE AGE OF REVOLLION 1789-1848. at 79-80 (1962) (noting that pre-Re olutionary French
debt service constituted half of national budget).
24. See, e.g., PETER I. LYASHCHENKO. HISTORY OFTIIE NATIONAL ECoOM'tN O1" Rt SSt'I TIlL 1917
REVOLUTION 768-69 (L.M. Herman trans.. 1949) (noting that from 1914 to 1917. Russian expenditures
totalled 47 billion rubles while budget deficit exceeded 46 billion rubles. leading to hypennflation in 1917).
RICHARD PIPES, THE RUSSIAN REVOLLrTION 234-36 (1990) (postulating that w%-ar deficits, financed by paper
money and foreign borrowing, led to hyperinflation).
25. See, e.g., CRANE BRINTON, THE ANATOMY OF REVOLLTION 28-39 (1965) (arguing that
Cromwellian Revolution, American Revolution, French Revolution. and Russian Re% olution cre all caused
in part by financial difficulty of governments).
26. See, e.g., 1994 Senate Judiciary Comm. Hearings. supra note 2. at 32 (statement of Da id M
Stanley, President, National Taxpayers Union) (comparing United States v, sth Gennany in 1920s and %% ith
present-day Argentina and Brazil); HAROLD G. MOULTON & LEO PASVOLSKY. WORLD WAR DEBT
SETTLEMENTS 10-23 (discussing German reparation debt): GusrAv STOLPER. GERIA" EcO',o t'
1870-1940: ISSUES AND TRENDS 137-42 (1940) (describing German reparation payment plan) John
Maynard Keynes believed that the Weimar Republic's debt service obligation %%as three times greater than
its ability to pay. See STOLPER, supra, at 140.
27. See. e.g., Diana E. Moller. Intervention. Coercion. or Justifiable Need' A Legal Anals ts of
Structural Adjustment Lending in Costa Rica, 2 Sw. J.L. & TRADE Am 483. 507 (1995) ("Costa RIca is
an excellent example of the difficulties a debtor nation faces wshen it Ines to maintain its sosereignty and
payments on its debt service simultaneously."); Anthony Galano 111. Comment. Internationul Monetars
Fund Response to the Brazilian Debt Crisis: Whether the Effects of Conditonaltr Hai Undermined
Brazil's National Sovereignty, 6 PACE INT'L L. REV. 323 (1994) (concluding that IMF conditionality did
not violate international law but that dissatisfaction with stnngent conditionality policies may derail future
negotiations). For more general discussions of the role of the World Bank and the International Monetary
Fund in the internal policies of debtor nations, see Jerome Levinson. Multilateral Financing Insittutions
What Form of Accountability?, 8 AM. U. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 47. 69-71 (1992) (asserting that World Bank
and IMF should be made more accountable), and Kim Reisman, Note. The World Bank and the IMF. At
the Forefront of World Transformation, 60 FORDHAM L. REv. S349. S392-94 (1992) (asserting that World
Bank and IMF intervention in domestic policies is necessary).
28. The Senate report noted:
Every day, the Government throws away over S800 million on interest payments, None of this
money goes toward education, health care, or the battle against drugs and cnme. Spending more
and more on interest leaves fewer and fewer resources to spend on the goods and scrs-ices
needed to address other, serious problems facing the Nation.
S. REP. No. 104-5, at 8 (1995).
29. See ROSE & PETERS. supra note IS. at 17-41.
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United States. Some may argue that we have already reached that point." In
any event, one of the principal arguments for balanced budgets is to avoid the
institutional problems created by financial impairmentI Excessive debt
weakens government; to maintain a strong federal government, we must
require balanced federal budgets.32 I will refer to the value implicit in this
argument as "institutional responsibility."
Under an institutional responsibility rationale, however, our target will not
necessarily be a balanced budget. If we believe that the debt is at unhealthy
levels, the rationale implies that we should run surpluses to reduce that debt,
not merely balance the budget. Conversely, if we believe that concerns about
current debt levels are overstated, it implies that we need not require balanced
budgets at all-we should merely monitor the problem. Unfortunately, there
is no consensus as to what constitutes a healthy level of national debt.
2. Intergenerational Equity
A second common argument in favor of balanced budgets is fairness to
future generations. 3 Proponents of this view argue that, "'We should consider
30. See, e.g., 1995 House Hearings, supra note 2, at 237 (statement of the National Association of
Manufacturers) (asserting that federal government already has too much debt); 1995 Joint Hearings, supra
note 2, Part I, at 10 (statement of Rep. Barton) (same); id., Part II, at 76 (statement of Rep. Mack) (same);
1994 Senate Judiciary Comm. Hearings, supra note 2, at 15 (statement of Fred Bergsten, Director, Institute
for International Economics) (same); 1983-84 Senate Hearings, supra note 2, at 295 (statement of David
A. Stockman, Director of the Office of Management and Budget) (same); 1979-80 House Hearings, supra
note 2, at 354 (statement of Rep. Coleman) (same); id. at 426 (statement of Rep. de la Garza) (same); H.R.
REP. No. 104-3, at 4, 26 (same); S. REP. No. 102-103, at 13 (1991) (statement of Sen. Biden) (same); S.
REP. No. 99-163, at 85 (1985) (statement of Sen. Simon) (same); S. REP. No. 98-628, at 3, 8 (1984)
(same). Some argue that the key issue is the size of the current deficit compared to the size of the
economy. See, e.g., Rodino, supra note 6, at 794. By this measure, the United States government is
financially the healthiest in the industrialized world. See, e.g., Jackie Calmes, Budget Deficit Shrinks to
Lowest Level in Two Decades, A Boon for Clinton, WALL ST. J., Oct. 29, 1996, at A2 (noting lowest U.S.
deficit as percentage of GDP in two decades). Others argue that even if the deficit is small, a large annual
interest obligation imposes a deadweight loss on the economy. See OTo ECKSTEIN, PUBLIC FINANCE 93
(3d ed. 1973) (describing restrictive effect of financing deficits).
31. See, e.g., 1995 House Hearings, supra note 2, at 137 (statement of Rep. Archer) (asserting that
amendment is needed to avoid institutional problems); id. at 240-46 (statement of James D. Davidson,
Chairman, National Taxpayers Union) (same); 1995 Joint Hearings, supra note 2, Part I. at 100, 105
(statement of Gov. George Allen) (same); 1994 Senate Judiciary Comm. Hearings, supra note 2, at 18
(statement of Fred Bergsten, Director, Institute for International Economics) (same); id. at 32 (statement
of David M. Stanley, President, National Taxpayers Union) (same); S. REP. No. 104-5, at 3 (same); id. at
70 (statement of Sen. Heflin) (same); S. REP. No. 97-151, at 32-33 (1981) (same).
32. For example, Senator Paul Simon, a leading Democratic advocate of a federal balanced budget
amendment, has argued: "Huge, continual deficits strangle the ability of even a nation as rich as ours to
respond when emergencies arise or when new opportunities or problems emerge, including recession, With
our government deep in debt and continuing to run huge deficits, we remain unable to shoulder new
responsibilities." 141 CONG. REc. S9934 (daily ed. July 13, 1995); see also 1994 Senate Judiciary Comm.
Hearings, supra note 2, at II (statement of former Sen. Tsongas) (asserting that balanced budget is
necessary for strong federal government); id. at 19-20 (statement of Fred Bergsten, Director, Institute for
International Economics) (same); S. REP. No. 104-5, at 3 (same); id. at 70 (statement of Sen. Heflin)
(same); S. REP. No. 99-163, at 85 (1985) (statement of Sen. Simon) (same).
33. This is the principal rationale cited by the 1995 Committee Report. See S. REP. No. 104-5, at 2;
see also 1995 House Hearings, supra note 2, at 215 (statement of Rep. de la Garza) (asserting that balanced
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ourselves unauthorized to saddle posterity with our debts, and morally bound
to pay them ourselves.""' I will refer to the value underlying such arguments
as one of "intergenerational equity."
Debt permits us to shift the costs of current consumption to future
generations, just as savings permit us to forgo current consumption for the
benefit of future generations.35 Many believe that such behaviors have
normative implications.36 We tend to think well of parents who save to
provide for their children. If children were liable for their parents' debts, we
would probably think poorly of parents who unnecessarily consumed more than
they earned, knowing that their children would be saddled with the resulting
obligations. The same normative concerns underlie the intergenerational equity
rationale for balanced national budgets. They suggest that each generation
should pay for what it consumes.
This may not be just a normative principle. It may also be a precondition
for effective democratic decisionmaking. One of the principal functions of
government is to supply what economists sometimes call "public goods,"
goods which society wants but which, because of their nature, markets cannot
budget needed for sake of future generations); 1995 Joint Hearings. supra note 2. Pan I. at 3 (statement
of Sen. Mack) (same); id., at 10 (statement of Sen. Kyl) (same); ad. at 20 (statement of Rep Emg)
(same); id., at 47-48 (statement of Rep. Manzullo) (same): id.. Pan 11. at 67 (statement of Rep Roth)
(same); id., Part 1, at 87 (statement of William A. Niskanen. Chairman. Cato Institute) (same)i. 1994 Senate
Judiciary Comm. Hearings, supra note 2. at 7. 8 (statement of former Sen Tsongas) (same). id at 58
(statement of Sen. Thurmond) (same): id. at 75-76 (statement of Professor Stear E Sterk) (same). id
at 94 (statement of Paul Volcker, former Chairman. Federal Re!ere Board) (samc). 19,53-4 Senate
Hearings, supra note 2. at 96 (statement of Lewis K. Uhler. President. National Tax Limitation Comm I
(same); 197940 House Hearings, supra note 2. at 314. 315 (statement of Rep White) (same), 1 R Rip
No. 104-3, at 4, 5 (1995) ("The major impetus for the ... amendment is the rapidly mounting federal debt
and the impact of climbing interest payments on future generations of Americans. Future generations
that will bear the greatest costs of excessive spending are not formally rcprsmented in the political
process-and ... need special protections."); S. REP. No. 103-163. at 1-2 (1993) (same). S REP No 102-
103, at 16 (1991) (statement of Sen. Thurmond) (same); S. REP. No. 101-391. at 2 (1990) (same). S REP
No. 99-163, at 87 (1985) (statement of Sen. Simon) (same); Biden. supra note 10. at 13A (asseting that
deficits limit future options for our children's generation): De\ine. supra note 17. at I IA (*If %%e don't
act now, our children and grandchildren will face an extremely bleak future."); Dole. supra note 10. at A21
(enacting balanced budget amendment is "'protecting the future for our children and grandchildren"), Stese
Largent, Opinion, Balanced Budget Amendment's Important. TttSA WORLD. Mar. 12. 1995. at 2 (declanng
that it is not "right for the federal government to spend more than they ha'e and pass the cost off to the
next generation"); Safire, supra note 5, at 4 ("[Our children's) tax dollars %%ll be consumed b, paying
interest on the deficits we run today, leaving nothing for their osn good life They %%Ill condemn their
parents' current profligacy as cruelly reckless.").
34. S. REP. No. 104-5, at 2 (quoting Thomas Jefferson).
35. Not all debt is incurred to finance current consumption. As President. Thomas Jefferson. a "idel)
cited advocate of balanced budgets, see Letter from Thomas Jefferson to John \Va)les Eppes (June 24.
1813), reprinted in THOMAS JEFFERSON: WRMNGS 1280. 1280-81 (Viking Press 1984). incurred a debt-like
obligation twice the size of the national budget to finance the purchase of the Louisiana Terrtory from
France. See infra note 87. In modern terms, Jefferson might hase justified this apparent inconsistency by
pointing out that the Territory had an extended useful life and therefore did not. in the main. constitute
current consumption.
36. See supra notes 33-34.
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efficiently supply-national defense, clean air, safe streets, a well-educated
populace, or acceptable patterns of income distribution.37 Voters, through
government, buy public goods and pay for them with taxes. Like all
consumers, when they perceive that they are not getting their money's worth,
they vote to buy less.38 When they perceive that further purchases would be
worth additional taxes, they vote to buy more.
Both the availability of debt to finance current consumption and the need
to service debt incurred to finance past consumption may distort this dynamic.
An electorate allowed to borrow to consume public goods may consume more
than it would be willing to pay for.39 Conversely, when a government's
budget includes large amounts of debt service for past consumption, voters
may perceive that they are getting less than they are paying for. They may
react by voting to buy less than they would be willing to buy in a public
market not distorted by such constraints. Economists disagree about the extent
to which a democracy is capable of choosing optimal levels for the purchase
of public goods.40 In any case, debt and debt service may distort democratic
decisionmaking.
Normative and perhaps efficiency concerns support the principle that each
generation be asked to pay currently for its consumption of public goods. As
will be discussed below, this principle leads to a target definition different in
many regards from that used in the 1995-96 Senate Draft. In particular, it
requires that we take spending into account as the purchased items are
consumed, not when payment is made. This precludes the use of pure cash
flow accounting; it requires instead some form of accrual accounting.
37. See ECKSTEIN, supra note 30, at 8-10 (describing collective [public] goods and noting divergence
between private and social costs or benefits); RICHARD A. MUSGRAVE, THE THEORY OF PUBLIC FINANCE:
A STUDY IN PUBLIC ECONOMY 43-44 (1959) (defining public goods); Peter 0. Steiner, Public Expenditure
Budgeting, in THE ECONOMICS OF PUBLIC FINANCE 241 (Alan S. Blinder et al. eds., 1974) (same).
38. In general, of course, U.S. voters express their preferences by voting for representatives. In recent
years, however, the major parties have come to represent different views on public goods, with Democrats
stereotypically supporting more expenditures on such goods and Republicans stereotypically supporting less,
except on national defense. Voters thus are able to express their views on the purchase of public goods in
congressional and presidential elections.
39. An individual debtor is forced to weigh current consumption against his or her own future
consumption. If the debtor's personal discount rate exceeds the cost of money, he or she will borrow, Such
borrowing is economically efficient. The same is not true of electoral decisions to borrow, since the
electorate that votes to borrow is not necessarily the same electorate that has to repay the debt. An electoral
decision to borrow is therefore a decision, in part, to shift costs to someone else. This suggests that
electoral decisions will not necessarily aggregate correctly the electorate's individual discount rates. Indeed,
an electorate may behave like an individual who does not care about the future. An excellent introduction
to the problem of intergenerational discounting appears in Daniel A. Farber & Paul A. Hemmersbaugh, The
Shadow of the Future: Discount Rates, Later Generations, and the Environment, 46 VAND. L. REV. 267
(1993).
40. See, e.g., WILLIAM R. KEECH, ECONOMIC POLITICS: THE COSTS OF DEMOCRACY (1995) (analyzing
impact of democratic institutions on economic performance); JOSEPH E. STIGLITZ, ECONOMICS OF TIlE




Finally, proponents of balanced budgets argue that government borrowing
reduces the national savings rate and crowds private borrowers out of the credit
markets. 4' This has the effect of raising interest rates faced by private
borrowers, which reduces private investment and lowers the rate of growth of
the economy. As a result, everyone is poorer in the long run. If the Federal
Reserve System attempts to keep interest rates down, the argument continues,
the stimulative effects of deficit spending will trigger inflation. In short,
government deficits are bad for the economy.4 2 I will refer to the value
underlying such arguments as "economic prudence."
Again, this value has important implications for target definition. First, it
implies that some government borrowing-which is to say, deficit
spending-is good. If government proposes to purchase public goods with a
higher projected rate of return than competing potential private investments,
borrowing to fund such government spending should be encouraged. Any other
result would be economically suboptimal. This conclusion, however, can be
accommodated in a formulaic balanced budget test only through accrual
accounting rules; the cash method will not suffice. Second, borrowing by any
government-created entity, not merely the United States itself, may crowd out
private investment. This supports a broad definition of entities to which the
amendment should apply. Third, if we care about economic prudence, our
target definition should accommodate issues of fiscal policy. That is, our target
should be defined in terms of or through processes that take economic
conditions into account. Fourth, because economics is an evolving and
specialized science, the rationale strongly suggests that any balanced budget
amendment should permit evolution of the target definition to incorporate new
learning and permit the correction of errors. It also suggests that the process
of target definition should be entrusted to a body competent to deal with
technical economic issues.
41. See, e.g., S. REP. No. 104-5, at 7 (1995) ("By consuming such an overwhelming part of the capital
in the economy, the Government 'crowds out' private sector investment. Thus. shen go% einercnt spending
rises unchecked by fiscal responsibility, it chokes off the pnmary engines of economic grosth and nsks
our long-term security."); WILLIAM A. Cox ET AL., A BALANCED BUDGET COxSTrnrmo,,AL AMENDMNT
ECONOMIC ISSUES 1-2 (Congressional Research Serv.. Dec. 1994) (distributed to Congres as part of Info
Pack 463B in preparation for consideration of proposals for balanced budget amendment by 104th
Congress) (noting that deficits reduce investment and productivity); see also HENNING ET AL. supra note
11, at 525-27 (describing effects of availability of credit): McCracken. supra note 17. at 6 (describing
decline in capital formation, leading to decline in productivity growth)
42. See S. REP. No. 104-5, at 6 (stating that "perisient deficits threaten the Nation's long-term
prosperity").
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4. Reconciling Competing Values
The foregoing values have different implications for defining the budgetary
target. To protect all of these values, a balanced budget amendment must
create a mechanism through which these sometimes inconsistent implications
can be reconciled. In general, to protect intergenerational equity, budgetary
balance should be measured by reference to consumption, not cash flows. To
reflect economic prudence, budgetary balance should be required, in effect,
each business cycle, not each fiscal year, and the microeconomic effects of the
test structure should be considered.43 Finally, to further institutional
responsibility, the target should be a surplus, not merely a balanced budget,
whenever it is determined that existing debt levels are unhealthy.
An amendment that fails to make one or more of these adjustments to its
budgetary target definition will fail to protect the values discussed above. The
optimal reconciliation of these sometimes inconsistent values, however, is
likely to vary from time to time. In a depression or period of high inflation,
issues of economic prudence will likely predominate. In periods of economic
health, surpluses may be warranted to reduce overall debt levels. From time
to time, although accrual accounting generally may be required to protect
intergenerational equity, economic prudence or institutional responsibility may
require explicit consideration of cash flows. Who should make this
reconciliation? Congress? The President? The Supreme Court? Some other
body.4" For the moment, it is sufficient to note an inevitable and profound
tension: No static target definition can protect all of the values a balanced
budget amendment is supposed to protect, but dynamic target definition is
impossible to incorporate in any simple numerical test.
B. Why a Constitutional Amendment?
One might hope that a review of the principal arguments in favor of a
constitutional, rather than a legislative, approach would provide similar insight
into the kind of enforcement mechanisms a balanced budget amendment should
contain. Unfortunately, the resulting insight is modest at best. This may be
because the theoretical explanations for legislative failure are newer and less
fully elaborated than the arguments in favor of budgetary balance discussed in
the preceding Section.
43. There are many possible ways to accommodate business cycle concerns. One would be to impose
multiyear limits; another would be to authorize an independent expert body to set annual or more frequent
budgetary targets, taking into account the state of the economy. Such a body also could take the
microeconomic effects of test structure into account. See generally infra Section lII.A (analyzing who
should evaluate targets).
44. For a consideration of these procedural issues, see infra Part Ill.
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Proponents appear united in their belief that the legislative solution does
not work.45 Indeed, twelve years after enactment of the Gramm-Rudman-
Hollings Act-which required a balanced budget by 1991 -the federal budget
is still in deficit.46 But even if we agree that legislation cannot solve the
problem, we still are left with the question: Why? If we cannot identify the
causes of legislative failure, our efforts to draft an amendment to prevent it
may be less than fully successful.
Underlying patterns of congressional behavior are difficult to explain. For
almost 200 years, the federal budget was generally in surplus except during
periods of war, most notably the Civil War and the World Wars. 7 It was not
until the middle of the Vietnam conflict that annual deficits in excess of one
percent of gross domestic product (GDP) became the rule rather than the
exception. 8 The deficit mushroomed to 3.5% of GDP in fiscal year 1975,
declined to 2.7% of GDP in 1981, but increased again after the 1981 tax cuts,
reaching 6.3% of GDP in 1983.49 It has declined in each of the last four
years, and now stands at 1.4% of GDP, the lowest level since 1974."0 Any
fully persuasive theory must explain at least the broad outlines of this
history-what procedural or other failures led to apparent changes in behavior
in 1967, 1975, and 1981, and why the government seems to have recently
recovered its financial bearings.
Public choice theory,5' which treats legislation as a commodity and the
45. See sources cited supra note 33; see also SATURNO. supra note 2. at 7 ("i\thout [the] discipline
[of a constitutional amendment, proponents] believe the goal of a balanced budget would not be attaincd
because of the conflicting pressure to spend."); S. REP. No. 104-5. at 7 (stating that because legislation has
not worked, "[we need a constitutional requirement to balance our budget").
46. See CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET OFFICE, THE ECONOMIC AND BUDGET OUTLOOK FISCAL YEARS
1997-2006, at 69-95 (1996) (listing projections through 2050 and concluding that economy %% ill not be able
to support debt level); OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT. HISTORICAL TABLES: BUDGET OF THE UNIrED STATES
GOVERNMENT 15 (1996).
47. See DEPARTMENT OF COMmERCE, HISTORICAL STATISTICS OF THE UNITED STATES. COLONIAL
TIMES TO 1970, PART 2, at 1104 (1989); OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, supra note 46. at 15
48. See OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT,. supra note 46. at 2 1.
49. See id.
50. See Calmes, supra note 30, at A2.
51. See, e.g., 1995 House Hearings, supra note 2, at 26. 33 (statement of Rep. Schaefer) (stating that
amendment is needed to protect future generations); id. at 88 (statement of \Villiam P Barr. former
Attorney General) (same); 1994 Senate Judiciary Comm. Hearings. supra note 2. at 75. 76 (statement of
Professor Stewart E. Sterk) (same); 1984 Joint Hearing. supra note 2. at 16. 18 (statement of Manuel
Johnson, Assistant Secretary for Economic Policy) (stating that amendment is needed to protect diffuse
taxpayer interests); id. at 57, 63 (statement of David L. Keating. Executive Vice President. National
Taxpayers Union) (same); 1983-84 Senate Hearings, supra note 2. at 211. 219 (Appendix. Paper Prepared
for Taxpayers' Foundation) (same); id. at 295, 300 (statement of David A. Stockman. Director of the Office
of Management and Budget) (same); 1979--80 House Hearings. supra note 2. at 64. 66 (statement of James
Dale Davidson, Chairman, National Taxpayers Union) (same); id. at 122. 123 (statement of Milton
Friedman, Senior Research Fellow. Hoover Institution) (same); id. at 473. 475 (statement of Altce RivIn.
Director, Congressional Budget Office) (same); S. REP. No. 97-151. at 4-5 (1981) ("cThe 'concentrated
benefit-dispersed cost' phenomenon] describes the fact that the benefits of any given spending program
normally are concentrated within a relatively small class of beneficiaries, while the costs of such a program
are dispersed throughout a relatively large class of persons, i.e., the taxpayers."); Bos en. supra note 6. at
570 (suggesting that deficits might be caused by rent-seeking behavior by legislatures). Charles L. Schultze.
The Balanced Budget Amendment: Needed? Effective? Efficient 7. 48 NAT'L TAX J. 317. 318 (1995) ("'he
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legislative process as a market, offers what is perhaps the most academically
fashionable explanation of why current processes do not produce balanced
budgets.5 2 Legislators are assumed to be motivated by self-interest, not public
interest. In the political market, legislation with a broad but diffuse benefit is
subject to the classic "free rider" problem of public goods: If a benefit can be
enjoyed even by those who do not contribute towards its purchase, less of that
good will be purchased than is optimal. This, in turn, leads to more special-
interest legislation and less legislation with a broad but diffuse benefit than
would otherwise be the case. For this reason, tax cuts and spending programs
are established and protected, but the diffuse interest in a balanced budget
loses out. To correct this market failure, the theory concludes, we should place
a constitutional thumb on the legislative scale53 or, perhaps, address more
directly the problem of legislative incentives. 4
The problem with this theory, at least at its current stage of development,
is its inability to explain much of this country's relevant financial history. If
the public choice explanation is correct, our government should have run
peacetime deficits throughout the nineteenth century and the first half of the
twentieth-which it did not-and should not now be moving towards
theoretical rationale for a balanced budget amendment stems from the proposition that majoritarian
decision-making rules ... impart a systematic bias towards excessive federal spending and/or deficit
financing.").
52. For an introduction to the current public choice debate, see, e.g., DANIEL A. FARBER & PHILIP P.
FRICKEY, LAW AND PUBLIC CHOICE (1991) (professing skepticism of public choice as grand theory, but
viewing it as incrementally useful); Daniel A. Farber & Philip P. Frickey, The Jurisprudence of Public
Choice, 65 TEX. L. REv. 873 (1987) (providing critical overview of public choice literature and its
implications for public law and noting strong empirical evidence that legislators do care about public
interest and act accordingly); Michael E. DeBow & Dwight R. Lee, Understanding (and Misunderstanding)
Public Choice: A Response to Farber and Frickey, 66 TEX. L. REV. 993 (1988) (defending public choice
against criticisms of Farber & Frickey); Daniel A. Farber & Philip P. Frickey, Integrating Public Choice
and Public Law: A Reply to DeBow and Lee, 66 TEX. L. REV. 1013 (1988) (responding to DeBow & Lee
criticisms); see also Dorothy A. Brown, The Invisibility Factor: The Limits of Public Choice Theory and
Public Institutions, 74 WASH. U. L.Q. 179 (1996) (asserting that public choice underestimates ability of
majority to influence political process and is therefore of limited use as predictive tool); Bernard Grofman,
Public Choice, Civil Republicanism, and American Politics: Perspectives of a "Reasonable Choice"
Modeler, 71 TEX. L. REV. 1541, 1544 (1993) (attempting "to debunk certain widely held beliefs about what
Public Choice theory tells us about the practice of democratic politics"); Herbert Hovenkamp, Legislation,
Well-Being, and Public Choice, 57 U. CHI. L. REv. 63, 88 (1990) (concluding that public choice theory
is attractive but unsupported by empirical evidence); Mark Kelman, On Democracy-Bashing: A Skeptical
Look at the Theoretical and "Empirical" Practice of the Public Choice Movement, 74 VA. L. REV. 199
(1988) (providing critical legal studies critique of public choice); Dwight R. Lee, Politics, Ideology, and
the Power of Public Choice, 74 VA. L. REV. 191 (1988) (noting that public choice suggests that ideology
will be more important than economic interest in providing general direction to legislation, but less
important in determining details); Abner J. Mikva, Foreword, 74 VA. L. REV. 167 (1988) (asserting in
foreword to Symposium on Theory of Public Choice that public choice model inadequately explains how
government works).
53. See James M. Buchanan, Clarifying Confusion About the Balanced Budget Amendment, 48 NAT'L
TAX J. 347, 351 (1995) (asserting that only procedural corrections are appropriate).
54. See, e.g., James Dale Davidson, The Balanced Budget Amendment: A Truly Marginal Reform, in
BEYOND THE STATUS QUO: POLICY PROPOSALS FOR AMERICA 13, 27 (David Boaz & Edward H. Crane
eds., 1985) ("The only way fiscal order can be restored is by constitutional reform that changes incentives
at the margin, raising the costs to congressmen of spending and borrowing money.").
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budgetary balance.55 Similarly, the theory does not account very well for
specific legislative outcomes, such as the Tax Reform Act of 1986,5 in which
numerous special-interest tax benefits were eliminated to fund a broad but
diffuse rate CUt.57 Nor does it explain why a majority of the members of
Congress seem persistently interested in a balanced budget amendment.5"
Unless and until the theory is empirically validated, its utility in shaping the
structure of balanced budget enforcement mechanisms is likely to be limited.
A second possible explanation is that governments now run deficits in part
because of changing economic theories about debt and deficits. Until the Great
Depression, the conventional view was that debt and deficits were bad per
se.59 Keynesianism and the postwar development of a debt-financed consumer
economy challenged that view.60 Although Keynesianism has itself recently
fallen into some disfavor,61 this history of changing attitudes may
nevertheless explain, at least in part, why chronic deficits are a uniquely
55. James Buchanan, one of the leading exponents of this explanation, argues that the reason
politicians exhibited fiscal responsibility until recently was that "[p]oliticians prior to World War 11 would
have considered it to be immoral (to be a sin) to spend more than they were %%illing to generate in tax
revenues." Buchanan, supra note 53, at 347. Keynesianism then eroded this moral constraint As a result.
"[t]he natural proclivities of democratically elected and constituency respondent politicians to spend and
not to tax were allowed free play." Id. at 348. While facially plausible. this argument begs the fundamental
question: If supermajorities are now persuaded again that deficits are immoral. shy do %%c need a
constitutional amendment? Should we not expect political behavior to return to pre-Kc nesian patterns on
its own?
56. Pub. L. No. 99-514. 100 Stat. 2085 (1986).
57. See, e.g., Sheldon D. Pollack, A New Dynaincs of Tar Pohcy. 12 Ast. J. TAX POL'Y 61.68 (1995)
(noting that "the crude interest group model, so popular among both law school facult) members and
journalists, fails to account for the kind of decisionmaking that charactenzed tax policymaking in the
1980s"); Daniel Shaviro, Beyond Public Choice and Public Interest: A Stud) of the Legislav ie Process as
Ilhstrated by Tax Legislation in the 1980s. 139 U. PA. L. REV I. 6-7 (1990) (assering that public choice
does not explain 1986 Tax Act).
58. Public choice theory suggests that any congressionally drafted and approscd constitutional
amendment to balance the budget would be drafted so as to be ineffective Drs Thaler and Shefnn offer
a more benign explanation for Congress's seemingly inconsistent behavior. Their "economic theory of self-
control" asserts that individuals have two separate economic decisionmaking personas. One is a myopic
consumer, the other is a long-term planner. The individual concludes, if the costs of monitorng and
persuasion are high, that the only way to constrain the consumer is for the planner to adopt rules that the
consumer cannot easily circumvent. See Richard H. Thaler & H.M. Shefnn. An Economic Theorv of Self.
Control, 89 J. POL. ECON. 392 (1981). This may describe why Congress might simultaneously engage in
deficit spending and seek adoption of a balanced budget constitutional amendment to prohibit its own
behavior. See CoX E" AL, supra note 41, at 6-7 (using theory of self-control to suggest why Congress
might voluntarily impose limitations on its own decisionmaking power). The same rationale might apply
to voters as well.
59. See, e.g., S. REP. No. 99-163, at 21-24 (1985) (describing history of U.S. attitudes towards public
debt through 1900s).
60. See, e.g., id. at 24-27 (describing history of deficits as instrument of fiscal policy) See generally
KEYNES AND ECONOMIC POLICY: THE RELEVANCE OF THE GENERAL TiEORY AFrER FTy YEARS (Walter
Eltis & Peter Sinclair eds., 1988) (providing history and current views of Keynes's theones)
61. See, e.g., Walter Eltis, The Continuing Relevance of Keynes to Economic Polici. in KEYNES AND
ECONOMIC POLICY, supra note 60, at 451, 462 ("The scope for Keynesian fiscal reflation may therefore
be limited to taking advantage of a small stable cyclically corrected deficit as an element in policies to
reduce unemployment in periods of recession ... : a tolerance of such deficits was really all that Keynes
himself actually recommended .... "); Bennett T. McCallum. The Role of Demand Management in the
Maintenance of Full Employment, in KEYNES AND ECONOMIC POLICY. supra note 60, at 25 (r'iewmg
continued viability of Keynesian activism).
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modern phenomenon and, indeed, why the pendulum may currently be
swinging back in favor of balanced budgets. But if economic theory sanctioned
modern deficits and a further change in theory now causes Congress to seek
to alter its course, the political process is not broken at all; Congress is merely
applying prevailing theories of political economy to public policy, as it should.
Some amount of political turmoil may be expected in the transition, but if this
explanation is correct, there is no need for a constitutional amendment.
A final possible explanation has its origins in the mundane traditions of
descriptive political science. Until the Great Depression, the role of the federal
government was relatively limited.62 Meanwhile, the government derived a
substantial portion of federal revenue from import tariffs, which were designed
to protect domestic industry.63 As a result, public sentiment often favored
higher federal taxes, sometimes much higher than were necessary to fund the
government's activities.64 Deficits were generally not the problem; surpluses
sometimes were.65 Beginning in the 1930s, changes in both spending and
revenue altered this dynamic. The emergence of the United States as a world
power required maintenance of higher levels of military spending. 66 A
confluence of factors-probably including the horror of the Great Depression,
a perceived need to compete against communism, and the emergence of an
electorate with a stronger national identity-created political demand for
expanded social spending at the federal level.67 Meanwhile, protectionism fell
into disfavor and the government began to rely primarily on the income tax,
which did not have a built-in constituency for higher rates. 68 As the electorate
demanded more spending and lower taxes, the explanation concludes, a
powerful political base was created for deficit spending.
62. See, e.g., DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE, supra note 47, at 1123-24 (listing federal government
expenditures, by function, from 1902 to 1970). Until the 1930s, it appears that the bulk of the federal
budget was dedicated to defense and veterans' services, the postal service, general administration, interest
on the national debt, and ports. See id.
63. See id. at 1106-07 (listing federal government receipts from 1789 to 1939 and internal revenue
collections from 1863 to 1970).
64. See DAVIS RICH DEWEY, FINANCIAL HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES 172-96 (12th ed. 1936)
(describing political struggles regarding import tariffs).
65. During the 1830s, for example, high tariffs generated more than enough revenue to fund existing
federal expenditures and significant opposition existed to expanded federal spending. The resulting surplus
became a political problem, which Congress solved through distributions to the states. Although technically
loans, the states treated these distributions as gifts and apparently made no effort to repay them. See
MARGARET G. MYERS, A FINANCIAL HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES 94-96 (1970) (describing
distribution of surpluses).
66. See DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE, supra note 47, at 1123-24 (noting federal government
expenditures, by function, from 1902 to 1970 and documenting major increase in military spending during
World War II that persisted into 1950s and 1960s).
67. See, e.g., Rodino, supra note 6, at 794. The expansion and recent contraction of the federal role
is explored in THE RISE AND FALL OF THE NEW DEAL ORDER, 1930-1980 (Steve Fraser & Gary Gerstle
eds., 1989).
68. See DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE, supra note 47, at 1105-06 (listing federal government receipts
by source 1940 to 1970 and federal government receipts in administrative budget 1789 to 1939).
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Unlike public choice theory, this more traditional explanation does not
postulate any market failure. Congress is simply giving the electorate what it
wants; the problem is inherent in democracy; democracy is not always
institutionally responsible; it is not always fair to future generations; it is not
always economically prudent. We need a balanced budget amendment, this
explanation suggests, to protect the sovereign People from themselves. If we
accept this explanation, it follows that enforcement of a balanced budget
amendment cannot be entrusted to Congress or the President, who are, after all,
expected to reflect the popular will.
In sum, arguments in favor of a balanced budget amendment to the U.S.
Constitution provide only modest and conflicting guidance as to what such an
amendment should look like, suggesting alternatively that enforcement
mechanisms not under congressional or presidential control may be necessary,
that procedural corrections may be warranted, that it may be useful to address
legislative incentives directly, or perhaps even that no amendment is necessary
at all. In the absence of clearer guidance, we are left with the task of balancing
our desire for credible and effective enforcement against our desire not to
disrupt an otherwise successful constitutional system.
C. Other Normative Issues
In drafting a balanced budget amendment, at least four other issues must
be resolved: the extent to which it should be enforceable if the political
branches fail to comply voluntarily; how flexible it should be in its application;
whether it should seek to accomplish goals other than balancing the budget;
and the extent to which disruption of existing constitutional structures, rules,
and doctrines is acceptable. Each of these issues has significant implications
for technical structure. My technical analysis will reflect my own views on
these questions. Specifically, I posit that a well-drafted amendment should
meet at least four criteria: (1) it should be enforceable, in spirit as well as in
letter; (2) it should permit flexibility in at least three regards-to allow
improvements to the budget process itself, to accommodate fiscal policy
concerns, and to permit the United States to meet extraordinary challenges and
opportunities; (3) it should be politically neutral-that is, it should not change
or distort political decisionmaking, intentionally or inadvertently, except to
require a balanced budget; and (4) it should not disrupt the balance of powers
among the several branches or otherwise disrupt our existing constitutional
system more than absolutely necessary.
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1. Enforceability
Some have argued that a balanced budget amendment need not be
enforceable, that a statement of principles will suffice.69 The committee report
accompanying the 1995-96 Senate Draft, for example, argues that the "ultimate
enforcement mechanism" will be the political process.70 By raising the
visibility of the issue, the amendment is apparently expected to cause Congress
to comply voluntarily or to cause voters to unseat politicians who cut taxes or
raise spending and thereby increase the deficit.
Such arguments are unpersuasive. The Gramm-Rudman-Hollings Act
7'
was highly visible. It is still the law, in theory, although it is now viewed by
many as a dead letter.72 State legislatures have similarly ignored or attempted
to circumvent state balanced budget constitutional provisions.73 In the long
run, there is no reason to believe that an unenforceable federal balanced budget
amendment would fare any better. Acceding to arguments that a balanced
budget amendment need not be enforceable would undermine both that
amendment and the Constitution as a whole. 74 By this, I do not mean that
courts, the traditional guarantors of constitutional order, should necessarily play
any significant role in enforcement. I mean, rather, that the institutional
dynamics contemplated by the amendment reasonably should be expected to
lead to routine compliance with defined budgetary targets notwithstanding
political pressures to the contrary. A mere statement of principles will not
suffice.
At least as important, but far less widely discussed, is the premise that the
amendment's enforcement mechanisms should protect its spirit, not merely its
letter. Almost any numerical test can be circumvented in spirit, even if subject
to strict literal enforcement. Here, the state experience is instructive.
75
69. See, e.g., 128 CONG. REc. 15,810-12 (1982) (statement of Sen. Thurmond) (asserting that purpose
is to establish balanced federal budget as "norm"); Buchanan, supra note 53, at 354 ("The very fact that
such a rule would be constitutional, and understood as such, would seem to be sufficient to guarantee
adherence."). But see 1995 House Hearings, supra note 2, at 14, 17 (statement of Charles L. Schultz,
Senior Fellow, Brookings Institution) (asserting that balanced budget amendment should be enforceable);
id. at 26, 39 (statement of Rep. Schaefer) (same); id. at 67 (statement of William P. Barr, Former Attorney
General, Department of Justice) (same); S. REP. NO. 104-5, at 9-11 (1995) (same); H.R. REP. No. 104-3,
at 4, 6-8 (1995) (same); S. REP. No. 97-151, at 62-66 (1981) (same).
70. S. REP. No. 104-5, at 9.
71. Balanced Budget and Emergency Deficit Control Act of 1985, Pub. L. No. 99-177, 99 Stat. 1038,
as amended by Balanced Budget and Emergency Deficit Reduction Reaffirmation Act of 1987, Pub. L. No.
100-119, 101 Stat. 754.
72. See supra note 10.
73. See supra note II.
74. See THE FEDERALIST No. 80, at 516 (Alexander Hamilton) (Edward Mead Earle ed., 1937)
("inhere ought always to be a constitutional method of giving efficacy to constitutional provisions.").
75. See, e.g., Kenneth J. Kirkland, "Creative Accounting" and Short-Term Debt: State Responses to
the Deficit Threat, 36 NAT'L TAX J. 395 (1983) (outlining some techniques used to circumvent state
balanced budget and debt limitation provisions); Daniel B. Suits & Ronald C. Fisher, A Balanced Budget
Constitutional Amendment: Economic Complexities and Uncertainties, 38 NAT'L TAX J. 467 (1985)
(reviewing Michigan's circumvention experience).
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Summarizing a history of state legislative circumvention of debt limitation
provisions, one prominent commentator concluded: "Since 1900 ... states
have developed means of borrowing for public improvements that escape
constitutional bans .... This development has been so complete that most
states are now able to borrow funds in any amount for nearly any purpose. 76
In 1982, a Congressional Budget Office study concluded that during the
preceding twenty years, state debt had risen at a higher rate than federal debt,
even though most states were subject to constitutional limitations then being
considered at the federal level."
In the face of this experience, amendment proponents can nevertheless
assert that states, by and large, balance their budgets. Such assertions are
literally true. All that this means, however, is that states nominally comply
with whatever numerical tests their constitutions impose. Even if a legislature
routinely takes advantage of holes in those tests, running up large debts and
spending more than the state takes in, its members can truthfully declare: "We
have balanced the budget."
Mere nominal compliance, I suggest, is not an adequate goal. Indeed,
nominal compliance with an inadequately specified target might be as
damaging in the long run as overt noncompliance. It would provide political
cover for financial irresponsibility and might thereby reduce the pressure for
real solutions. Before a balanced budget amendment is proposed or ratified,
therefore, we should be confident that it will actually do what its supporters
in Congress, in the state legislatures, and within the American electorate
expect.
2. Flexibility
While the values underlying balanced budgets may be important, they are
not the only values that we, as a nation, share. From time to time, we may
agree that some other goal or value is either more important than or not
inconsistent with the amendment's values. A good balanced budget amendment
should therefore permit flexibility in the application of numerical tests in at
least three regards.
First, it should be drafted in language independent of a particular budget
process. This is necessary to give Congress flexibility to change and improve
its budgetary procedures over time. Unless we believe that the current process
cannot be improved, an amendment that constitutionalizes that process and
freezes it forever in its current form would be unnecessarily rigid and, in the
end, self-defeating. Further, an amendment that invokes existing budgetary
concepts brings with it unnecessary interpretive baggage. For example, future
76. HEINS, supra note II, at v.
77. See CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET OFFICE. supra note 2. at I 17.
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interpreters of a constitutional test defined by reference to "outlays" and
"receipts" '78 or "debt of the United States"79 might be tempted to turn to the
meanings given those terms at the time the amendment was proposed and
ratified. Unwarranted fidelity to static definitions would radically limit
responses to innovative circumvention techniques.
Second, it should be consistent with sound fiscal policy, what economists
sometimes refer to as the stabilization aspect of government taxation and
expenditure.80 Macroeconomic issues arise in several contexts. Perhaps most
obvious is the problem of transitions. The economic price of achieving balance
in a single year can be prohibitive; sound fiscal policy may require a less
abrupt transition to budgetary balance."' This problem may arise when the
amendment is first ratified. It will also arise whenever the budget goes out of
balance thereafter. For example, if the United States goes to war and runs one
or more permitted deficits, an amendment that does not take into account the
problem of transitions-the 1995-96 Senate Draft, for example-may require
an abrupt and disruptive return to balanced budgets immediately upon the
conclusion of that war.
Another macroeconomic concern is the problem of economic downturns.
An economic recession or depression may throw the budget out of balance
without any fault on Congress's part.82 To require an immediate return to
budgetary balance could aggravate such a downturn. Some economists believe,
for example, that a policy of attempted balanced budgets in the face of a
declining economy helped cause the Great Depression. 3 A balanced budget
78. See infra Section II.A.
79. See infra Section iI.B.
80. See, e.g., MUSGRAVE, supra note 37, at 22-27; Alan S. Blinder & Robert M. Solow, Analytical
Foundations of Fiscal Policy, in THE ECONOMICS OF PUBLIC FINANCE 3, 4 (1974).
81. See, e.g., S. REP. No. 104-5, at 29 (1995) (statement of Sen. Biden) (suggesting that glide path
is necessary). A proposal to structure a formulary "glide path" to budgetary balance was defeated in the
Senate Judiciary Committee and was therefore not included in the 1995-96 Senate Draft. See id. at 12
(noting defeat of glide path amendment).
82. See 1995 House Hearings, supra note 2, at 14 (statement of Charles L. Schultz, Senior Fellow,
Brookings Institution) (asserting that recession or depression may throw budget out of balance); id. at 115
(statement of Alice M. Rivlin, Director, Office of Management and Budget) (same); id. at 168 (statement
of Rep. Gephardt) (same); 1995 Joint Hearings, supra note 2, Part I, at 26, 85 (statement of William A.
Niskanen, Chairman, Cato Institute) (same); 1979-80 House Hearings, supra note 2, at 148 (statement of
Milton Friedman, Senior Research Fellow, Hoover Institution) (same); Buchanan, supra note 53, at 352-53.
83. See, e.g., JOHN A. GARRATY, THE GREAT DEPRESSION 15-19, 47 (1986). There is no consensus
as to the causes of the Great Depression. Some have attributed it to mismanagement of the money supply,
see, e.g., MILTON FRIEDMAN, A MONETARY HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES: 1867-1960, at 407-19
(1963), some to the Smoot-Hawley tariff, see, e.g., JUDE WANNISKI, THE WAY THE WORLD WORKS 136
(1983), and some to the lack of an international lender of last resort, see, e.g., CHARLES KINDLEBEROER,
THE WORLD IN DEPRESSION 289-90 (rev. ed. enlarged 1986). Proponents of a balanced budget amendment
have sometimes taken sides in this debate. In S. REP. No. 99-163, at 21 (1985), for example, the Senate
Judiciary Committee asserted: "While there are many economic explanations for the Great Depression, it
is extremely difficult to understand the argument of a small minority of individuals that the commitment
of the Hoover Administration to a balanced budget was in any way responsible." Such arguments miss the
point. The problem is that economics is still an evolving science. The possibility of a second Great
Depression, this time in a world with nuclear weapons, is simply unacceptable. Accommodating this
concern, moreover, does not require rejection of a balanced budget amendment per se; it merely requires
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amendment that triggers similar future depressions would not be viewed as a
success.
A third and related problem arises because the federal budget is believed
to have a countercyclical effect.8 In a strong economy, the budget tends to
produce a surplus, or at least a reduced deficit, which has a moderating effect
on the economy. By contrast, in a weak economy, budget deficits are
exacerbated because taxable activity declines and spending increases on items
such as unemployment compensation. This, in turn, may have an ameliorative
effect on recessions. s5 The result is to moderate both economic extremes. A
policy of balanced budgets defined without regard to economic conditions
would exaggerate both extremes-making expansions stronger and harder to
control, and recessions or depressions more serious. Such a policy would not
be economically prudent.
Finally, a good balanced budget amendment should permit the use of debt
to meet extraordinary national challenges and opportunities, even as it prohibits
the use of debt to finance routine operations. Most of this country's wars have
been debt-financed.16 The Louisiana Purchase required the federal government
to incur a debt-like obligation almost twice the size of its annual budget. 7
that we design the amendment with sufficient flexibility to permit intelligent rtspons es to the problem
84. See Cox ET AL., supra note 41. at 15-17.
85. See, e.g., 1995 Joint Hearings, supra note 2. Part 1. at 106 (statement of Lairence Chimerine,
Managing Director and Chief Economist. Economic Strategy Institute) (asserting that budget delicits can
ameliorate recessions); 1995 House Hearings. supra note 2. at 111-12 (statement of Alice M Ri'.lin.
Director, Office of Management and Budget) (same); id. at 198. 200 (statement of Robert Eisner. Professor
of Economics, Northwestern University) (same); id. at 234 (statement of Charles J Whalen. Resident
Scholar, Jerome Levy Economics Institute) (same); 1979-80 House Hearings. supra note 2. at 29 (statement
of Professor Paul A. Samuelson) (same); id. at 101. 103 (statement of Charles L. Schultze. Chairman.
Council of Economic Advisers) (same); id. app. at 161, 187 (Gerard Brannon. Allen R Ferguson. A Report
on the Economic Issues Raised by Proposed Constitutional Amendments to Require a Balanced Budget)
(same); id. at 473-74 (statement of Dr. Alice Rivlin. Director Congressional Budget Office) (same).
ECKSTEIN, supra note 30, at 100-09 (same); HENNING Er AL.. supra note II. at 509-11 (same) PAL.L A
SAMUELSON, ECONOMICS 353-57 (12th ed. 1985) (same); see also id. at S2465 (daily ed Feb 10. 1995)
(statement of Sen. Sarbanes, citing Dr. Laura D'Andrea Tyson. It's a Recipe for Economic Chaos. WASH
POST, Feb. 7, 1995, at A19); id. at 52205-06 (daily ed. Feb. 6. 1995) (statement of Sen Boxer, citing
letters of Dr. James Tobin, Dr. Robert M. Solow, Dr. Lawrence R. Klein. and statement signed by "oser
200 economists and political scientists") (same): id. at S2119-22 (dal) ed Feb 3. 1995) (statements of
Henry J. Aaron, Dr. Paul A. Samuelson & Dr. Robert M. Solo%%; Dr Jeff Faux. and Dr Layrence
Chimerine, inserted at request of Sen. Moynihan) (same).
86. See DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE, supra note 47. at 1104-05 (charting administratie budget of
federal government from 1789 to 1939 and federal government finances from 1929 to 1970). BRAY
HAMMOND, SOVEREIGNTY AND AN EMPTY PURSE: BANKS AND POLITICIANS I.% T4: CI% IL WAR paisum
(1970) (discussing financing of Civil War); JOHN WATTS KEARNY. SKEIcil OF AIERIcA%, Fi%',,CL.
1789-1835, at 76-110 (New York, G.P. Putnam's Sons 1887) (discussing financing of War of 1812).
MYERS, supra note 65, at 75-78 (same); id. at 148-73 (discussing financing of Cisd War). t at 270-92
(discussing financing of World War I); id. at 343-60 (discussing financing of World War 11). ALLXADER
D. NOYES, THE WAR PERIOD OF AMERICAN FINANCE 1908-1925. at 194-214 (1926) (discussing financing
of World War I); EDWIN J. PERKINS, AMERICAN PUBUC FINANCE AND FINANCIAL SERVIcis 170G-1815.
at 324-48 (1994) (discussing financing of War of 1812); ALLEN SCHICK. THE FEDERAL BL DGET POLMCS,
POLICY, PROCESS 34 tbl.3-2 (1995) (Impact of War on Federal Spending. Selected Fiscal Years.
1811-1975).
87. See Act of Nov. 10, 1803. stat. 1, ch. 11, 2 Stat. 245; id. at ch. II1. 2 Stat. 247; Con% ention for the
Cession of Louisiana: Financial Arrangement, Apr. 30, 1803. U.S.-Fr.. 8 Stat. 206: DEWEY. supra note 64.
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Similarly, the acquisition of Florida was at least nominally financed through
an assumption of debt.8" We do not know what challenges and opportunities
will face us in the next several centuries. 8 9 It is safe to predict, however, that
any amendment that limits the United States government's ability to deal with
extraordinary events will place this nation at a significant disadvantage vis-a-
vis its competitors and adversaries. 90
In general, proponents of a balanced budget amendment have
acknowledged a need for flexibility but have not always drafted language to
accommodate it.9t This is both unfortunate and unnecessary. A well-drafted
at 121 (explaining Louisiana's price of $15,000,000, financed through issuance of $11,250,000 new 6%
stock, redeemable after 15 years in four annual installments, $2,000,000 to be paid in cash, and remainder
to be met by temporary loan); KEARNY, supra note 86, at 61 (same). The obligation issued was stock, not
debt, but had a fixed maturity date and paid a fixed return indistinguishable from debt. The circumvention
potential of stock issuances is discussed below. See infra notes 158-63 and accompanying text.
88. By the Treaty of February 22, 1819, between the United States and Spain, the United States agreed
to assume responsibility for up to five million dollars in claims by U.S. citizens against Spain; in exchange,
it received Florida. See Treaty of Amity, Settlement, and Limits, Feb. 22, 1819, U.S.-Sp., 18 Stat. (2) 712,
715 ("The United States, exonerating Spain from all demands in future, on account of the claims of their
citizens to which the renunciations herein contained extend . . . undertake to make satisfaction for the same,
to an amount not exceeding five millions of dollars."). Compare HUBERT BRUCE FULLER, TtlE PURCHASE
OF FLORIDA: ITS HISTORY AND DIPLOMACY 307 (Rembert W. Patrick ed., Univ. Fla. Press 1964) (1906)
(stating that United States received Florida in exchange for agreement to settle up to five million dollars
of claims of U.S. citizens against Spain), vith id. at xi, xiii (editorial preface by Rembert W. Patrick)
(asserting that "[niever in American history have the terms of an international agreement been as incorrectly
reported and misinterpreted" and noting that "fn]ot a penny was paid to Spain for the Floridas, or to
Americans claiming indemnity for property losses suffered by Spanish acts, or to Spaniards demanding
payment for American depredations").
89. Futurists generally take current trends and extrapolate forward. See, e.g., DONELLA H. MEADOWS
Er AL., THE LIMITS TO GROWTH (1972) (using mathematical models to project population growth, food
production, and other trends); ALVIN TOFFLER, FUTURE SHOCK (1970) (projecting social and technological
trends). Because the most difficult challenges and opportunities are likely to be those that take us by
surprise, prediction is a doubtful proposition. Nevertheless, with this caveat, events that might lead
supermajorities to believe that the United States should incur more debt for nonroutine purposes within the
next fifty years might include a rapid and widespread proliferation of nuclear weapons, a collapse of the
global environment, or a race for the colonization of space or the moon (which would likely have
significant military implications).
90. Any attempt to posit how history would have been different if the original Constitution had
contained an absolute and inflexible balanced budget requirement is necessarily speculative. It is fair to say,
however, that the United States probably would have been a very different country. Without the Louisiana
Purchase and the purchase of Florida, its territory would have been much smaller. The Marshall Plan and
NATO would have been less politically feasible, as would involvement in the Korean and Vietnam
conflicts. Some other country might have been the first to place a man on the moon. Indeed, it is not even
clear that the United States would have been willing to finance the policy of containment-and the arms
buildup that was necessary to implement it-that arguably led to the defeat of Communism.
91. See, e.g., S. REP. No. 104-5, at 8 (1995) (noting that 1995-96 Senate Draft has necessary
flexibility); see also 1995 House Hearings, supra note 2, at 26, 48 (statement of Rep. Schaefer) (asserting
that balanced budget amendment should be flexible); 1994 Senate Judiciary Comm. Hearings, supra note
2, at 25, 29 (statement of Martin A. Regalia, Vice President and Chief Economist, U.S. Chamber of
Commerce) (same); 1984 Joint Hearing, supra note 2, at 20, 25 (statement of Manuel H. Johnson, Assistant
Secretary for Economic Policy) (same); id. at 44, 50 (statement of Richard W. Rahn, Vice President and
Chief Economist, U.S. Chamber of Commerce) (same); 1983-84 Senate Hearings, supra note 2, at 271,
275 (statement of Richard W. Rahn, Vice President and Chief Economist, U.S. Chamber of Commerce)
(same); id. at 295, 304 (statement of David A. Stockman, Director of the Office of Management and
Budget) (same); 1979-80 House Hearings, supra note 2, at 336 (statement of Rep. Rousselot) (same); id.
at 358-59 (statement of Rep. Quayle) (same); H.R. REP. No. 104-3, at 19 (1995) (same); S. REP. No. 102-
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balanced budget amendment can and should permit flexibility in each of the
foregoing regards.
3. Political Neutrality
While enforcing the values it is intended to enshrine, a good balanced
budget amendment should not otherwise distort political decisionmaking,
intentionally or unintentionally. I borrow this concept from tax policy, in which
it is often argued that the tax system, while inevitably reducing the after-tax
returns from economic activity, should be structured so as otherwise to
interfere with market decisions as little as possible.92 Similarly, I suggest, a
well-drafted balanced budget amendment should not otherwise interfere with
the ebb and flow of politics. It should favor neither Republicans nor
Democrats, conservatives nor liberals. If Congress, in the absence of such an
amendment, would choose Policy A over Policy B, each having the same long-
term costs, the amendment should not create incentives to select the less
desired policy. An amendment that distorts this process will lead to poorer,
less democratic government.
Two types of potential distortion deserve special note. First, a balanced
budget amendment should not bias the political process in favor of short-term
solutions. It would be ironic indeed if a provision intended to ensure the long-
term financial health of the nation were to inhibit the long-term solution of
other problems. While this premise may seem obvious, we will discover that
it has important implications for our choice of accounting methods. '
Second, a well-drafted balanced budget amendment should not attempt to
further political goals other than balancing the federal budget. Many draft
amendments have included provisions limiting federal taxes or otherwise
attempting to constrain federal activities.94 Such "antifederalist" provisions,
103, at 14 (1991) (same), S. REP. No. 99-163. at 78 (1985) (statement of Sen. Bidcn) (samc). S REP No
80-154, at 2 (1947) (same).
92. For example, the Department of Treasury has defined such neutrality as follos, s
[An ideal tax system] would not unnecessarily distort choices about ho%% income is earned and
how it is spent. It would not unduly favor leisure over work. or consumption o%er $aing and
investment. It would not needlessly cause business firms to modify their production techniques
or their decisions on how to finance their activities. A neutral tax policy %sould not induce
businesses to acquire other firms or to be acquired by them merely for tax considerations- It
would not discourage risk-taking or the formation of new businesses. It would not discourage
competition by granting special preferences only to one industry or one t)pc of financial
institution. In short, an ideal tax system would be as neutral as possible toward pnsate
decisions.
I DEPARTMEN OF THE TREASURY, TAX REFORM FOR FAIRNESS. SIMPuCITY. AND EcoN.otic GROWTM
13 (Nov. 1984).
93. See infra Subsection II.A.2.
94. See, e.g., H.RJ. Res. 1, § 2. 104th Cong. (1995) (providing that no bill to increase reenue shall
become law unless approved by 60% of whole number of each House); SJ. Res. 2. § 2. 101st Cong. (1989)
(providing that receipts shall not increase by rate greater than rate of increase in national income in
previous fiscal year unless each House passes bill directed solely to approving specific additional receipts).
See generally SATURNO, supra note 2, at 37-40 (analyzing selected tax or expenditure limitation
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I suggest, should not be included in any proposed balanced budget amendment
for several reasons.
First, the amendment is most likely to produce balanced budgets in the
long run if it commands the broadest possible political support. An amendment
that is viewed in part as an attempt by a temporary antifederalist majority to
legislate in constitutional stone is more likely to be circumvented and less
likely to command continuing popular support when the political winds shift,
as they always do.
Second, many members of Congress, state legislatures, and the electorate
support the concept of a balanced budget amendment but are less clear in their
support of antifederalism. 95 One suspects that antifederalist provisions have
been included in politically popular draft balanced budget amendments in part
because such provisions lack the support necessary to make it through the
amendment process on their own. 96 This kind of legislative game-playing is
inappropriate in the drafting of constitutional amendments. The power to frame
is one of Congress's most potent powers; forcing the nation to choose between
a balanced budget amendment with antifederalist provisions and no balanced
budget amendment at all is improper.97 Even proponents of antifederalism
should think twice before endorsing such a precedent. Members of Congress,
the state legislatures, and the electorate deserve the opportunity to consider
each set of provisions on its own merits.
provisions).
95. See, e.g., 1995 House Hearings, supra note 2, at 129 (statement of Rep. Frank) (expressing
concern about antifederalist provisions of balanced budget amendment proposal); 1994 Senate Judiciary
Comm. Hearings, supra note 2, at 1-2 (statement of Sen. Simon) (focusing on budgetary balance); id. at
6-8 (statement of former Sen. Tsongas) (same); id. at 16 (statement of Fred Bergsten, Director, Institute
for International Economics) (supporting balanced budget amendment, opposing tax limitation provisions);
S. REt,. No. 99-163, at 3 (noting that S.J. Res. 225 "does not propose to read any specific level of spending
or taxing forever into the Constitution"); Buchanan, supra note 53, at 351 (opposing tax limitation
provisions).
96. An amendment to require a supermajority vote to raise taxes recently failed in the House. See John
Godfrey, Tax Limitation Constitutional Amendment Falls Short in House, 71 TAX NOTES 430 (1996).
97. Although there is no requirement in Article V that each constitutional amendment address a single
subject, members of Congress have expressed concern about draft amendments that combine subject
matters, especially in connection with the Twenty-Third Amendment, which originally contained three
unrelated provisions, two of which were stripped out before the amendment was proposed and ratified. See
106 CONG. REc. 1520 (statement of Sen. Case) ("Particularly with amendments, it has seemed to me
desirable to have them refer to one subject, either dealing with direct election of Senators, women's
suffrage, or whatever the subject might be."); id. at 1521 (statement of Sen. Javits) ("I am at a loss to
understand why so important a matter as a constitutional amendment ... should not be considered and
debated on its own."); id. at 1716 (statement of Sen. Stennis) ("[T]he fact that they are proposed together
is enough to defeat both of them."); id. at 1758 (statements of Sens. Keating and Cotton) (noting that each
amendment should be presented and voted upon separately); id. at 12,557 (1960) (statement of Rep.
McCulloch) ("[Wlith anything as fundamental and lasting as a constitutional amendment I much prefer to
confine consideration to one topic at a time."). For a history of the Twenty-Third Amendment, see STAFF
OF SUBCOMM. ON THE CONSTITUTION, SENATE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, 99TH CONG., AMENDMENTS TO
THE CONSTITUTION: A BRIEF LEGISLATIVE HISTORY 76-77 (Comm. Print 1985). Although the Bill of
Rights was proposed as a single resolution, the states nevertheless considered each provision separately and
in fact rejected two. See id. at 5-12.
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Third, drafting a technically sound balanced budget amendment is hard
enough. A rigorous analysis of proposed tax limitations or similar antifederalist
provisions is beyond the scope of this Article. However, before any such
provisions are enshrined in the Constitution, they should be subjected to the
same kind of technical analysis that this Article proposes for balanced budget
provisions. Such an analysis has not yet been undertaken.
Fourth, an antifederalist amendment is theoretically distinct from a
balanced budget amendment. 98 The former requires less governance,
regardless of how such governance is paid for; the latter, financially
responsible, pay-as-you-go governance, regardless of size or scope. An
antifederalist amendment might permit the incurring of debt to finance actions
believed to be appropriate at the federal level, such as preparing to meet a
military threat. Conversely, it would prohibit federal intrusion into realms
believed more appropriate for state action, even where the proposed federal
program is fully tax-funded. A balanced budget amendment is at best a poor
surrogate for well-drafted antifederalist rules.
4. Constitutional Nondisruption
Finally, a well-drafted balanced budget amendment should preserve
existing constitutional provisions and doctrines whenever possible. It should
not significantly disrupt the current system of checks and balances among the
several branches. 99 To the greatest extent possible, a balanced budget
amendment should refrain from tampering with political decisions best left to
98. Many balanced budget proposals have included limitations on Congres's po%%er to ta, Although
a smaller federal role is currently linked politically with lo%.er taxes, for most of our histor this .as not
the case. Until World War I, a substantial portion of federal revenues came from taxes on imports See
DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE, supra note 47. at 1106. Levels of taxation were determined in significant part
by reference to the need of U.S. business for protection, not by the need of the U S go.ernment for
revenue. As a result, the government sometimes faced the perceived problem of repeated budget surpluses
See generally MYERS, supra note 65, at 94-96 (discussing budget surplus dunng Jackson presidency)
Should the United States adopt a value added tax refundable at the border, the current alliance bctseen
those who support lower taxes and those who support a smaller federal role might disappear. A refundable
value added tax-from which exports are exempt but to which imports are subject in full-has protectionist
aspects. As a result, those who represent the interests of American business might find thcmselses
supporting both smaller government and higher taxes, the historical norm. Should this occur. some sho
have heretofore advocated constraints on taxes to limit federal activity sould find thenisclses constrained
by their own amendment.
99. See, e.g., Mistretta v. United States. 488 U.S. 361. 381 (1989) (contending that "'the greatest
security against tyranny ... lies . . . in a carefully crafted system of checked and balanced po%%cr %ithin
each Branch"); Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714. 722 (1986) (asserting that "checks and balances sere the
foundation of a structure of government that would protect liberty"): TIlE FEDERALIST No 47. at 314
(James Madison) (Edward Mead Earle ed.. 1937) (quoting Montesquieu for proposition that ""Itlhere can
be no liberty where the legislative and executive powers are united in the same person, or body of
magistrates"'); THE FEDERALIST, No. 51, at 337-38 (Alexander Hamilton or James Madison) (Edward
Mead Earle ed., 1937) ("This policy of supplying, by opposite and nal interests, the defect of better
motives .... cannot be less requisite in the distribution of the supreme poers of the State ")
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the political branches.' ° Most importantly, it should make clear which
existing constitutional rules it changes and which it leaves in place. Silence
about issues so close to the heart of the structure of government is both
dangerous and unnecessary. In this regard, the 1995-96 Senate Draft, it will
be seen,'0 ' is disturbingly open-ended.
Readers may disagree with some or all of the foregoing criteria. There is
no consensus as to what a balanced budget amendment should look like, nor
do I expect this Article to create one. What I do suggest is that all draft
balanced budget amendments should be subject to close technical scrutiny at
the design stage regardless of the evaluative criteria their authors believe
appropriate. This Article will examine the technical issues that arise in
attempting to meet the criteria I have urged; a similar analysis should be made
of draft amendments purporting to satisfy different criteria.
That said, how can we design and implement a technically sound balanced
budget amendment? The problem can be divided into two parts: first, defining
a budgetary target, and second, specifying the processes through which that
target is interpreted, enforced, and waived. I will consider the issues raised by
each of these tasks separately.
II. DEFINING THE BUDGETARY TARGET
A balanced budget amendment is typically built around a numerical test
in which the relationship between income and spending is compared
periodically to a target. In defining that test, the amendment must, explicitly
or implicitly, address at least four questions.
(i) What method of accounting should be used? Stated another way, when
should spending be taken into account? When Congress authorizes it?
When the executive agency signs the contract obligating the
government? When the resulting bill is paid or as the purchased item
is used? Similarly, when should income be taken into account?
(ii) What entities or programs should be subject to a balanced budget test?
Only the United States itself? The United States plus all wholly owned
subsidiaries? Perhaps some broader or different class of entities and
programs?
(iii) When should the test be applied? When Congress votes? When money
is spent? Only when a debt ceiling is reached? 02 At some other time?
100. See, e.g., S. REP. No. 104-5, at 8 (1995) (claiming that 1995-96 Senate Draft "leaves political
decisions to the political system").
101. See infra Subsection III.B.5.
102. Section 2 of the 1995-96 Senate Draft, for example, purports to use a debt ceiling limitation
mechanism to enforce the draft's balanced budget requirement. See S.J. Res. 1, 104th Cong. § 2 (1995),
reprinted in Appendix; infra text accompanying notes 272-84.
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(iv) How should the test accommodate issues of fiscal policy? In other
words, should the target be adjusted for economic conditions?
These issues may seem so technical as to seem unimportant. They are not.
Almost a century of experience with the income tax has taught us that the
success or failure of any system of financial controls depends on its choice of
accounting rules. At the core of any income tax is a definition of income.
Similarly, at the core of any balanced budget amendment is a definition of
budgetary balance. A balanced budget amendment cannot be understood
without some consideration of how the amendment addresses these seemingly
unimportant technical issues."0 3
A. Accounting for Spending and Income
When should spending and income be recorded for balanced budget
purposes? Readers whose only experience with accounting has been to balance
a checkbook or file an income tax return may wonder what the issue is. Is it
not obvious that money is spent when it is spent and income received when
it is received? The answer, unfortunately, is: "'Not necessarily."
In fact, two methods of accounting are commonly recognized: cash and
accrual. There are many forms of each, but no generally accepted theoretical
definition of either."°4 For purposes of this Article, I will define a cash
103. All examples used in this Article are stated in nominal dollars-that is. dollars unadjusted for
inflation.
104. For sample definitions, see GENERAL ACCOUNTING O-iCE. A GLOSSARN O- Ti RMS LsI.D I' %nit,
FEDERAL BUDGET PROCESS 19 (Exposure Draft Jan. 1993) (defining cash basis as "'llhe basis %%hereby
receipts are recorded when received and expenditures are recorded shen paid. s ithout regard to the
accounting period in which the receipts are earned or the costs incurred" and defining accrual basis as
"It]he basis whereby transactions and events are recognized s, hen they occur, regardless of %khen cash is
received or paid"). Treasury regulations give the following definitions,
Generally, under the cash receipts and disbursements method in the computation of taxable
income, all items which constitute gross income ... are to be included for the taxable )ear in
which actually or constructively received. Expenditures are to be deducted for the taxable year
in which actually made .... Generally, under an accrual method, income is to be included for
the taxable year when all the events have occurred that fix the right to receec the income and
the amount of the income can be determined with reasonable accuracy. Under such a method.
a liability is incurred, and generally is taken into account for Federal income tax purposes. in
the taxable year in which all the events have occurred that establish the fact of the liability, the
amount of the liability can be determined with reasonable accuracy, and economic performance
has occurred with respect to the liability.
Treas. Reg. § 1.446-l(c)(I)(i)-(ii) (as amended in 1995).
One court compared cash accounting to a lower form of the human spint
The cash method-simple, plodding, elemental-stands firmlN in the physical realn It responds
only through the physical senses, recognizing only the tangible flo% of currency Money is
income when this raw beast actually feels the coins in its pnmal paw; expenditures are made
only when the beast can see that it has given the coins asa)
Knight-Ridder Newspapers, Inc. v. United States. 743 F.2d 781. 787 (11 th Cir 1984) On the other hand.
accrual accounting inspired the court to ecstatic discourse:
The accrual method, however, moves in a more ethereal. mystical realm. The % Isionar) prophet.
it recognizes the impact of the future on the present, and wsith grase foreboding or ecstatic
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method as any method that reports financial transactions based on cash flows.
Under a cash method, income is recorded when received; expenses are
recorded when paid. I will define an accrual method as any method that reports
financial transactions based on the substance of the reporting entity's activities
and commitments. It attempts to look at what is really happening, not merely
at when cash moves. It therefore typically records income when earned and
expenses when incurred.
A financial system that seeks to measure something other than cash
flows-such as income or consumption, for example-must use accrual
accounting rules. Thus the so-called "cash method" used to measure income
for federal tax purposes actually incorporates major elements of accrual
accounting: capitalization and amortization rules, time-value-of-money
adjustments, and a general substance-over-form rule, among others. 0 5 A
system of accrual rules may similarly be structured to measure consumption;
under such a system, expenses would be recorded as consumption occurs. For
example, the premium value of Social Security insurance might be recorded
as an expense as the working population ages; we would not have to wait until
benefits are actually paid.'0 6 Conversely, the cost of a new highway would
be amortized over its expected useful life. Only a balanced budget amendment
using accrual rules can accurately measure consumption and therefore
consistently protect the value of intergenerational equity.
Cash and accrual accounting differ in other important regards as well. The
cash method is formal, mechanical, and easier for non-accountants to
understand and implement. Legislators without financial or accounting
expertise may find the cash method easier to use. On the other hand, accrual
anticipation, announces the world to be. When it becomes sure enough of its prophecies, it
actually conducts life as if the new age has already come to pass. Transactions producing
income or deductions spring to life in the eyes of the seer though nary a dollar has moved.
Id.
105. In general, for federal income tax purposes, the cost of an asset whose useful life extends
significantly beyond the end of the taxable year must be capitalized (that is, the cost must be added to the
asset's basis), instead of being claimed as an immediate deduction. See Treas. Reg. § 1.263(a)-2(a) (as
amended in 1987). That cost is then amortized over the useful life of the asset-that is, a portion of the
cost is allowed as a deduction for each year of the asset's useful life. See, e.g., I.R.C. § 167 (1996)
(depreciation, amortization, and depletion generally); id. § 168 (depreciation of certain tangible property);
id. § 197 (amortization of certain intangible property); id. § 611 (depletion of mineral deposits). The result
is to match the costs of producing income to the resulting income, an accrual rather than cash method goal.
Similarly, a number of Code provisions require the use of accrual rather than cash method accounting even
by cash method taxpayers to reflect more accurately the time value of money. See, e.g., id. § 1272 (original
issue discount); id. § 1274 (imputed interest on sales); id. § 7872 (imputed interest rules generally). The
principle that tax will be imposed on the substance, rather than on the form, of a transaction applies to both
cash and accrual taxpayers. See, e.g., BORIS 1. BITrKER & JAMES S. EUSTICE, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION
OF CORPORATIONS AND SHAREHOLDERS 1-19 (1979).
106. This is not to suggest that the premium value represents consumption. However, taxes equal to
the premium value are being paid, in effect, to purchase an annuity. To allow use of the same funds to
finance current consumption would be to double-credit them. An alternative solution would be to exclude
the Social Security system from the budget altogether, requiring it to be funded separately on an actuarially
sound basis.
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accounting, with its focus on the substance of an organization's activities and
commitments, generally provides a more accurate picture of an organization's
finances.'0 7 The timing of cash flows can easily be manipulated. The timing
of an organization's actual activities and commitments, by contrast, are subject
to external constraints. Even if they are manipulated for tax, reporting, or
budget balancing purposes, the resulting changes reflect real changes in the
organization's financial situation. For this reason, the financial reports of all
major corporations are required to be prepared in accordance with "generally
accepted accounting principles," a body of accrual rules developed by the
financial accounting community.0 8 For the same reason, large businesses are
required to use accrual accounting for U.S. income tax purposes."° Even the
federal government has begun to move into the accrual age for internal
management purposes."' In this respect, the 1995-96 Senate Draft, with its
reliance on pure cash flow accounting, is a dinosaur.
The 1995-96 Senate Draft is built around two basic rules."' First, for
any fiscal year, outlays may not exceed receipts. Section 1 states: "Total
outlays for any fiscal year shall not exceed total receipts for that fiscal year,
unless three-fifths of the whole number of each House of Congress shall
107. See United States v. Catto, 384 U.S. 102. 116 (1966)- 2 DEPARTMiET OF Till TREAsILRY. supra
note 92, at 215-16; MICHAEL J. GRAETZ & DEBORAii H. SCHENK. FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION 713 (3d
ed. 1995); OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT & BUDGET, OBJECTIVES OF FEDERAL FINANCIAL REPO R G
STATEMENT OF FEDERAL FINANCIAL ACCOUNTING CONCEPTS No. I. at 65 (Scpt- 1993) (stating that cash
basis accounting is unacceptable for GAAP); STANLEY S. SURREY or AL. FEDERAL INCOMtE TAXATiON
579-81 (successor ed. 1986).
108. See I DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY, supra note 92. at 216. STANLEY SILGEL & DAVID A
SIEGEL, ACCOUNTING AND FINANCIAL DISCLOSURE: A GUIDE TO BASIC CONCETS 35 (1983). see. e g.
In re Multi Benefit Realty Fund, 1976 SEC LEXIS 2210. *2-4 (1976) (stating thai financial statements
filed with SEC must be on accrual basis as required by generally accepted accounting pnnciples because
"'cash basis financial statements are necessarily distorted to some extent'); 12 C FR. § 335 627 (1996)
(requiring accrual method); 17 C.F.R. § 4.25(a)(7)(i) (1996) (same).
109. See I.R.C. § 448 (1996). See generally STAFF OF 7ItE JOINT CoM.,irEE oN TAkATIO,. GENERAL
EXPLANATION OF THE TAX REFORM ACT OF 1986, at 474-75 (1986) (requinng large businesses to use
accrual method).
110. See, e.g., OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT & BUDGET. ACCOUNTING FOR SELECTED ASSETS AND
LIABILITIES, STATEMEN-T OF FEDERAL FINANCIAL ACCOUNTING STANDARDS No. I pamn (,Mar 1993)
(proposing use of accrual accounting for federal financial accounting and reporting purposes). OFFICE OF
MANAGEMENT & BUDGET, MANAGERIAL COST ACCOUNTING CONCEPTS AND STANDARDS FOR TlE
FEDERAL GOVERNMEN-T, STATEMENT OF FEDERAL FINANCIAL ACCOUnTING STANDARDS NO 4. at 17-18
(July 1995) (using accrual method, not cash method, for managerial cost accounting); see also OFFICE OF
MANAGEMENT & BUDGET, ACCOUNTING FOR INVEN-0'RY AND RELATED PROPERTY. STATFiE.E.N" OF
FEDERAL FINANCIAL ACCOUNTING STANDARDS No. 3. at 9. 13 (Oct. 1993) (recommending consumption
method of accounting for operating materials and supplies and for stockpile matenals) The federal Bureau
of Economic Analysis already computes an accrual method deficit figure as par of its "national income
and product accounts," commonly known as NIPAs. See CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET OmCE. supra note 46.
at 125-29. Baseline deficit projections using the NIPA accrual method currently anticipate larger deficits
in the next several years than those projected using Congress's current modified cash method Compare
id. at 128 tbl.D-2 (listing NIPA accrual method projected deficits), with id. at xvii (summary tbL3) (listing
modified cash method deficits).
11. Section 3 of the draft also requires that the President each year submit a proposed budget for the
United States Government in which total outlays do not exceed total receipts. See SJ Res 1. I104h Cong.
§ 3 (1995), reprinted in Appendix.
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provide by law for a specific excess of outlays over receipts by a rolicall
vote."' 12 Second, a supermajority vote is needed to increase the limit on U.S.
debt held by the public. Section 2 states: "The limit on the debt of the United
States held by the public shall not be increased, unless three-fifths of the whole
number of each House shall provide by law for such an increase by a rollcall
vote."
113
What do these rules mean? Both invoke the cash method of accounting,
which generally takes expenses into account when cash actually flows-that
is, when the expenses are paid. On this issue, section 2 is clear: Because as a
practical matter borrowing is not necessary unless and until cash actually
passes, section 2 uses pure cash accounting. The answer is somewhat less clear
under section 1, which prohibits "outlays" in excess of "receipts." For
budgetary purposes, Congress currently computes "outlays" and "receipts" on
a cash basis, but not on a pure cash basis." 4 It might be argued that section
1 is intended to constitutionalize existing practice, not pure cash accounting.
Neither the draft itself nor the accompanying 1995 Senate committee report
explicitly addresses this question. If "outlays" and "receipts" are interpreted to
refer to pure cash flows, however, the relationship between sections 1 and 2
becomes clear and elegant: Section 1 simply mandates a budget that does not
require the government to borrow. So read, section 1 is almost identical in
substance to section 2. Section 1 articulates the principle; section 2 enforces
it. Consistent with this reading, the 1995 Senate committee report states that
section 2 is intended to constitute the "primary enforcement mechanism" for the
amendment as a whole."1
5
The distinction is important because a numerical test can only control what
it measures. If an amendment only measures cash flows, then it can only control
cash flows. Congress may authorize any spending it wishes. The government may
order and consume any goods or services it wants. Unless and until the bill is
actually paid, there can be no violation of the amendment. The inaccuracies of the
cash method, in turn, create substantial enforcement problems for any balanced
budget amendment that invokes it. To explore all such problems here would be
impractical; a few illustrations should suffice.
112. See id. § 2.
113. See id. Many state balanced budget provisions are similarly framed as debt limitation provisions.
See Kiewiet & Szakaly, supra note 1I, passim (reviewing state constitutional limitations on borrowing);
Sterk & Goldman, supra note 11, at 1305-06 (same).
114. See infra notes 166-69 and accompanying text.
115. See S. REP. No. 104-5, at 8 (1995). Any other reading of section I leads to anomalous results.
If "outlays" and "receipts" are computed other than on a pure cash basis, the tests imposed by sections I
and 2 will differ. It is unclear why the draft would impose two different balanced budget tests; the 1995
Senate committee report evidences no such intention. More importantly, the report strongly suggests that
section 1 is not self-enforcing; enforcement of the principle set forth in section 1 is to be provided by
section 2. See id. If this is true, however, the two sections must use the same accounting method: pure cash
accounting.
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1. Treatment of Unpaid Obligations
Perhaps the most flagrant inaccuracy of the cash method is its treatment of
unpaid obligations: It ignores them. For income tax purposes, this is not a
problem. Unpaid obligations represent potential deductions, and it is in the
government's interest to permit taxpayers to ignore deductions." 6 For financial
reporting purposes, however, this kind of inaccuracy is a major problem. Any
accurate picture of an organization's finances must include unpaid obligations.
Consequently, use of the cash method is prohibited in corporate reports to
investors and shareholders." 7
The same considerations suggest that unpaid obligations should be taken into
account in assessing the federal government's financial status as well. Congress
may obligate the government in ways that ensure financial catastrophe. As long
as no actual payment is made, however, the cash method will report that all is
well. This is fundamentally inconsistent with the value of institutional
responsibility, which even the most simpleminded balanced budget amendment
should protect.
Assume, for example, that Congress authorizes the issuance of twenty-year
zero-coupon bonds having a face value of $20 trillion--that is, twenty-year bonds
that pay no interest but require the government to pay the holders $20 trillion at
maturity. The Treasury issues the bonds for $5 trillion in cash and uses the
proceeds to pay off all existing U.S. indebtedness."' Financial theory tells us
that these bonds are approximately equivalent to bonds in the face amount of $5
trillion paying interest annually at a rate of 7.18%. For this reason, under the
accrual method a corporate issuer of such bonds would be required to accrue the
equivalent of interest on such bonds every reporting period even though no
interest is actually paid." 9
Under a pure cash method, however, expenditures are only reported when
paid. 2 If the cash method is used to account for the foregoing transaction, the
effect will be to eliminate all interest expense from the federal budget for the first
nineteen years, thereby balancing the budget beyond the expected terms of most
members of Congress without any painful spending cuts or tax increases
whatsoever. The problem, of course, is that in the twentieth year, Congress will
116. Indeed, the income tax rules even place accrual method taxpayers on the cash method with
respect to some deductions. See I.R.C. § 461(h) (1996).
117. See supra note 108 and accompanying text.
118. As of December 31, 1995, the gross federal debt was estimated to be S4.92 mlhon. See
DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY, supra note 20. at 189.
119. See I.R.C. §§ 163(e), 1272-73.
120. Because of the significant inaccuracies of the cash method in this context. even cash method
taxpayers are generally required to use accrual accounting in reporing the implicit interest-known in the
Internal Revenue Code as "original issue discount"-for federal income tax purposes. See id. § 1272
Currently, similar rules are imposed for debt issued to the public under the variation of cash method
accounting used for federal budgetary purposes. See DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASLRY. supra note 20. at
334.
1997] 1483
The Yale Law Journal
have to come up with $20 trillion to pay off the bonds-a budgetary time bomb
waiting to go off.
I do not suggest that Congress would be so irresponsible as to balance the
budget in the manner discussed above. 2' My point is rather that a balanced
budget amendment that permits Congress to do so is fundamentally inadequate.
Moreover, there are many more arcane and less understandable ways of reaching
similar results.' 22 Readers skeptical of my hypothetical should note that the
Treasury already issues long-term zero-coupon bonds. We know them as "savings
bonds."' 23 To circumvent an amendment that uses pure cash method accounting,
Congress would merely have to alter the mix of debt instruments it already
authorizes. 24
The potential for avoidance created by this inaccuracy of the cash method
arises any time the government incurs an obligation that it does not immediately
pay. The largest budgetary time bomb now waiting to go off is Social Security,
which involves massive future payments that Congress has obligated the
government to make but which, under the cash method, have no current
budgetary impact.' 25 Any balanced budget amendment that allows Congress to
ignore the largest budgetary problem it now faces is of questionable integrity.'26
Indeed, to the extent that a cash method balanced budget amendment forecloses
other methods of bidding for reelection, it may even encourage the creation of
similar unfunded liabilities in the future. By contrast, as has been noted, 27
under an accrual method amendment the premium value of future benefits would
be recorded as a current expense, thus forcing Congress to deal with the problem
in advance and protecting future generations from potential governmental default.
121. Under existing statutory federal budgetary accounting rules, deemed interest on zero-coupon
bonds must be accrued currently. See DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY, supra note 20, at 335. This
treatment, though, is within Congress's control and is acknowledged to represent one of several limited
exceptions to the general rule of cash method accounting. See id. at 334-35.
122. Some of the better-known ways to structure nondebt financings that are indistinguishable from
zero-coupon bonds as a matter of financial theory are described in Alvin C. Warren, Jr., Commentary,
Financial Contract Innovation and Income Tax Policy, 107 HARV. L. REV. 460 (1993). The Treasury
Department has recently proposed comprehensive regulations in an attempt to curtail use of such
instruments for tax avoidance purposes. See Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.1275-6, 59 Fed. Reg. 64905 (1994).
123. Savings bonds are exempted from tax rules that require current accrual of original issue discount.
See I.R.C. § 1272(a)(2)(B).
124. Ultimately, of course, the financial markets will penalize irresponsible governmental behavior,
if only by imposing higher interest costs on governmental borrowings. Relying on such market constraints
to prevent borrowing deemed excessive, however, is inconsistent with the purposes of a balanced budget
amendment. Such market constraints already exist; by adopting a balanced budget amendment, we have
necessarily concluded that market constraints are inadequate. States often face higher interest rates on
borrowings structured to circumvent similar constitutional provisions; such borrowings are nevertheless
common. See supra note 11.
125. A review of the projected budgetary impact of Social Security and related programs appears in
a 1996 CBO study. See CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET OFFICE, supra note 46, at 69-95.
126. The issue is not merely financial. An amendment that forces Congress to resolve the uncertainties
of Social Security today would allow future potential beneficiaries-including the author of this Article-to
rely on the government's promises.
127. See supra note 106 and accompanying text.
1484 [Vol. 106: 1449
Balanced Budget Amendment
2. Treatment of Capital Expenditures and Receipts
A second inaccuracy of the cash method is its treatment of the purchase and
sale of assets, both capital assets'2 and inventory. For the U.S. government,
Stealth bombers, bullets, federal office buildings, national parks, oil rights in the
continental shelf, the Strategic Petroleum Reserve, gold in Fort Knox, Japanese
yen held by the Federal Reserve Bank, and the name "United States of America"
all fall in this category. 29
Under pure cash method accounting, the purchase of an asset is treated as a
current expense, and receipts on the sale of the asset are treated as income. If the
government buys $100 worth of gold, then sells it for $100 cash, pure cash
method accounting treats the purchase as a $100 "outlay" and the sale as a $100
"receipt." This treatment, while simple and mechanical, is unrealistic. When the
government exchanges cash for gold, it is not, as a result, $100 poorer, it is not,
in the rhetoric of balanced budget concerns, $100 closer to bankruptcy.
Conversely, when it converts the same gold back into cash, it is not $100 richer.
It has merely converted wealth from one form into another.
For this reason, even cash method taxpayers are required to use accrual
accounting t3 for capital assets and inventory in computing their federal taxable
income. 131 In general, a taxpayer who buys such an asset cannot deduct its cost.
Instead, the taxpayer is assigned a basis in the asset equal to its cost.' If the
asset is used in the production of income, that cost is then amortized over its
useful life,'33 reducing the taxpayer's basis as the deductions are allowed.'
When the taxpayer sells the asset, income is recognized only to the extent that the
sales price exceeds the taxpayer's remaining basis in the asset.' These rules
more accurately reflect economic reality and are now used for almost all tax and
financial accounting purposes.'3
128. By use of the term "capital asset." I mean to invoke its common meaning-an asset. other than
inventory, having a useful life extending beyond a single reporting penod-not the more rcstncti'c
technical meaning assigned to it in I.R.C. § 1221.
129. Currently, the Office of Management and Budget groups federal investment outlays into three
main categories: physical investment, research and development, and education and training See
DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY, supra note 20. at 92-93.
130. Although tax lawyers sometimes view the requirement that capital expenditures be capitalized
as inherent to the cash method, the intention of the requirement is to match expenses to income. the goal
of accrual accounting-not to track cash flows, the goal of cash accounting. Sce Treas. Reg § I 446-
l(c)(2)(i) (as amended in 1995) (defining inventory accounting as accrual method)
131. See I.R.C. § 263 (discussing capital expenditures); Treas. Reg. § I 446(cl)t2)(ia tas amended
in 1995) (discussing inventory).
132. See I.R.C. § 1012. Basis is an attribute of an asset used to keep track of a taxpayer's deemed
investment in the asset for tax purposes. See generally Glen Arlen Kohl. The Identificaton Theon of Basis.
40 TAx L. REv. 623 (1985).
133. See I.R.C. § 167.
134. See id. § 1016(a)(2).
135. See id. § 1001(a).
136. Similar principles have been suggested. but not adopted, for federal budgetar) accounting
purposes. See Cox El AL., supra note 41, at 18-21.
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In the context of a balanced budget amendment, the inaccuracies of pure cash
accounting for asset purchases and sales create both incentives for distorted
decisionmaking and avoidance potential.' 37 Let us consider incentives for
distorted decisionmaking first. Assume that Congress must choose between two
solutions to a problem. One will cost $40 billion today but will solve the problem
for forty years. The other will cost $4 billion today but will solve the problem
only for the budgetary year in question. Assume further that a financially prudent
decisionmaker, operating without artificial constraints, would adopt the long-term
solution, which costs an average of $1 billion per year, over the short-term
solution, which costs $4 billion per year. The cash method will obscure the
solutions' relative efficiencies. The long-term solution will have an immediate $40
billion impact on the budget; the short-term solution an impact of only $4 billion.
A Congress operating under the imperatives of a cash method balanced budget
rule may feel constrained to choose the latter, even though the former is more
economically rational. An accrual method, by contrast, can be structured to reflect
correctly the relative financial merits of the two choices.
138
A second distortive effect of this aspect of cash method accounting is an
artificial incentive to sell federal assets. Under the cash method, a sale of
Yosemite National Park is treated as increased wealth for the federal government.
The government may then use that extra "wealth" to finance current operations.
In reality, of course, a sale of Yosemite at market value does not change the
government's wealth at all; it merely represents the conversion of one kind of
wealth into another. Spending down the nation's wealth to finance current
operations is unfair to future generations and is, in substance, a form of deficit
spending. A cash method balanced budget amendment encourages such spending.
Supporters of smaller government may welcome this aspect of the cash
method because the sale of federal assets arguably makes the federal government
smaller. I have already suggested that the use of a balanced budget amendment
for this purpose is inappropriate. 39 An additional problem with using a cash
method balanced budget amendment for this purpose is that, under the cash
method, there is no lower limit to the incentive; smaller is always better. After
the less-used national parks are sold,"4 the amendment still gives Congress an
137. Perhaps for these reasons, some senators have advocated the creation of a separate capital budget.
See, e.g., S. REP. No. 104-5, at 28 (1995) (statement of Sen. Biden); id. at 54 (minority views of Sens.
Kennedy, Leahy, and Feingold). A separate capital budget is necessary only if operating accounts are kept
on a pure cash basis.
138. It has been noted that if capital expenditures are spread relatively evenly overtime, the net Impact
on the budget will be the same regardless of how they are accounted for. See MUSORAVE, supra note 37,
at 558-62. While true, this statement ignores the incentive effects of the cash method at each decision
point. See id. at 562.
139. See supra Subsection I.C.3.
140. Proposals to sell off the less-used national parks and monuments to help balance the federal
budget have circulated recently in Congress. See National Park System Reform Act of 1995, H.R. 260,
104th Cong. (1995). These proposals have met with wide criticism. See, e.g., 141 CONG. REc. H9086 (daily
ed. Sept. 18, 1995) (statement of Rep. Richardson); America For Sale, ST. Louis POST-DISPATCH, July 17,
1995, at 6B; Don't Close The Parks, SALT LAKE TRia., May 6, 1995, at A12; For Sale: National Parks.
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incentive to sell off the more popular parks, then the gold at Fort Knox, then the
Strategic Petroleum Reserve,' then less vital military bases, then the bombers
and missiles themselves. In fact, under a cash method balanced budget
amendment, the ideal size of the federal government is zero. '2
Perhaps as troublesome as the distortive effects of this aspect of the cash
method is its avoidance potential. Consider the following transaction. The
government, forced to balance the budget but seeking also to retain Yosemite for
future generations, sells the park to private investors but leases it back for a 100-
year term, renewable indefinitely at the government's option. In substance, the
government keeps the park but receives a large sum of money today that it will
then pay back, together with a market return, over the next century. Accrual
accounting, which focuses on the economic substance of the transaction
(commonly known as a "sale-leaseback"), treats it as a loan if it has no economic
substance. Because of the avoidance potential of sale-leasebacks, tax rules require
such treatment even for cash method taxpayers. 4 3 An accounting method that
focuses strictly on cash flows, however, may treat the sales proceeds as
"receipts," which can then be used to finance other governmental operations.'"
Under a cash method amendment, the sale-leaseback gives Congress yet another
possible tool to meet the technical requirements of the amendment without, in
fact, balancing the budget.1
45
MIAMI HERALD, June 27, 1995, at A8. But see 141 CONG. REc. H9086.-87 (daily ed Sept. 18. 1995)
(statement of Rep. Hefley) (arguing that H.R. 260 is not 'park-closing bill").
141. See Ralph Vartabedian, Dipping Into the Strategic Petroleum Reserve. L.A. TitEs. May 9. 1996.
at DI (discussing sales from Strategic Petroleum Reserve to help balance budget)
142. I do not contend that a cash method balanced budget amendment would result in the
disappearance of the federal government. Countervailing political forces would clearly operate to limit
Congress's ability to sell assets for which there are strong constituencies. My contention rather is that a
systemic incentive to sell federal assets would distort federal decisionmaking in ways either unrelated or
contrary to the values the amendment is supposed to implement.
143. See, e.g., JACOB MERTENS, JR., THE LAW OF FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION § 6A.74 (1994)
(discussing tax treatment of sale-leasebacks for both accrual and cash method taxpayers).
144. One might consistently adopt the cash method and still treat sale-leasebacks as loans. The result
would be to treat such sale proceeds as loan proceeds for purposes of section 7 of the 1995-96 Senate
Draft. See S.J. Res. 1, 104th Cong. § 7 (1995), reprinted in Appendix. This possibility. however. merely
raises again the basic question posed by any accounting method other than pure cash accounting: Who
defines the rules? If Congress has the power to define the treatment of sale-leasebacks for constitutional
purposes, the avoidance potential remains.
145. Current budget rules recharacterize lease-purchase transactions as debt-financed purchases. See
DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY, supra note 20, at 334-35. No such recharacterization rules are currently
applied to sale-leasebacks. Indeed, the use of the sale-leaseback as a governmental financing technique
appears to be relatively common. See STAFF OF JOINT COMm. ON TAXATION. 98M CONG.. TAX ASPECTS
OF FEDERAL LEASING ARRANGE.MENTS 22-27 (1983) (examining policy issues, including budgetary
accounting issues, raised by governmental leasing); Ira P. Robbins. The Legal Dimensions of Private
Incarceration, 38 AM. U. L. REV. 531, 630-32 (discussing sale-leaseback techniques for prisons); Michael
H. Schill, Note, The Participation of Charities in Limited Partnerships. 93 YALE LEJ. 1355. 1373 (1984)
(noting that federal, state, and local governments have used sale-leaseback techniques to take advantage
of tax benefits).
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3. What is Cash?
Since the cash method focuses on flows of cash, flows of anything else may
escape the limitations of a cash method amendment. The definition of cash
therefore becomes critical. Consider the following transaction: The government
uses $100 worth of silver to pay for $100 worth of services, which it immediately
consumes. How we treat this transaction under a cash method amendment will
depend on whether silver is considered property or cash. If we treat it as property,
then the transaction is economically indistinguishable from a sale of silver for
$100 and a purchase of services for $100-a $100 receipt coupled with a $100
outlay. In other words, our budget is balanced. If instead we treat silver as cash,
there is only one transaction, a $100 purchase of services-a $100 outlay. Our
budget now shows a deficit of $100.46
Of course, if the technique requires the government to own the silver it sells,
the government may not own enough silver to make this an interesting issue.
Here is where modem financial markets come to the government's rescue.
Assume that the government receives the $100 but does not immediately deliver
the silver to its buyer. In fact, it does not own any silver at the time of sale; in
financial parlance, it sells the silver "short." Assume further that the government's
promise to deliver the silver is evidenced by a certificate, which I will call a
"silver certificate." A silver certificate, in this hypothetical, evidences the holder's
right to receive a specified amount of silver, measured in grams, from the
government. Using short sales, the government can print and sell an indefinite
quantity of such certificates; its ability to sell short is limited only by public
confidence in its ability to perform the executory promises evidenced by
certificates outstanding. The government need not own any silver at all.
What the government has done in our hypothetical is to print something that
looks suspiciously like money. Our hypothetical "silver certificates" differ from
the "silver certificates" that the United States historically issued as currency in
two principal regards: They are denominated in grams of silver, not in dollars,
and they are not, as a matter of law, "legal tender." Nevertheless, they can be
spent. So long as silver is treated as property, under a cash method balanced
budget amendment Congress may spend as much of this new "money" as it likes
without creating any deficit, because the cash method treats the transfer of such
an instrument as a short sale of silver (triggering $X of receipts) coupled with a
purchase of whatever the government has bought (triggering $X of outlays).
Closing this loophole is not easy. Defining money as something that
governments issue in the exercise of their sovereign powers will not work. In our
hypothetical, the United States has not performed any governmental function or
146. Although silver has sometimes been used as a medium of exchange, in the modem world we
normally treat it as a commodity, that is, as property. On the other hand, in our hypothetical, the
government is in fact $100 poorer when the transaction is over; it has spent a portion of its wealth to fund
current operations. If we fail to treat this silver as cash, we have opened a hole in the rules.
1488 [Vol. 106: 1449
Balanced Budget Amendment
exercised any governmental power whatsoever.4 7 It has merely participated in
existing private markets and evidenced its obligations within those markets by
issuing bearer certificates. Anyone can print "money" using this technique. The
only reason the U.S. government can do so more credibly is that its credit rating
is better. Defining silver, gold, and other quasi-monetary commodities as "cash"
will not solve the problem either. 48 The same technique will work with any
fungible commodity: uranium, wheat, crude oil, mortgage pools, or pollution
emission rights.
Again, I have used a relatively simple and obvious example to illustrate the
problem. It seems unlikely that Congress would authorize short sales of silver.
But government-sponsored entities already routinely sell financially sophisticated
interests in other fungible commodities-mortgage pools, for example."' And
short sales are hardly the most difficult-to-understand instruments available in
modern financial markets. The use of more sophisticated and less obvious
techniques to create cash surrogates would substantially complicate the
enforcement of a cash method amendment.
4. What is Debt?
Section 2 of the 1995-96 Senate Draft requires a supermajority vote to
increase the "limit on the debt of the United States held by the public.""'' The
1995 Senate committee report states that for this purpose, -debt" is defined by
reference to current federal accounting usage, where the term is limited to
formally issued, transferable debt instruments."' Section 7 of the 1995-96
147. Under current federal budgetary rules, seigniorage. the profit from coining monc). s excluded
from receipts and is treated as a means of financing the deficit other than borromg from the public See
DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY, supra note 20, at 336-37. Seigniorage. ho%,eer. arise! from the exercise
of the government's monetary power, see id., which is not insol'd in the tevt's h)pothctical
148. Under current federal budgetary rules, gold--but not sil cr. platinum, or an) other quasi-monctar
commodity-is treated as a "monetary asset." Its sale is therefore accounted for as a borro ing See id at
336. Other "monetary assets," under current rules, include U.S. deposits with the International Monctar)
Fund and holdings of foreign currency by the Exchange Stabilization Fund- See d at 337
149. For descriptions of the activities of government-sponsored entities in the secondary market for
mortgages, see, e.g., Paula C. Murray & Beverly L. Hadawa). Mortgage-Backed Securite, An
Investigation of Legal and Financial Issues, II J. CORP. L. 203. 204-10 (1986) (descnbing scondary
market activities of Ginnie Mae, Fannie Mac, and Freddie Mac). and Joseph C. Shenker & Anthony I
Colletta, Asset Securitization: Evolution. Current Issues and New Frners. 69 TEL\ L RE ,' 1369.
1383-88 (1991) (same). The sophistication of instruments issued by such entities is suggested b) the fact
that among the derivatives involved in the Orange County bankruptcy %%cre instruments issued b) Fannic
Mae and Freddie Mac. See Jeanette Redmond. Note. State and Local Governmental Entities In Search
of... Statutory Authority to Enter into Interest Rate Swap Agreements. 63 FORDiiA' L RE% 2177,
2212-13 (1995) (recommending how state legislatures safely could perni goemment units to use interest
rate swap agreements to reduce risks and costs); see also John Connor. Inquin, Launched of Derisautis
Used By Both Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, WALL ST. J.. July 5. 1994. at CI8 (reporting mscstigation
of derivatives issuances by government-sponsored entities).
150. SJ. Res. 1. 104th Cong. § 2 (1995). reprinted tn Appendix.
151. See S. REP. No. 104-5. at 16 (1995). There is one major exception: Certain leas-cpurchasc
transactions are treated as though the asset leased has in fact been purchased outright in exchange for debt
See DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY, supra note 20, at 334-35. This rule. hosseser. is intended to preserc
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Senate Draft similarly defines "receipts" to include "all receipts of the United
States Government except those derived from borrowing" and "outlays" to include
"all outlays of the United States Government except for those for repayment of
debt principar'; 52 section 1 then prohibits outlays in excess of receipts in the
absence of a supermajority vote. 53 For purposes of these sections, the 1995
Senate committee report states: "It is intended that those obligations the title to
which can be transferred by the present owner to others, like Treasury notes and
bonds, be excluded from receipts.""'
The 1995-96 Senate Draft's definition of debt is thus consistent with the
purest, most formalistic mode of cash accounting. As has already been noted, the
cash method ignores unpaid obligations.155 In reality, of course, an unpaid
obligation is a debt. Under the cash method, therefore, many types of debt-under
the Draft's unusually formalistic approach, any debts that are not formally issued
and transferable-are simply ignored.' 56 This creates obvious opportunities for
circumvention. In late 1995 and early 1996, for example, the Treasury converted
debts owed to several trust funds into unpaid obligations, thereby circumventing
statutory limits on the national debt; 57 the 1995-96 Senate Draft would
apparently permit unlimited use of such techniques in the future.
Indeed, any balanced budget amendment that relies on a formalistic definition
of debt invites circumvention. Techniques for creating synthetic debt-instruments
that look and act like debt but are made up of components that are formally
treated as something else-have become extremely sophisticated in recent years,
triggering extensive theoretical commentary' and major Internal Revenue
the integrity of cash accounting for asset purchases, not to preserve the integrity of the definition of debt.
There is no corresponding rule for sale-leasebacks.
152. S.J. Res. 1, 104th Cong. § 7 (1995), reprinted in Appendix (emphasis added).
153. See id. § 1.
154. S. REP. No. 104-5, at 19.
155. See supra Subsection II.A.I.
156. Thus accounts receivable held by cash method taxpayers are only treated as debts for bad debt
deduction purposes if they have already been taken into income. Conversely, accounts payable of cash
method taxpayers for trade or business expenses are treated as debts for discharge of indebtedness income
purposes if they have already triggered a deduction. The relationship between accounting methods and the
definition of debt for tax purposes is explored in Theodore P. Seto, The Function of the Discharge of
Indebtedness Doctrine: Complete Accounting in the Federal Income Tax System, 51 TAX L. Rev.
(forthcoming 1997).
157. See Budget Impasse: U.S. Taps Trust Funds as Interest Comes Due, L.A. TIMES, Nov. 16, 1995,
at 16; Frank James, Congress Reaches for Solution on Debt Ceiling: President May OK Bill with 'Strings',
CHI. TRIB., Jan. 31, 1996, at 4; David E. Sanger, Treasury Secretary Takes a Risk to Sidestep an Even
Bigger One: U.S. Default, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 16, 1995, at B12.
158. See, e.g., David P. Hariton, The Taxation of Complex Financial Instruments, 43 TAX L. REV. 731
(1988) (discussing taxation of contingent obligations, fixed obligations with variable interest payments,
foreign currency instruments, debt-equity hybrid instruments, and convertible debt obligations); Edward D.
Kleinbard, Equity Derivative Products: Financial Innovation's Newest Challenge to the Tax System, 69
TEX. L. REv. 1319 (1991) (discussing taxation of equity derivatives); Scott Marc Kolbrenner, Derivatives
Design and Taxation, 15 VA. TAX REV. 211 (1995) (same); Reed Shuldiner, A General Approach to the
Taxation of Financial Instruments, 71 TEx. L. REv. 243 (1992) (proposing uniform rules for taxation of
financial instruments); Jeff Stmad, Taxing New Financial Products: A Conceptual Framework, 46 STAN.
L. REV. 569 (1994) (proposing taxonomy of tax systems for financial instruments); Warren, supra note 122
(examining problems posed by financial contract innovation and possible approaches to coherent taxation).
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Service efforts to recharacterize synthetic debt as debt for tax purposes. "' One
can anticipate that under a cash method balanced budget amendment similar
problems would arise eventually, if not immediately.
Even the use of sophisticated techniques, however, may not be necessary if
simpler circumventions remain available. Debt is not the only type of instrument
a corporate entity may issue to raise funds; it may also issue stock. During its
early years, the United States government did just that, redeeming its "stock"
through sinking fund mechanisms typical of preferred stock issued
contemporaneously by private corporations."w The Louisiana Territory, for
example, was purchased by giving the French government "stock," not debt.'6 '
More recently, Congress financed the Resolution Trust Corporation, a corporation
deemed part of the government for budgetary purposes, in significant part,
through the issuance of "capital certificates" to the Resolution Funding
Corporation, a "private" corporation the sole purpose of which was to purchase
those certificates, which purchase was in turn financed by borrowing from the
public.' 62 The result was to place some $30 billion of borrowing completely off-
budget. Such stock issuances would remain off-budget in the future under the
1995-96 Senate Draft.
Recharacterizing such stock as debt is problematic. Such recharacterization
is possible for income tax purposes in very limited circumstances, but Congress
could probably structure stock issuances so as to resist recharacterization under
similar rules. 63 Unless stock issued by a federal instrumentality is treated as
debt for balanced budget purposes, however, the use of stock offers virtually
unlimited potential for circumvention under any cash method amendment
resembling the 1995-96 Senate Draft.
159. See Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.1275-6. 59 Fed. Reg. 64.905 (1994).
160. See KEARNY, supra note 86, at 61.
161. See supra note 87.
162. See, e.g., Marirose K. Lescher & Merwin A. Mace 111. Financing the Bailout of the Thrift Crisis
Workings of the Financing Corporation and the Resolution Funding Corporation, 46 BLS. LA% 507,
521-28 (1991) (describing use of Resolution Funding Corporation to place debt off-budget); Kenneth
Ryder, Savings & Loan Crisis: Lessons and a Look Ahead: A Guide to FIRREA s Off-Budget Financing.
2 STAN. L. & POL'Y REv. 82 (1990) (same). Essentially the same structure %%-as u ed to place some S15
billion of borrowing off-budget to finance the Federal Savings and Loan Insurance Corporation See Leschcr
& Mace, supra, at 510-20; Ryder, supra, at 85.
163. See, e.g., Full Service Beverage Co. v. Commissioner. 69 T.C.M. (CCH) 2221. 2225-27 (1995)
(refusing to accept petitioner's characterization of stock as debt): Estate of Schott ,%. Commissioner. 43
T.C.M. (CCH) 1188, 1195, 1200-01 (1982) (same); Miele v. Commissioner. 56 T.C. 556, 564--66 (same),
aff'd without opinion, 474 F.2d 1338 (3d Cir. 1971), aff'd without opinion sub nom. Spiniello v
Commissioner, 475 F.2d 1396 (3d Cir. 1973); Ragland Inv. Co. v. Commissioner. 52 T.C. 867. 875-79
(1969) (same), aff'd 435 F.2d 118 (6th Cir. 1970); Zilkha & Sons, Inc. v. Commissioner. 52 TC. 607.
612-13 (1969) (same), acq. 1970-1 C.B. xvi. But see Gen. Couns. Mem. 34.529 (June 18. 1971) (arguing
that nominal preferred stock may constitute indebtedness). See generally William T. Plumb, Jr.. The Federal
Income Tax Significance of Corporate Debt: A Critical Analysis and a Proposal, 26 TAX L REv. 369
(1971) (discussing distinction between debt and equity for tax purposes).
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5. Constitutional Implications of a Choice of Accounting Methods
Constitutional lawyers may wonder what the problem is. Why not simply
adopt an accrual method balanced budget amendment, that is, an amendment that
looks at the substance of the government's activities, not merely at their form?
Tax lawyers and accountants, on the other hand, may complain that I have
caricatured the cash method. We use a modified version of the cash method for
tax purposes, imposing accrual rules whenever necessary to solve at least some
of the problems identified in the foregoing pages. Why not permit use of such a
hybrid system for balanced budget purposes as well?
The problem is that, in general, accrual accounting only works with outside
supervision. Because accrual accounting focuses on the substance of the reporting
entity's activities, some judgment is always required to translate that substance
into numbers; and because the reporting entity almost always has an incentive to
bias that judgment in one direction or another, its judgment requires outside
review. This is not a problem in the private sector. One of the principal functions
of the Internal Revenue Service is to identify and prevent taxpayer abuse of
accounting rules. Similarly, certified financial statements are reviewed by
independent certified public accountants.164
An accounting method that requires routine outside review of a legislature's
judgments, however, raises potentially serious separation of powers issues.165
It is principally for this reason, I suggest, that governments have continued to use
cash accounting for financial control purposes notwithstanding the fact that, by
modem standards, the cash method is unacceptably primitive. It is also for this
reason that I have used pure cash method accounting as a starting point for my
examination of the problems of that method; every deviation from an accounting
method based strictly on cash flows requires that the same constitutional questions
be asked anew. This may be why the 1995-96 Senate Draft seems to invoke the
purest, most formal cash accounting techniques.
Current federal budgetary rules reflect this linkage between accounting and
constitutional issues, materially deviating from pure cash accounting in only three
regards:' 6 (1) interest is accrued on public issues of Treasury debt, regardless
of whether it is paid; 67 (2) the subsidy cost of direct loans and loan guarantees
164. See, e.g., Thor Power Tool Co. v. Commissioner, 439 U.S. 522, 542 (1979) (stating that major
responsibility of accountant is to protect management, shareholders, creditors, and others properly interested
from being misled and that major responsibility of IRS is to protect public fisc).
165. By this I do not mean to suggest that outside review of a legislature's scorekeeping judgments
would be unconstitutional under current law. To the contrary, in Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714 (1986),
the Court held that Congress's attempt to retain the scorekeeping function within the legislative branch, in
the person of the Comptroller General, was an infringement on executive power. Nevertheless, it is clear
that Congress was concerned about reposing the scorekeeping function in the executive branch.
166. See OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT & BUDGET, CIRCULAR No. A-34, INSTRUCTIONS ON BUDGET
EXECUTION 91 21.1, at 11-4 (Nov. 1994).
167. See DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY, supra note 20, at 335. Interest on special issues of debt
securities held by trust funds and other Government accounts, by contrast, is normally recorded on a cash
1492 [Vol. 106: 1449
Balanced Budget Amendment
is accrued when the loans are disbursed;'" and (3) so-called cash equivalent
transactions are treated as cash transactions. '6 All three deviations are
implemented through mechanical rules that do not require the exercise of any
significant judgment.
We are faced, therefore, with a choice between, on the one hand, an
inaccurate accounting method that permits circumvention, encourages distorted
decisionmaking, and fails to protect the value of intergenerational equity but
allows Congress to operate without outside review, and, on the other hand, an
accounting method that can be made as accurate and effective as desired but
requires an independent body to keep score. I will discuss the pros and cons of
an independent scorekeeper later. Nevertheless, an effective, enforceable,
politically nondistortive balanced budget amendment must use accrual accounting.
The decision made in the 1995-96 Senate Draft to enshrine the cash method
forever in the Constitution is wrong.
70
B. Scope of the Amendment
A second problem in structuring and interpreting a balanced budget
amendment is that of defining the entities or programs to which it applies. To the
extent that Congress has the ability to move receipts into, or outlays and debt out
of, an amendment's computations, it may meet the technical requirements of the
amendment simply by redefining what is included in the budget, without making
any real changes to receipts, outlays, or debt. The 1995-96 Senate Draft speaks
in terms of receipts and outlays of "the United States Government"'' and
imposes limits on "the debt of the United States held by the public. '" " What
is "the United States Government"? What is "debt of the United States"? What
is "the public"? The answer to each of these questions is less certain, more
complex, and more subject to manipulation than one might hope.
Current budgetary practice draws no distinction between the United States
and so-called "government-owned corporations" like the Postal Service, the
basis. See id. In the case of debt purchased by the MilitaO Retirement Trust Fund or the Education Benefits
Trust Fund, however, the difference between purchase price and the par salue of the debt is amortized oser
the life of the debt. See id.
168. See id.
169. Debt instruments such as bonds, debentures, notes. or moneiary credits are treated as cash for this
purpose. See id. at 334. In addition, lease-purchasc transactions arc recorded as direct purchases See id
at 334-35. Government deposits with the International Monetary fund are treated as cash. as are holdings
of foreign currency by the Exchange Stabilization Fund. See id. at 337 Gold is treated as cash as ",cl. and
sales of gold are therefore treated as a means of financing. See td at 336
170. 1 do not here advocate the adoption of any particular form of accrual accounting The accrual
method used for federal income tax purposes is clearly imperfect. See. e.g. GRAETZ & Sc'EK. stipra note
107, at 713-14. In Section III.A below. I argue for the creation of an independent scorekeeper Implicit in
this recommendation is that such a scorekeeper would adopt and refine accrual accounting rules structured
to protect the values the amendment is intended to further.
171. S.J. Res. I, 104th Cong. § 7 (1995), reprinted ti Appendix.
172. Id. § 2.
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Resolution Trust Corporation, the Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation, and the
Government National Mortgage Association (more familiarly known as "Ginnie
Mae"). 73 Outlays and receipts of entities in both categories are consolidated in
a single budget, analogous to a consolidated tax return or financial statement,
known as the "Budget of the United States Government," which is subject to
congressional control under the Appropriations Clause of the Constitution. 74
The budgets of those entities not subject to congressional review and
appropriation-including so-called "government-sponsored enterprises" like the
Student Loan Marketing Association ("Sallie Mae"), the Federal National
Mortgage Association ("Fannie Mae"), and the Federal Home Loan Mortgage
Corporation ("Freddie Mac")-are treated as private entities 75 and excluded
from the budget. Thus the Federal Reserve System, although an agency of the
United States, is excluded from the federal budget because its funds are exempt
by statute from congressional review and appropriation.
76
The consolidated budget of the United States government is broken into at
least four types of funds: one general fund and a number of special funds,
revolving funds, and trust funds.'" Whether the outlays and receipts of an
administrative unit are accounted for through a given type of fund is not
necessarily related to whether the unit is structured as an integral part of the
United States or as a separate corporate entity. The general fund accounts for
many core governmental activities: Its receipts include most income and excise
taxes, and its outlays, many of the principal expenses of government, include
interest on the national debt.178 Special funds (such as the Land and Water
Conservation Fund) and trust funds (such as the Social Security trust funds)
account for programs financed by collections from specific sources.
179
Revolving funds-both "public enterprise" funds and intergovernmental
funds-account for entities or programs that charge for the sale of goods or
services. The Postal Service, which is a separate corporate entity, and the Federal
173. See DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY, supra note 20, at 330-31 (noting that budget includes all
government entities except government-sponsored enterprises).
174. The Appropriations Clause provides: "No Money shall be drawn from the Treasury, but in
Consequence of Appropriations made by Law; and a regular Statement and Account of the Receipts and
Expenditures of all public Money shall be published from time to time." U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 9, cl. 7.
175. See DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY, supra note 20, at 330 (discussing government-sponsored
enterprises generally); DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY, BUDGET OF THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT,
FISCAL YEAR 1997, APPENDIX 1129-45 (1996) (describing existing government-sponsored enterprises and
their budgets).
176. See DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY, supra note 20, at 330. The System's net earnings, however,
are transferred annually to the Treasury and recorded as receipts. See id.
177. See id. at 331. In addition, the budget includes so-called "credit program accounts," which record
the subsidy cost of government loans and loan guarantees. As loans are disbursed, amounts are transferred
from the appropriate credit program account to a nonbudgetary "credit financing account." Id. at 335-36.
In effect, program accounts serve as budgetary reserves for loan outlays accrued but not paid under special
budgetary rules for the accrual of loan program expenses.
178. See id. at 255; SCHICK, supra note 86, at 14.
179. See DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY, supra note 20, at 255; SCHICK, supra note 86, at 14,
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Buildings Fund, which is not, are both accounted for as revolving funds."W
Collections by revolving funds are treated as offsets to outlays, not as "receipts."
As a result, only outlays net of collections are currently subject to budgetary
control.' 8 All funds other than trust funds are known collectively as "federal
funds"; trust funds are not included in this aggregation.' Finally, three funds
whose outlays and receipts are in fact reported as part of the budget are deemed
"off-budget" by law: the Postal Service and the two Social Security trust
funds. 8 3 The government accommodates this paradox by including their outlays
and receipts in the budget but labeling them "off-budget."'" The only outlays
and receipts excluded from the budget are those of entities whose budgets are
exempt from congressional review and appropriation. Somewhat confusingly,
these entities are also sometimes referred to as "off-budget."
Consistent with this complexity, the government reports at least three annual
deficit figures: the unified or consolidated deficit, the on-budget deficit, and the
federal funds deficit.' The deficit most commonly reported in news accounts
is the unified deficit, which aggregates all budgetary outlays and receipts,
including on-budget items deemed "off-budget" by law but not items actually
excluded from the budget. Consistent with its name, the on-budget deficit
excludes items deemed "off-budget" by law, that is, outlays and receipts of the
Postal Service and the two Social Security trust funds.'" Because the Social
Security system currently runs a large surplus, the on-budget deficit is currently
much larger than the unified deficit." 7 The federal funds deficit, finally, omits
the outlays and receipts of all trust funds.'"
On its face, the 1995-96 Senate Draft appears to track current budgetary
practice. The balanced budget requirement of section 1 is applied by section 7 to
the "United States Government,""' a term that seems to refer to the same
"United States Government" for which a budget is now enacted and published
each year'9 -- that is, the aggregate of all entities or programs whose budgets
180. See DEPARTMET OF THE TREASURY. supra note 20. at 476 (Federal Buildings Fund). id. at 493
(Postal Service). Revolving funds are further divided into two categories: "public enterprise funds." which
are used to account for programs that conduct business-type operations, prmarily sith the public, in ,hich
outlays generate collections, and "intragovemmental funds," which are used to account for business-typc
operations within and between government agencies. See id. at 331.
181. See id. at 255, 331-32.
182. See id. at 331.
183. See id. at 330.
184. See SCHICK, supra note 86, at 14.
185. See id. at 28-29. Two other deficits are generally reported: the operating deficit. %%hich excludes
investment in physical capital, and the structural deficit, which estimates what the unified deficit should be
if the economy were operating at 5.5% unemployment, excluding the effects of extraordinary ecnts such
as the Persian Gulf War. See id. at 29-3 1.
186. See id. at 28.
187. See id.
188. See id. at 28-29.
189. SJ. Res. I, 104th Cong. § 7 (1995), reprinted in Appendix.
190. See, e.g., DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY. BUDGET OF TE UNITED STATES GO%,ER*',%IENT.
FISCAL YEAR 1996 (1995).
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are subject to congressional review and appropriation. The language of section 2,
which applies to "debt of the United States held by the public," similarly invokes
a phrase now used to refer to debt issued by those same entities or programs' 9'
and held either by private investors or by entities or programs whose budgets are
not subject to congressional review.' 92 Such a reading, combined with the
modified cash method currently used by Congress, would target the "unified
deficit." It would also make the balanced budget amendment coextensive with the
Appropriations Clause, which, at least in theory, defines the boundaries of the
current budget.' 93
Although facially attractive, adoption of the line used to define the scope of
the Appropriations Clause to define the scope of a balanced budget amendment
creates serious problems. First, Congress has asserted the power to determine by
statute whether entities are subject to the Appropriations Clause. By statute, for
example, the Federal Reserve System, a federal agency exercising quintessentially
governmental powers, is exempt from the appropriations process, excluded from
the budget, and counted as part of the "public" for purposes of measuring debt
of the United States held by the public.' 94 As has been noted, the Resolution
Funding Corporation was statutorily excluded from the budget to circumvent then-
existing balanced budget rules; its sole purpose was to incur off-budget debt to
finance the Resolution Trust Corporation, which is on-budget. 95 If a unitary
standard were to be adopted for both the Appropriations Clause and a balanced
budget amendment, and Congress's asserted power to define that standard were
to be upheld or insulated from constitutional challenge, Congress would have the
191. The 1995 Committee Report states that "'debt of the United States held by the public ...° is a
widely used and understood measurement tool.... The current, accepted meaning of 'debt ... held by the
public' is intended to be the controlling definition under this article." S. REP. No. 104-5, at 16 (1995). The
report quotes the GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, supra note 104, which defines "debt held by the public"
as "[t]hat part of the gross federal debt held outside of the federal government." Id. at 38. The term "gross
federal debt" is then defined to include all public and agency debt. Public debt consists of debt incurred
when the Treasury or the Federal Financing Bank borrows directly from the public or another fund or
account. Agency debt includes debt of other budgetary entities and therefore does not include debt of
"government-sponsored enterprises." Id. at 37. The proposed debt ceiling rules thus differ significantly from
the current statutory federal debt limit. Currently, the ceiling is not limited to debt held by the "public."
In addition, not all Treasury debt is subject to the current limit; silver certificates and debt issued by the
Federal Financing Bank, a part of the Treasury Department, are not. See DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY,
supra note 20, at 194. Moreover, all agency debt except debentures issued by the Federal Housing
Administration is currently exempt. See id.
192. The 1995 Committee Report states: 'Debt Held by the Public ... includes any federal debt held
by individuals, corporations, state or local governments, the Federal Reserve System, and foreign
governments and central banks. Debt held by government trust funds, revolving funds, and special funds
is excluded from debt held by the public."' S. REP. No. 104-5, at 16 (quoting GENERAL AccOUNTINO
OFFICE, supra note 104).
193. The Appropriations Clause prohibits expenditures out of "the Treasury" without appropriation.
See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 7. The 1995 Committee Report states similarly: "' ... Total receipts ...'
is intended to include all moneys received by the Treasury of the United States ... except those derived
from borrowing ........ Total outlays . . .' is intended to include all disbursements from the Treasury of
the United States ... except those for repayment of debt principal." S. REP. No. 104-5, at 19. The
Tennessee Valley Authority, however, is intended to be off-budget for amendment purposes. See id.
194. See DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY, supra note 20, at 331.
195. See supra note 162 and accompanying text.
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power to exempt outlays and debt from the limitations of a balanced budget
amendment at will.
Solving this problem by permitting the courts to set a unitary constitutional
standard for both the Appropriations Clause and a balanced budget amendment
creates other difficulties. The current working definition of the scope of the
Appropriations Clause may not be constitutionally sound. The statute that exempts
the Federal Reserve System from congressional budgetary control,' for
example, is difficult to reconcile with the Appropriations Clause.'1 Defining the
scope of a politically contentious balanced budget amendment by reference to
current budgetary practice is likely to bring such constitutional issues to the fore.
This might, in turn, force unanticipated changes in the structure of the federal
government. Most worrisome is the possibility that the Federal Reserve System
would lose control over its budget. If the Fed's budgetary independence
contributes to the independence of its monetary policy from political
influence, 9" such a loss might compromise U.S. monetary discipline. In such
an event, a balanced budget amendment would represent at best a Pyrrhic victory.
Even a constitutionally defined standard, however, is unlikely to prevent
Congress from manipulating the limits of the amendment if the same line is used
for both Appropriations Clause and balanced budget purposes. The courts have
long held that money genuinely held in trust by the United States is not "public
money" subject to appropriation or budgetary control.'9 Whether money is held
in trust is, in turn, a question of property law subject to statutory resolution.
Adoption of the Appropriations Clause line for balanced budget purposes would
therefore allow Congress to insulate programs from a balanced budget
amendment's limitations simply by converting such programs to trust form.
Currently, no programs subject to appropriation are so structured. 'Trust funds"
are not trusts in the conventional sense; all moneys held by such funds are the
196. See 12 U.S.C. § 244 (1994) ("[Flunds derived from such assessments shall not be construed to
be Government funds or appropriated moneys.").
197. See U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 9, cl. 7. Both the Comptroller General and the Attorne, General hase
opined that Federal Reserve funds are "public moneys." See 3 Comp. Gen. 190. 192-93 (1924). 30 Op
Att'y Gen. 308, 309-10 (1919).
198. It is not clear whether financial independence is necessary for the effectt'c functioning of a
central bank. See, e.g., ALEX CUKIERMAN, CENTRAL BANK STRATEGY. CREDIBILITY. AND IDEPENDENCE
(1992) (describing benefits of central bank independence and de'.eloping proxy variables for such
independence). The Federal Reserve System's authorizing statutes. ho%%ever. do evidence Congress's belief
that such independence is important. See CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET OFFICE. TilE BUDGETARY STATUS OF
THE FEDERAL RESERVE SYSTEM at xiii (Feb. 1985) ("This insulated budgetary status has enabled the
Federal Reserve to make decisions with relative independence from Congressional and Prestdental
influence."); SUBCOMM. ON GENERAL CREDIT CONTROL AND DEBT MANAGE.MENT OF TIlE JOINT CO'Itt
ON THE ECONOMIC REPORT, 82D CONG., MONETARY POLICY AND TIE NANAGE.M -ENT OF TiE PUBLIC DEBr
62 (1952) (expressing fear that "if the Federal Reserve System were subjected to standard appropriation
procedure-with all the structural changes in the System which this would imply---he role of monetary
policy in the economic affairs of the Government would inevitably be curtailed and an important bulwark
against inflation would be weakened").
199. See, e.g., United States v. Ten Thousand Dollars in U.S. Currency. 860 F2d 15 11. 1514 (9th Cir.
1988); Emery v. United States. 186 F.2d 900, 902 (9th Cir. 1951); Varney v. Warchime. 147 F2d 238. 245
(6th Cir. 1945); United States v. Rogers, 81 F. 941. 943 (9th Cir. 1897).
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property of the government.2°° Congress could, however, convert many such
programs into genuine trusts. For example, Congress might declare that Social
Security funds are not government property but are held in trust for future
beneficiaries; the result would be to take Social Security off-budget, 20' exclude
Social Security premiums from "receipts" for balanced budget purposes, and
exempt Social Security benefits from any cuts required in the event of a
government deficit.
It may also prove difficult to define a unitary constitutional standard that
prevents manipulation of the line between government-owned and government-
sponsored corporations. In general, entities owned in part by the government are
currently treated as part of the government; entities in which the government has
no equity interest are not.2' Even if such a rule were constitutionalized, all
Congress would have to do to place an entity off-budget would be to authorize
it to issue stock to private shareholders and create incentives for the purchase of
such stock.
At least in the context of the 1995-96 Senate Draft, the 1995 Senate
committee report creates a further obstacle to the adoption of a unitary standard.
Apparently to reassure affected constituencies, the report states:
Among the Federal programs that would not be covered by S.J. Res. 1
is the electric power program of the Tennessee Valley Authority. Since
1959, the financing of that program has been the sole responsibility of
its own electric ratepayers-not the U.S. Treasury and the Nation's
taxpayers. Consequently, the receipts and outlays of that program are not
part of the problem S.J. Res. 1 is directed at solving.0 3
200. See DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY, supra note 20, at 331 (contrasting use of term for federal
budgetary purposes with general legal usage).
201. Whether Social Security should be part of the budget subject to any balanced budget amendment
has been the subject of considerable controversy. See. e.g., H.R. REP. No. 104-3, at 28-30 (1995)
(dissenting views) (asserting that balanced budget amendment will place Social Security at risk). In 1995,
several senators stated that they would have voted for the 1995-96 Senate Draft if Social Security had been
removed from the budget for amendment purposes. See, e.g., 141 CONG. REc. S3514 (daily ed. Mar. 6,
1995) (statement of Sen. Boxer). Removal would have at least three consequences. First, any excess of
Social Security receipts over Social Security expenditures would not be available to mask larger deficits
in other parts of the budget; in the short run, the deficits subject to the amendment would appear much
larger. Second, cutting Social Security expenditures would not cut the reported deficit; Social Security
expenditures would thus be effectively immune from any remedial action imposed as a result of the
amendment. Finally, the amendment would not require that the Social Security program itself be run in a
manner consistent with institutional responsibility, intergenerational equity, and economic prudence. For
those concerned about Social Security benefits, the worst result would be for Social Security to remain on-
budget for amendment purposes until the program itself goes into deficit (permitting Social Security receipts
to mask deficits elsewhere and Social Security cuts to constitute budget-balancing) and then moved off-
budget for amendment purposes and be self-funding thereafter.
202. See DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY, supra note 175, at 1129-45 (describing structure and
operations of current government-sponsored enterprises); A. Michael Froomkin, Reinventing the
Government Corporation, 1995 U. ILL. L. REV. 543, 547-48, 554-55 (contrasting wholly-owned and
mixed-ownership government corporations).
203. S. REP. No. 104-5, at 19 (1995).
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The TVA is an on-budget instrumentality of the United States Government,
accounted for as a revolving fund subject to the Appropriations Clause, which has
recently (notwithstanding the report's suggestion to the contrary) run a deficit of
between $500 million and $1 billion per year.20 If the foregoing 1995 Senate
committee report language were given effect, the 1995-96 Senate Draft and the
Appropriations Clause cannot be coextensive.
Articulating a general principle that would exempt the TVA, but not other
government programs, from the 1995-96 Senate Draft is a difficult task. By
definition, all revolving funds are financed by business-type activities, except to
the extent of deficits.20 One reading of the quoted language in the 1995 Senate
committee report might be to exempt all revolving funds, or at least all "public
enterprise" funds, from the amendment. Transfers from the general fund to cover
revolving fund deficits would constitute "outlays," but revolving funds themselves
could nevertheless borrow for their own accounts without such debt constituting
"debt of the United States." Any such construction, however, would open major
holes in the amendment. The current budget contains scores of both "public
enterprise" funds, which conduct business operations primarily with the
public,2°6 and "intragovernmental" funds, which conduct business operations
204. See DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY, supra note 20. at 495.
205. See id. at 331.
206. See id. at 385-500. Government entities accounted for completely or primanly as -public
enterprise" funds include the National Technical Information Service, the William Langer Jewel Beanng
Plant, the Helium Fund, the Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation. the Saint Lawrence Seaway
Development Corporation, the Exchange Stabilization Fund. the Office of Thrift Supervison. the Farm
Credit Administration, the Farm Credit System Insurance Corporation. the Federal Deposit Insurance
Corporation, the Federal Housing Finance Board, the National Credit Union Administration, the Panama
Canal Commission, the Postal Service, the Resolution Trust Corporation. the Tennessee Valley Authority.
and the U.S. Enrichment Corporation Fund. See id.
Less well-known "public enterprise" funds include the Agency for International DEselopmcnt' s
Property Management Fund; the Military Sales Program's Special Defense Acquisition Fund. the Grain
Inspection, Packers and Stockyards Administration's inspection and weighing senices, the Farm Service
Agency's Federal Crop Insurance Corporation and Commodity Credit Corporation Funds: the Rural Utilities
Service's Rural Communication Development Fund liquidating account: the Rural Business and Cooperative
Development Service's Alternative Agricultural Research and Commercialization Rcsoling Fund, the
National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration's Coastal Zone Management Fund and Damage
Assessment and Restoration Revolving Fund; the Defense Department's Homeowners Assistance and
National Defense Stockpile Transaction Funds; the Office of Postsecondary Education's College Housing
Loans program; the Energy Department's Isotope Production and Distribution Program Fund: the Food and
Drug Administration's revolving fund for certification and other services; the Health Resources and
Services Administration's Health Loan Fund; the Health Care Financing Administration's Health
Maintenance Organization Loan and Loan Guarantee Fund: the Housing and Urban Development
Department's low-rent public housing loans, Community Planning and Development Revolving. Rental
Housing Assistance, Flexible Subsidy, and Homeowners Assistance Funds: the Bureau of Reclamation's
Lower Colorado River Basin Development Fund; the Federal Railway Administration's Railroad
Rehabilitation and Improvement Liquidating Account: the Federal Aviation Administration's Aviation
Insurance Revolving Fund; the Maritime Administration's Vessel Operations and War Risk Insurance
Revolving Funds; the U.S. Mint's Public Enterprise Fund; the Internal Revenue Service's Federal Tax Lben
Revolving Fund; the Veterans Health Administration's Medical Facilities and Canteen Service Revolving
Funds, Special Therapeutic and Rehabilitation Activities Fund. and medical center research organizations.
the Veterans Benefits Administration's Service-Disabled Veterans Insurance. Veterans Reopened Insurance.
and Servicemen's Group Life Insurance Funds; the Veterans Affairs Department's Parking Garage
Revolving Fund; the Environmental Protection Administration's Reregistration and Expedited Processing
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primarily within and between government agencies.207 In addition, many funds
currently classified as special funds or trust funds could probably be converted
into revolving ones. Social Security, for example, could be recast as a public
enterprise fund engaged in the business of providing retirement insurance to
working Americans.
If neither a line coextensive with the Appropriations Clause nor the line
implied by the foregoing language in the 1995 Senate committee report is
workable, how should the boundaries of a balanced budget amendment be
defined? An approach sometimes used by states with constitutional balanced
budget provisions is to exclude any entity whose debt is not secured by the
general credit of the state from the scope of balanced budget computations.08
The state experience in this regard provides little basis for optimism; the principal
consequence of such a rule seems to be higher overall interest costs, not an
effective cap on borrowing. 209 Applying the same rule to section 2 of the
1995-96 Senate Draft, however, would result at best in a patchwork system, since
the debt of many on-budget entities is not secured while the debt of some off-
budget entities is.
210
In any event, such a line would be relatively easy to circumvent. Consider
the following transaction: Congress creates a new off-budget entity, which I will
call the National Parks Authority, contributes the minimum cash necessary to
make the Authority creditworthy, say $20 billion, and grants the Authority a
secure source of revenue. The Authority buys the national parks from the United
States for $100 billion, raising the remaining $80 billion by issuing bonds to the
public and using the parks as collateral. The Authority then operates the parks as
they have always been operated, using its secure source of revenue to service the
debt. In reality, Congress has merely borrowed against existing government
assets. Because the Authority is an off-budget entity whose debts are not secured
by the general credit of the United States, however, it is treated as private for
budgetary accounting purposes. As a result, the price paid for the parks is treated
as a "receipt" deemed to contribute toward a balanced budget, and the new debt
is exempt from budgetary limitations. This technique, commonly known as
securitization, is only one of a number of sophisticated approaches to credit
enhancement commonly used in the private sector, each of which would create
Revolving Fund; the General Services Administration's Consumer Information Center Fund; the Small
Business Administration's Surety Bond Guarantees Revolving Fund; the Federal Emergency Management
Agency's National Insurance Development and National Flood Insurance Funds; and the Pennsylvania
Avenue Development Corporation's Land Acquisition and Development Fund. See id. If the budgets of all
other such public enterprise funds were excluded, a balanced budget amendment would be porous Indeed.
207. Most of the Government's current intragovernmental funds are used for purposes of internal
administration. A few, including Federal Prison Industries, Inc., the Federal Financing Bank, and the Bureau
of Engraving and Printing, exist as separate entities. See id. at 428-29, 450.
208. See, e.g., HEINS, supra note I1, at 13-27 (reviewing role of nonguaranteed state debt).
209. See id. at 36-81 (discussing additional interest and other costs associated with nonguaranteed
borrowing).
210. See SCHICK, supra note 86, at 16.
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yet another possible avenue for circumvention of a balanced budget
requirement.2t!
More work needs to be done on defining the boundaries of any amendment.
One possible approach might be to define as part of the government any entity
subject to effective control by federal appointees.21 2  The successful
implementation of this or any other line, however, is likely to require some
degree of outside review. If Congress retains unsupervised control over the scope
of the amendment, abuses are likely regardless of the line chosen.
C. When to Test
The question of when to test involves similar trade-offs. If the test is applied
during the legislative process, it will constrain that process directly; if applied
later, the amendment cannot directly limit congressional action. In addition, the
later the test is applied, the harder it will be to remedy noncompliance; eventually
a point will be reached where effective remedial action is impossible. An effective
amendment will test the projected consequences of congressional action during
the legislative process itself, so as to encourage congressional adherence to the
values the amendment is supposed to protect. This will require that estimates be
made of the likely budgetary consequences of proposed action, which will in turn
require the exercise of judgment and, to prevent circumvention of the amendment,
independent review of that judgment. The alternative, a test applied only when
money is actually received and spent, eliminates the need for outside review but
permits Congress to continue to act irresponsibly, limits remedial options, and
may ultimately reduce Congress's participation in the formulation of a remedy.
The problem arises because there is generally a delay between congressional
action and any resulting effect on the deficit. Current federal budgetary
procedures are built around three concepts: budgetary authority, obligations, and
outlays. 213 Congress votes on budgetary authority. A grant of budgetary
authority authorizes an agency to incur obligations; that is, to purchase goods or
services, enter into contracts, or undertake other actions that may result in a claim
for payment. The actual payment is called an "outlay." Incurring obligations and
making outlays are generally executive, not legislative, functions.
Outlays are not necessarily made in the year in which budgetary authority is
voted. When Congress authorizes the purchase of an aircraft carrier, for example,
the contract may not be signed until a subsequent year, and payments to the
shipbuilder are likely to be spread over many years; their timing may depend on
factors beyond the control of the government. In any fiscal year, therefore, the
211. For a general discussion of securitization techniques. see Joseph C. Shenker & Anthony J.
Colletta, Asset Securitization: Evolution, Current Issues and New Frontiers. 69 TEX. L. REV 1369 (199 1).
212. See Froomkin, supra note 202, at 630-31 (proposing actual control as test for v.anety of purposes,
apparently including budgetary purposes).
213. See DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY, supra note 20, at 333-35: SCHICK. supra note 86. at 19-20
1997] 1501
The Yale Law Journal
government normally spends only part of the budgetary authority approved for
that year; all or part of the remainder may be carried forward to future years. At
the same time, the government may spend part of the budgetary authority carried
forward from prior years. 4
In addition, a substantial portion of government spending is subject to so-
called "permanent" appropriations: budgetary authority enacted for more than one
year and often indefinitely. For example, Congress has given the executive branch
permanent authority to make interest payments on the national debt. 15 Spending
programs subject to permanent appropriation, which currently include Social
Security, Medicare, veterans' pensions, welfare, and farm subsidies, among others,
are referred to as "direct," "nondiscretionary," or "mandatory" spending or,
sometimes, as "entitlements"; spending subject to annual appropriation is called
"discretionary spending." '216 The projected cost of permanent appropriations,
absent a change in law, is called the "baseline.' 2t 7 A law reducing permanent
appropriations does not necessarily reduce spending; it may merely reduce the
rate of projected increase in spending. Nevertheless, it represents an affirmative
decision of Congress to reduce what it had previously authorized to be spent. On
the revenue side, taxes are generally imposed and collections authorized by
permanent, rather than annual, legislation. Revenues for a particular year cannot
be predicted with perfect accuracy because they almost always depend, in part,
on factors outside the control of the government, such as taxpayer behavior or the
state of the economy.
The delay between congressional action and its effect on receipts and outlays
creates two problems. First, a budget approved by Congress for a given fiscal
year requires that revenues and budgetary authority defined other than in dollar
terms be estimated. The choice of estimating techniques can determine whether
that budget is projected to meet a given fiscal target. For example, a technique
that assumes that a tax cut will stimulate the economy, thereby triggering
economic growth, may lead to the conclusion that such a tax cut will result in an
increase in revenue. This technique, sometimes known as "dynamic scoring,"
allows a tax cut to be scored as a tax or, more accurately, revenue increase. Such
scoring permits Congress to cut taxes, increase spending, and "balance" the
budget, all at the same time.21
214. See DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY, supra note 20, at 333-35 (describing relationship between
authority, obligations, and outlays); SCHICK, supra note 86, at 19-21 (same).
215. See 31 U.S.C. § 3123 (1994).
216. See DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY, supra note 20, at 327. Estimates of the relative sizes of
different types of federal spending are given infra text accompanying notes 289-97. It will be seen that
permanent appropriations comprise a relatively large portion of all appropriated expenditures.
217. See CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET OFFICE, supra note 46, at 149 ("(B]aseline: A benchmark for
measuring the budgetary effects of proposed changes in federal revenues or spending. As specified In the
Budget Enforcement Act of 1990 (BEA), the baseline for revenues and entitlement spending generally
assumes that laws now on the statute books will continue."); SCHICK, supra note 86, at 20-24 (describing
role of baseline projections in budget process)
218. See, e.g., 1995 Joint Hearings, supra note 2, Part t, at 7, 9 (statement of Sen. Kyl) (asserting that
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A second issue is the choice of period over which to measure the effects of
a given proposal. Even if conservative techniques are used to estimate projected
receipts and outlays, the choice of period can dramatically affect the estimators'
conclusions. The "Contract With America," for example, proposed a new system
of depreciation for equipment placed into service after 1994.29 For short-lived
equipment, the new system was somewhat less generous than existing law; for
longer-lived equipment, however, it was far more generous. As a result,
estimators projected an $18 billion revenue increase during the first five years and
a $139 billion revenue loss during the next five, with revenue losses exploding
even more thereafter.22° For budget balancing purposes, Congress focused only
on the first five years and was therefore able to score this tax cut as a significant
revenue increase, permitting additional tax cuts in other areas. If Congress
controls scorekeeping rules, skillful use of estimating techniques and periods may
allow it effectively to circumvent the spirit of any balanced budget requirements.
Under the 1995-96 Senate Draft, no estimation is required, but the only
relevant year is the current fiscal year. Because section I is framed in terms of
actual, not authorized, outlays and receipts and section 2 in terms of limits on
borrowing, the need for which arises only when money is actually spent,
compliance is tested when money is spent, not when spending is authorized. The
1995 Senate committee report then goes further, explaining that compliance with
section 1 is to be tested only retrospectively for the year as a whole. 2' This
means that the test cannot be performed until the year has closed, at which time,
the report reassures its anxious senatorial readers, it will be too late for anyone
tax cut can generate more revenue); 1995 House Hearings. supra note 2. at 234. 236 (statement of Charles
J. Whalen, Resident Scholar, Jerome Levy Economics Institute) (discussing d)namic scoring), Bruce
Bartlett, The Case for Dynamic Scoring, WALL ST. J. EUR.. July 31. 1996. at 6 (asserting that dynamic
scoring is warranted); Martin Feldstein, Board of Contributors: The Case for D4namic Anal st. WALL ST
J., Dec. 14, 1994, at A14 (arguing that dynamic scoring is necessar)). But see Keeping Score on the
Budget, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 5, 1994, at AI8 (criticizing Republican proposals for dynamic sconng); Peter
Passell, Some Creative Ways Republicans Could Deliver on the Contract, N.Y. TimES. Nov 17. 1994, at
D2 (discussing dynamic scoring as way of fudging numbers); Laura D'Andrea Tyson. DYnamic Scoring:
Not Ready for Prime Time, WALL ST. J., Jan. 12, 1995, at A14 (critiquing Bartlctt and Feldstein positions).
For more extensive discussions of the problem, see Michael D. Bopp. The Roles of Revenue Estimation and
Scoring in the Federal Budget Process, TAX NOTES TODAY. Sept. 24. 1992. available in LEXIS. Taxana
Library, TNT File, 92 TNT 194-108; Jane G. Gravelle. Can a Capital Gains Tax Cut Pay for Itself'. TAX
NOTES TODAY, Mar. 23, 1990, available in LEXIS, Taxana Library. TNT File, 90 TNT 131-9; Robert D.
Reischauer, Budget Estimates: Current Practices and Alternative Approaches. CBO Report for Joint
Hearing of House and Senate Budget Committees, TAX NOTES TODAY. Jan. II. 1995. available in LEXIS.
Taxana Library, TNT File, 95 TNT 7-16; Robert D. Reischauer Effects of Lower Capital Gains Taxes on
Economic Growth, TAX NOTES TODAY, Aug. 31, 1990, available in LEXIS. Taxana Library. TNT File. 90
TNT 181-1.
219. See House Republican Conference Legislative Digest, Tax Fairness and Deficit Reduction Act.
H.R. 1215, TAX NOTES TODAY, Mar. 28, 1995, available in LEXIS. Taxana Library. TNT File. 95 TNT
67-53.
220. See Albert J. Davis, Budget Implications of Contract with America Tax Cuts. TAX NOTES TODAY.
May 8, 1995, available in LEXIS, Taxana Library. TNT File. 95 TNIT 91-89. Davis notes that the full
revenue losses from the proposed depreciation system would not appear for about 30 years. Overall. he
notes, the tax package is projected to lose S189 billion during the first five years (the period counted for
budget-balancing purposes) but another $452 billion in the following five years. See id.
221. See S. REP. No. 104-5, at 10-1 (1995).
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to impose a remedy if Congress has not already complied voluntarily.2 ' Under
either reading, compliance is not tested and therefore is not required at any time
during the legislative process. As a result, the draft imposes no direct limitation
whatsoever on legislative action. Its controls, to the extent that they are
enforceable at all, are imposed instead on an executive activity-the spending
itself.
2 3
The Draft thus avoids the problems inherent in estimation. It does so,
however, at the cost of extreme short-sightedness. So far as the amendment is
concerned, nothing projected to occur beyond the end of the current fiscal year
matters. As a result, the Draft does not prohibit prospective tax cuts or spending
increases, no matter how extravagant. Admittedly, all chickens eventually come
home to roost. In the meantime, however, Congress may act as irresponsibly as
it wishes, dispensing future tax cuts and committing the government to future
spending with wild abandon.
D. Accommodating Fiscal Policy
The final problem is accommodating macroeconomic concerns. Here, the
problem is not primarily one of potential circumvention but rather how to
implement what is, in part, a macroeconomic constitutional provision in ways that
make economic sense. As has been noted, an amendment that fails to address this
problem may require unnecessarily painful transitions, aggravate recessions or
depressions, and eliminate the budget's current countercyclical stabilization
function. Unfortunately, no formulaic adjustment has yet been suggested that
resolves all these issues satisfactorily.
One obvious economic inaccuracy of most proposed deficit measures is their
failure to adjust for inflation. 224 Such an adjustment can radically alter
conclusions as to the size of the deficit problem.m Assume, for example, that
the national debt at the beginning of the year is $5 trillion. Over the course of the
year, the government runs a $200 billion nominal deficit and borrows the extra
$200 billion. At the end of the year, the national debt is therefore $5.2 trillion.
Assume, however, that inflation for the year is 5%. In inflation-adjusted dollars,
therefore, the national debt at the end of the year is only $4.95 trillion. In other
222. See id.; infra notes 250-51 and accompanying text.
223. The many substantive problems (and few benefits) that flow from this decision will be discussed
infra Section II.D.
224. See, e.g., COX ET AL., supra note 41, at 22; cf CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET OFFICE, THE FEDERAL
DEFICIT: DOES IT REALLY MEASURE THE GOVERNMENT'S EFFECT ON NATIONAL SAVING? 15-19 (1990).
225. See generally ROBERT EISNER, How REAL IS THE FEDERAL DEFICIT? 9-25 (1986) (discussing
"tricks played by inflation"); William G. Dewald, CBO and OMB Projections, Adjusted for Inflation, Show
Federal Budget Deficit Under Control, ECON. REV. (Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond), Nov.-Dec. 1985,
at 15, 17 (illustrating how failure to adjust budget for inflation makes standard measures of deficit
deceptive).
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words, the real debt has gone down, not up. In real terms, the government has run
a $50 billion surplus, not a $200 billion deficit.
2 '
Congress has long recognized the need to make inflation adjustments to other
financial measures. 227 Other economic indicators are generally inflation-adjusted.
For those attempting to set fiscal policy, this difference may be vitally important.
Indeed, some economists have argued that when inflation is accounted for, fiscal
policy has a much larger effect on the economy than has been acknowledged.
Such a conclusion, if confirmed, might provide an additional argument for
controlling the deficit thus defined. 2 9 Even so, such an adjustment would not,
by itself, solve the problems of transition, downturn, and countercyclical
stabilization.23
Another possible adjustment would account for changes in levels of economic
activity.23' A deficit caused by recession is arguably less troubling than one
caused by congressional irresponsibility. A balanced budget amendment should
attempt to control the latter, not the former. In addition, an amendment
incorporating an adjustment for economic conditions may be structured to require
a balanced budget over the business cycle, not merely over an economically
arbitrary fiscal year. This may, at least partially, accommodate the problem of
downturns and continue to permit the federal government to play a
countercyclical stabilizing role.
Perhaps with these possibilities in mind, the Treasury separates the nominal
deficit into two parts, the so-called "cyclical deficit," which reflects the lower
receipts and higher expenses that occur automatically whenever there is slack in
the economy, and the "structural deficit," an estimate of what the deficit would
be if the economy were operating at full employment.232 The effect of requiring
a balanced structural deficit would be to permit a nominal deficit during
recessions and require a nominal surplus during periods of full employment.
226. In effect, inflation is a tax imposed on the holders of dollar-denominatd goemmcnt debt In
the hypothetical in the text the debt is worth $250 billion less. in real terms, at the end of the )ear and the
government, again in real terms, is $250 billion wealthier. The "recetpt'" from this "tax" concn a 5200
billion deficit into a S50 billion surplus.
227. See, e.g., I.R.C. §§ 1(f), 29(d)(2)(B), 32(j). 43(b)(3). 45(d)(2)(B). 45A(c)(3), 63(c 4. 6Stb;Q2.
132(f)(6), 135Co)(2)(B), 7872(g)(5) (1996).
228. See EISNER, supra note 225, at 1-8; JOHN H. MAKIN. U.S. FISCAL POUCY ITS EFFECTS AT
HOME AND ABROAD 4-6 (1986).
229. I do not here advocate the adoption of an adjustment for inflation. In Section IIA. I argue for
the creation of an expert independent scorekeeper. Implicit in this recommendation is that such a bod,
would examine the issue of appropriate adjustments and promulgate rules best structured to protect the
values the amendment is intended to further.
230. See MAKIN, supra note 228, at 4-5.
231. See DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY, supra note 20, at 10-11 ('"Changes in the structural deficit
give a better picture of the impact of budget policy on the economy than does the unadjusted deficit.").
SCHICK, supra note 86, at 30-31 (asserting that structural deficit is "useful in distinguishing bct, ccn
deficits due to the performance of the economy and those due to government policy").
232. See CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET OFFICE, supra note 46. at 99-111; DEPARTME.N-T OF THE
TREASURY, supra note 20, at 10-11; SCHICK. supra note 86. at 30-31.
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Some have gone further to argue that the target should be a balanced inflation-
adjusted structural deficit.233
Even the most sophisticated such formula, however, will probably never be
fully satisfactory. No formula deals well with the problem of transitions: how to
move without undue pain from an unbalanced budget to one that complies. It is
also likely that no formula, however sophisticated, will deal with economic
downturns and the business cycle as well as informed judgment might. In
addition, all such formulae reflect a still developing economic science; it would
be premature to constitutionalize even the most sophisticated exemplar.
The 1995-96 Senate Draft responds to these problems by ignoring them. It
attempts to control what economists sometimes call the "nominal deficit"-that
is, the deficit unadjusted for inflation or variations in economic conditions. The
Draft requires Congress to implement a contractionary fiscal policy during
recessions and permits Congress to implement an expansionary fiscal policy
during periods of rapid economic growth, thereby amplifying both extremes of
the business cycle. Absent a supermajority vote in both houses, the Draft
apparently even prohibits running a deficit in a full-fledged economic depression,
regardless of how deep. And it requires an immediate and abrupt return to
budgetary balance at the conclusion of those events that do permit temporary
deficits, regardless of their size.
None of these results is necessary to implement the values underlying the
amendment. Each is inconsistent with economic prudence. The approach taken
by the 1995-96 Senate Draft instead reflects both a concern that Congress lacks
the institutional competence to make fine macroeconomic judgments and a
reluctance to permit external involvement in administering the amendment. In
other words, it again evidences a tension between outside review and effective
administration. So viewed, the problem of accommodating fiscal concerns may
be amenable to the same type of solution as the prior three problems discussed
in this Part. As I will discuss in Section IlA, an independent scorekeeper could
be authorized to set annual numeric budgetary targets, taking into account both
the values underlying the amendment and the condition of the economy.
Ill. How TO GET THERE
Although the problem of enforcement has received far more consideration
than the problem of defining the budgetary target, it has resisted satisfactory
solution. Two issues have dominated the debate: judicial enforcement and
presidential impoundment. Judicial enforcement involves the possibility that a
court would determine that a budgetary target has not been met and order a
remedy-e.g., spending cuts or tax increases. Presidential impoundment involves
233. See Robert Eisner & Paul J. Pieper, A New View of the Federal Debt and Budget Deficits, 74 AM.
ECON. REv. 11, 11 (1984).
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the possibility that the President would make the same determination and refuse
to spend appropriated moneys. Both solutions have troubled Congress and
commentators.
Much ink has been spilled over issues raised by, but ultimately tangential to,
the problem of judicial enforcement: whether, under existing law, courts could
hear such a case and whether, again under existing law, courts could order a
remedy.21 These questions, while important in some respects, are largely
irrelevant to drafting enforcement solutions, since a constitutional amendment may
change existing law to resolve such problems. The relevant question is the
substantive one: Should courts determine whether the numerical standards
imposed by the amendment have been met and fashion a remedy if they have
not? Opponents of judicial enforcement have argued that courts lack institutional
competence to make such decisions, should not be asked to set priorities among
spending programs, and should not have the power to raise taxes.?'" Allowing
the courts to fashion a remedy, they assert, would radically shift the balance of
power.23 Proponents have responded that if the political branches cannot
balance the budget, the courts offer the only real hope.2'" At the same time,
they have attempted to meet opponents' concerns by suggesting restrictions on the
scope of permitted judicial review.
238 Congress has also expressed concern over
the possibility that a balanced budget amendment would be construed to authorize
presidential impoundment. 239 The power of the purse is one of Congress's most
234. See, e.g., Bowen, supra note 6. at 565 (dealing with standing and political question doctrinel.
Tobin, supra note 6, at 185-92 (same): Crosthwait. supra note 6. at 1071-89 (same). State £tperiente.
supra note 6. at 1610-15 (dealing with political question doctrne)
235. See, e.g., 1995 House Hearings. supra note 2, at 17 (statement of Charlc L Schult/. Senior
Fellow, Brookings Institution) (noting problem of judges making tax and spending dcctsion,,). id at 59
(statement of Rep. Schaefer) (same); id. (statement of Rep. Conyers) (same); td. at 180 tstatement of Jel'frc)
N. Wennberg, Mayor, Rutland, Vermont) (same); id. at 227 (statement of William Dellinger. As.sistant
Attorney General, Department of Justice) (same); 1994 Senate Jiudictars Comm. Heanig. Jupra note 2. at
80 (statement of Griffin Bell, former Attorney General. Department of Justice) (same). 1983-S4 Senate
Hearings, supra note 2, at 82 (statement of Professor Robert D. Goldstein) (same). id at 260 (statement
of Professor George D. Brown) (same): id. at 281 (statement of Archibald Cox. Chairman, Common Causc)
(same); H.R. REP. NO. 104-3, at 35 (1995) (dissenting views) ("The most frightening scenario to many
taxpayers is court-ordered tax increases. And the specter of court-ordcred budget cuts or automatic
sequestration of funds in the middle of a fiscal year is no less likely. or disturbing."). id. at 40-42
(additional views) ("The resolution reallocates one of Congress' core functions-federal budgetr)
priorities-to the Judicial Branch."); Rodino, supra note 6, at 801 (noting that courts do not ha%e staffs of
budgetary experts and that budgetary decisions are inherently legislatise because they m o1e reconciliation
of competing priorities).
236. See, e.g., Crosthwait. supra note 6, at 1090-103 (noting unprecedented intrusion upon coequal
branches); State Experience, supra note 6. at 1610-15 (arguing that granting courts poer of enforcement
would distort balance of power).
237. See, e.g., 1995 Joint Hearings. supra note 2, at 38 (statement by Sen. lack) (maintaining that
court enforcement may be necessary); 1995 House Hearings, supra note 2. at 67 (statement of William P.
Barr, Former Attorney General, Department of Justice) (arguing that judicial interention would be -cr)
limited); 141 CONG. REC. H754 (daily ed. Jan. 26. 1995) (statement of Rep. Schaefer) (claiming that courts
could make only limited range of decisions); Bowen, supra note 6, at 618 (endorsing view that courts could
and should fashion appropriate relief).
238. See, e.g., S.J. Res. 1. 104th Cong. § 6 (1995). reprinted ti Appendix.
239. In the absence of such authorization, the President lacks the power to impound lawfull)
appropriated funds. See American Fed'n of Gov't Employees v. Phillips. 358 F. Supp 60, 75 (D D C
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important powers. 40 Impoundment, it is argued, would shift the balance of
power in favor of the executive, without any check on the executive's exercise
of that power.241
The 1995-96 Senate Draft, as elaborated in the 1995 Senate committee
report, solved both of these problems by purporting to reserve almost all
enforcement power to Congress itself. Senate Joint Resolution 1, as originally
introduced, left open the question of judicial enforcement. The 1995 Senate
committee report justified this silence with an exercise in studied ambiguity: "By
remaining silent about judicial review in the amendment itself, its authors have
refused to establish congressional sanction for the Federal courts to involve
themselves in fundamental macroeconomic and budgetary questions, while not
undermining their equally fundamental obligation to 'say what the law
is .... ,,, 24 2 The report proceeded to argue that members of Congress should
not fear judicial review because: (1) no one would have standing to bring suit
under the amendment;243 (2) even if someone had standing, the "political
question" doctrine would preclude judicial involvement; 24 (3) even if courts
heard the case, respect for Congress would preclude judicially ordered
remedy;245 and (4) even if courts intervened and ordered a remedy, Congress
could statutorily deny courts the power to do so.246 When these arguments
failed to persuade a sufficient number of senators, the following sentence was
added to section 6 of the Draft: "The judicial power of the United States shall not
extend to any case or controversy arising under this Article except as may be
specifically authorized by legislation adopted pursuant to this section. ' In its
final version, therefore, the 1995-96 Senate Draft purported to give Congress
complete control over the scope of judicial review.
The Senate was equally unwilling to cede enforcement power to the
President. Section 1 of the draft, read literally, prohibits outlays in excess of
receipts.248 Since outlays are made primarily by the executive branch, this
1973). It is possible that a balanced budget amendment would change this conclusion. See, e.g., Judy v.
Schaefer, 627 A.2d 1039, 1040 (Md. 1993) (holding impoundment necessary to carry out purposes of state
balanced budget requirement).
240. See, e.g., 19 ANNALS OF CONG. 1330 (1809) (statement of Rep. Randolph) ("Among the
duties-and among the rights, too-of this House, there is perhaps none so important as the control which
it constitutionally possesses over the public purse."); Kate Stith, Congress' Power of the Purse, 97 YALE
L.J. 1343, 1344 (1988) (delegation of power of purse to Congress "is at the foundation of our constitutional
order").
241. See, e.g., S. REP. No. 104-5, at 26-27 (1995) (statement of Sen. Biden) (expressing concern that
amendment will fundamentally shift balance of powers by permitting impoundment); H.R. REP. No. 104-3,
at 35 (1995) (dissenting views) (finding impoundment possible); Rodino, supra note 6, at 801 (stating that
giving President impoundment power "would be inconsistent with our basic Constitutional structure").
242. S. REP. No. 104-5, at 9 (quoting Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (I Cranch) 137, 177 (1803)).
243. See id. at 10-I1.
244. See id. at 10.
245. See id. at 9-10.
246. See id. at 11.
247. S.J. Res. 1, 104th Cong. § 6 (1995), reprinted in Appendix.
248. See id. § 1.
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might seem to authorize-indeed, require2 9-the President to impound
appropriated funds to the extent necessary to prevent a violation of the section's
mandate. The 1995 Senate committee report, however, stated:
[I]t is not the intent of the committee to grant the President any
impoundment authority under S.J. Res. I. In fact, up to the end of the
fiscal year, the President has nothing to impound because Congress in
the amendment has the power to ratify or to specify the amount of
deficit spending that may occur in that fiscal year.2-"
In effect, the report argued that section 1 was to be applied only to the year
as a whole; as a result, compliance could not be determined until after the year
was over. It would, therefore, alvays be too late for the President, or anyone
else, to impose corrective action. While some may question this reading,2' the
report clearly evidenced Congress's reluctance to allow the President any
enforcement role beyond his existing veto power.
In sum, the 1995-96 Senate Draft reserved for Congress both the power to
define what a balanced budget was and to take corrective action if Congress
failed to comply voluntarily with its core requirements. Perhaps in response to
anticipated likely criticism, the 1995 Senate committee report made two further
arguments: (1) that the "primary enforcement mechanism" for the amendment as
a whole was section 2, which required a three-fifths vote to increase the debt
ceiling; z2 and (2) that the "ultimate enforcement mechanism" was the political
process, through which voters would refuse to reelect members of Congress who
did not comply.5 3 There is little evidence that the political process punishes
politicians who vote to cut taxes or increase spending; it is, in part, this very
failure that has led proponents to assert the need for a constitutional amendment.
In effect, therefore, the requirement of a supermajority vote to raise the debt
ceiling was the only proposed enforcement mechanism with any teeth at all. I will
suggest below that this mechanism is wholly inadequate to the task.-"
249. See S. REP. No. 104-5, at 15 (stating that ... shall not e.rceed.. is a clear mandate a
command").
250. Id. at I.
251. See, e.g., id. at 27 (statement of Sen. Biden): id. at 38-41 (minonty i evs of Sens Kenned).
Leahy, and Feingold).
252. See id. at 8.
253. See id. at 9.
254. See, e.g., 1995 Joint Hearings. supra note 2. at 82 (statement of Rep. Manzullo) (asscrtmng that
politicians are not necessarily punished for voting to cut taxes or increase spending)- 1995 House Hearngs.
supra note 2, at 27 (statement of Rep. Schaefer) (same); id. at 140 (statement of Rep. Schroeder) (same).
id. at 242 (statement of James D. Davidson, Chairman. National Taxpayers Union) (same). 1994 Senate
Judiciary Comm. Hearings, supra note 2, at I I (statement of former Sen. Tsongas) (same). 1983-84 Senate
Hearing, supra note 2, at 142-43 (statement of Sen. Hatch) (same): id. at 182 (statement of Langdon
Flowers, representing National Association of Manufacturers) (same): id. at 312 (statement of Professor
Milton Friedman) (same): 1979-80 House Hearings. supra note 2. at 4 (statement of Rep scCIlory)
(same); id. at 65 (statement of James Davidson. Chairman. National Taxpayers Union) (same). id at 362
(statement of Rep. Nelson) (same).
255. See infra Section III.B.
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Proponents of the 1995-96 Senate Draft may nevertheless point to the first
sentence of section 6 which provides: "The Congress shall enforce and
implement this article by appropriate legislation, which may rely on estimates
of outlays and receipts. ' 56 This sentence, it may be argued, would give
Congress the power to experiment with enforcement procedures until it finds
procedures that work. This argument, however, raises questions that some,
particularly the states, may find disturbing: Does section 6 of the 1995-96 Senate
Draft give Congress the power, by majority vote, to restructure the federal
government in ways that would be unconstitutional absent that section? Stated
another way, does section 6 amend Article V of the Constitution, which currently
requires the affirmative vote of two-thirds of the members of each chamber and
ratification by three-fourths of the several states to effect such a restructuring z"
A negative answer to these questions may imply that the first sentence of section
6 is surplusage, a construction normally to be avoided. These questions are
rendered acute by the second sentence of the same section, which precludes
judicial review of "any case or controversy arising under this Article"" s except
as permitted by statute.
An immediate practical consequence of section 6 and its approach to the
problem is that the issue of enforcement is likely to remain open even if an
amendment similar to the 1995-96 Senate Draft is ratified. By approving such a
draft, Congress will simply defer solution of the problem, in the process possibly
granting itself the power to restructure the federal government in ways that would
otherwise be unconstitutional. In other words, the 1995-96 Senate Draft may
actually expand congressional power, rather than constrain it.
Judicial enforcement, presidential impoundment, and a complete reservation
of enforcement powers to Congress are not, of course, the only possible
techniques for enforcing a budgetary target. Chairman Peter Rodino of the House
Judiciary Committee wrote in 1983:
In the Ninety-seventh Congress alone, members of the House introduced
more than sixty-five resolutions representing a wide variety of
approaches. In various combinations, these proposals contain provisions
with balanced budget "requirements," spending limitations, revenue
limitations, borrowing limitations, and mandated schedules for the
repayment of the national debt. Even within the general rubric of
"balanced budget proposals," the resolutions would operate in widely
varying manners. Some merely declare that the budget shall be balanced,
while others restrict the power of Congress to appropriate. Various
proposals require Congress to plan a balanced budget; place a general
256. SJ. Res. 1, 104th Cong. § 6 (1995), reprinted in Appendix.
257. See U.S. CONST. art. V ('The Congress, whenever two thirds of both Houses shall deem it
necessary, shall propose Amendments to this Constitution . . . [which] shall be valid to all Intents and
Purposes, as Part of this Constitution, when ratified by the Legislatures of three fourths of the several
States ....").
258. S.J. Res. 1, 104th Cong. § 6 (1995), reprinted in Appendix.
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duty on Congress to balance the budget; mandate that a deficit be
extinguished within a given period; or merely establish a balanced
budget as a goal. Finally, there are differences in such basic matters as
whether the restrictions could be waived in times of war or other
national emergency, and, if so, what emergency would suffice; how the
restrictions would be enforced; and the anticipated role of the Executive
in the budget process.29
Among the proposed enforcement mechanisms, the Chairman noted, were the line
item veto and a provision giving the President the power to impose an income tax
surcharge.' ° Since 1983, the volume of proposals has, if anything,
increased.6
This Article will not attempt a comprehensive review of outstanding
proposals. Instead, it will attempt to reconceptualize the problem. First, I will
suggest that enforcement problems fall into three categories: (I) how the target
is defined each year and how compliance with the target is determined; (2) how
a remedy is formulated and imposed if Congress fails to meet the target thus
defined; and (3) how, if ever, the requirements of the amendment may be waived.
It may be useful, I suggest, to examine each of these problems separately.
Procedures for target definition, scorekeeping, and waiver may be amenable to
current resolution. The most difficult problem is the second, that of imposing a
remedy if Congress fails to comply voluntarily. I will suggest, in this regard, a
new approach to categorizing and thinking about possible solutions. I am not yet
able to offer a solution; my goal is rather to map the terrain and define the
problems more sharply.
A. Setting Annual Targets and Deciding Whether They Have Been Met
Much has been written about whether courts should be empowered to cut
spending, raise taxes, or order other remedies if Congress fails to balance the
budget.62 Far less has been written about whether courts are best suited to
interpret the budgetary target and determine whether it has been met. Perhaps this
gap reflects greater comfort with courts in an interpretive and factfinding role; it
may also reflect an assumption that the two functions-keeping score and
imposing a remedy-are part and parcel of a single task and should be assigned
to a single body.
I would like to begin by considering the scorekeeping function separately and
asking whether that aspect of the problem, at least, might be amenable to solution.
259. Rodino, supra note 6, at 789-91.
260. See id.
261. 1 am unaware of any catalog of balanced budget proposals introduced into Congress that purports
to be complete, nor have I attempted to compile one. It is unlikely. hoseer that the current volume is less
than one hundred per year.
262. See supra note 6.
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Who construes the portion of the amendment that defines the target? Who
projects, for amendment purposes, the budgetary consequences of proposed
congressional action? Who determines whether the target has been met? While
these questions do raise separation of powers issues, they are not nearly as serious
as those raised by proposals to authorize presidential impoundment or to permit
courts to take remedial action.
The 1995-96 Senate Draft reserved these tasks to Congress itself. As Part II
of this Article has demonstrated, effective enforcement of a balanced budget
amendment requires outside review of congressional action. Outside review would
permit the development of rules to respond to attempts to circumvent the
amendment through innovative accounting rules or by moving deficits off-budget.
It would also allow contemporaneous review of congressional action, without
waiting for receipts to be received and expenditures to be made. Permitting
Congress to control target definition and scorekeeping, by contrast, would be like
imposing an income tax but permitting taxpayers to define "income" and audit
their own returns.
Should the scorekeeping function be assigned to the executive branch? Like
the 1995-96 Senate Draft, the Gramm-Rudman-Hollings Act attempted to reserve
scorekeeping to the legislative branch, specifically to the Comptroller General.
Under that Act, a determination by the Comptroller General that the budgetary
targets had not been met was sufficient to trigger sequestration. In Bowsher v.
Synar,263 the Supreme Court held this structure unconstitutional on the ground
that the role assigned to the Comptroller General was inherently executive.26
Whatever the merits of Bowsher, we are not bound by it in drafting a new
constitutional amendment. There are at least two disadvantages to assigning the
scorekeeping function to the executive branch. First, as a practical matter, doing
so would probably strengthen the executive branch at the expense of the
legislative. At the very least, we might expect that Congress, which controls
amendment drafting, would be reluctant to adopt such a solution. Moreover, there
is no obvious reason to believe that the executive branch would do a better job.
Like Congress, the Executive is a political branch, prone to the same pressures
to spend and not tax. Although it may be easier for the electorate to hold the
President personally accountable, the scorekeeping function is sufficiently
technical that it is unlikely that a President would be politically vulnerable for,
say, a decision to use the cash method.
Under traditional three-branch analysis, this leaves only the courts. As I have
noted, most discussion of the proper role of the courts in enforcing a balanced
budget amendment has focused on the problem of remedies. It has been suggested
that courts do not have the expertise to assess budgetary issues.26 Proponents
263. 478 U.S. 714 (1986).
264. See id. at 715.
265. See, e.g., Rodino, supra note 6, at 801.
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of judicial review have noted, in turn, that courts deal with complex economic
and other technical issues all the time.266
Both proponents and opponents, I suggest, are asking the wrong question.
The question is not whether courts could appropriately interpret the rules defining
the budgetary target and make factual findings as to whether the target has been
met. Of course they could. The proper question is whether the amendment would
function most effectively if scorekeeping were assigned to the courts. The answer,
I suggest, is no.
First, as Part II demonstrates, the problem of budgetary target definition is
technically complex. Not only is the potential for circumvention high, but
effective circumvention may be relatively easy to conceal. The ideal scorekeeper
therefore needs independent economic, accounting, and financial expertise. It
should be able to apprehend the most sophisticated circumventions and respond
promptly to developments in economics, accounting, and finance. The adversarial
model, in which advocates supply competing sources of expertise and a neutral,
but not necessarily expert, body determines which argument is more "credible,"
is less likely to result in the prompt, effective identification of problems.
Second, although some degree of rule stability is important, the ideal
scorekeeper should not be bound by stare decisis. In tax, an interpretation of the
Internal Revenue Code that creates a loophole can be remedied by legislation. If
the scorekeeper for a balanced budget amendment were bound by stare decisis,
however, the consequences would be far more severe. An interpretation that
creates a loophole or implements an economic theory later subject to challenge
would be correctable only by constitutional amendment.
Third, the ideal scorekeeper should be able to respond quickly and to render
advisory decisions as needed. Congress should not have to guess whether
proposed tax or spending legislation will result in a violation of the amendment.
In other contexts, it may be appropriate to require Congress to determine as an
initial matter whether a statute is constitutional and defer final resolution of the
issue until a case or controversy arises. Tax and spending legislation, however,
is necessary to the ongoing, day-to-day administration of the federal government.
The amendment would function more efficiently if Congress could obtain an
authoritative advance determination whether a particular program or change in
law would comply. In addition, an expedited advance ruling procedure would
leave more effective power in Congress's hands and be less disruptive of
legislative and political processes.
Finally, the ideal scorekeeper should have rulemaking power. It should be
able to define general interpretive principles so as to allow Congress to make
policy with some assurance that its decisions will not be second-guessed, even in
the absence of an advance ruling. It should be able to consider interpretive issues
266. See. e.g., Bowen, supra note 6, at 589-93.
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systematically, not merely as they are presented by specific cases and
controversies.
It follows that the courts are probably not the ideal scorekeepers. They are
not expert; they are bound by stare decisis; the federal courts, at least, are
prohibited from issuing advisory decisions; and they lack substantive rulemaking
power. These deficiencies could, of course, be remedied in the amendment itself.
The resulting institution, however, would not look very much like an American
court.
To ask the courts to serve as scorekeepers would also threaten the integrity
of the courts themselves. Confirmation hearings would likely come to focus
significantly on economic, accounting, and financial issues. The best legal minds
would not necessarily make the best fiscal arbiters, nor would the best economists
make the best jurists. Politicization of the courts, which some argue is already a
problem, 267 would likely become far more serious.
A nontraditional model merits consideration-a body constitutionally
independent of the three existing branches, charged solely with the tasks of
interpreting the rules, defining the budgetary target, and determining whether
budgetary targets have been met, but not with the task of formulating a remedy
if they have not. Administration of the scorekeeping function by such an
independent body would have significant advantages. It could be given the
requisite independent expertise and capacity to analyze data, would not need to
be bound by stare decisis, could render prompt advisory decisions, and could
make rules. In addition, creation of such a body would permit the amendment to
define its target by reference to values, rather than numerical tests. 268 The
independent scorekeeper would then set periodic numeric targets, annually or over
whatever period or periods would most effectively accomplish the purposes of the
amendment. This, in turn, would permit the scorekeeper to accommodate the
fiscal policy concerns discussed in Section II.D above: The scorekeeper could
define economically prudent transitional targets in a manner that would retain the
federal budget's stabilizing features, as well as respond prudently to economic
267. Professor Friedman has discussed this problem outside the balanced budget context: "Extended
debates, both within the Senate and beyond, concerning recent decisions and the political philosophy of a
nominee cannot help but diminish the Court's reputation as an independent institution and impress upon
the public-and indeed on the Court itself-a political perception of its role." Richard D. Friedman, Tribal
Myths: Ideology and the Confirmation of Supreme Court Nominations, 95 YALE L.J. 1283, 1317 (1986).
An extended debate regarding a judicial nominee's views of Social Security or tax rates would only
compound the problem. The scholarly literature on the proper role of politics in the confirmation of judicial
nominees is extensive. See, e.g., STEPHEN L. CARTER, THE CONFIRMATION MESS (1994) (arguing that
confirmation process has gone awry); David A. Strauss & Cass R. Sunstein, The Senate, the Constitution,
and the Confirmation Process, 101 YALE L.J. 1491 (1992) (advocating more independent Senate role to
reduce partisanship); John 0. McGinnis, The President, the Senate, the Constitution, and the Confirmation
Process: A Reply to Professors Strauss and Sunstein, 71 TEX. L. REV. 633 (1993) (advocating more limited
Senate role); Essays on the Supreme Court Appointment Process, 101 HARV. L. REV. 1146 (1988)
(collection of five essays on Supreme Court appointment process).
268. Section I of such an amendment, for example, might read simply as follows: "The fiscal policy
of the United States Government, as reflected in its net budgetary surplus or deficit, shall be responsible,
economically prudent, and fair to future generations."
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emergencies. Finally, creation of such a body would avoid any shift in the
balance of powers among the three existing branches.
I do not claim that such a solution is without problems. Creation of an
independent scorekeeper would necessarily infringe on the current scorekeeping
prerogatives of the political branches. Even seemingly technical rulings by such
a body would generally have substantial political implications, to which it seems
unlikely that the scorekeeper would be oblivious. On the other hand, any
amendment that provides for outside review of congressional compliance will
necessarily infringe on the current scorekeeping prerogatives of Congress. Under
an independent scorekeeper, at least some degree of depoliticization would likely
occur. At worst, the political branches would regularly be forced to persuade an
only partially politicized scorekeeper that they had not strayed too far from the
spirit of the amendment.
I also do not claim that creation of an independent expert body would solve
the entire enforcement problem. What to do if Congress fails voluntarily to adhere
to declared targets and when to permit waiver of those targets for competing
policy reasons are issues that would still need to be addressed. Such a body
could, however, credibly solve the information problem. A single set of analyses
perceived to be expert, authoritative, and relatively nonpartisan and
nonmanipulative would substantially advance resolution of the problem as a
whole.
B. Imposing a Remedy
A much more difficult problem is that of forcing democratically elected
legislators to do what they, and perhaps the sovereign People.20 do not want
to do. However the target is defined, what remedy should be imposed if the
political branches fail to meet that target voluntarily? We do not yet have a
consensus on an answer. The 1995 Senate committee report characterized the
approach taken in the 1995-96 Senate Draft as an "auxiliary precaution."'Z71
This characterization, however, begs the most important question: How will it
work in practice? I suggest that it may be useful to focus on the basket of taxes
that will actually be collected and expenditures that will actually be made if the
target is not met voluntarily. I will call this basket, which presumably would be
structured to comply with the target, the amendment's "default solution." So
framed, the question of remedy has two parts: What is the amendment's default
solution? And through what processes is it defined?
I propose that a good default solution should meet at least two criteria. First,
it should not be broadly unacceptable. This is, admittedly, a fuzzy measure. Our
269. The fact that the sovereign People. through their eprescntati'es, adopt a constitutional
amendment today does not necessarily mean that a majonty of the People ten or a hundred years hence will
agree that the federal budget should be balanced.
270. S. REP. No. 104-5, at 2-3 (1995).
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democracy normally validates political outcomes by majority vote. The default
solution cannot be defined through normal democratic processes because, by
hypothesis, those processes have failed. Nevertheless, I submit that some default
solutions are broadly unacceptable and should therefore not be incorporated into
any proposed amendment. A default solution involving substantial risk of a
collapse of the U.S. economy, for example, would fall into this category. Second,
the default solution should reflect, to the extent possible, the contemporary
democratic will.27 ' Although, by hypothesis, normal democratic processes have
failed, a default solution that reflects, to the greatest extent possible, the
contemporary democratic will is superior to one that does not. This is one of the
reasons that courts should probably not define the default solution; the federal
courts, at least, are intentionally countermajoritarian.
Not all readers will agree with these criteria. Even those who subscribe to
different criteria, however, may find the proposed analytic approach useful. The
remainder of this Section will consider some of the more commonly suggested
balanced budget remedies through the lens of this approach.
1. Debt Ceiling Limitations
The debt ceiling limitation of section 2 of the 1995-96 Senate Draft has been
billed as the "primary enforcement mechanism" for that draft.272 What does the
proposed analytic approach tell us about how such a mechanism might work?
Under a debt ceiling limitation, the government taxes and spends as authorized
by Congress, borrowing to cover any shortfall, until the moment it reaches the
debt ceiling. Amounts spent prior to that moment are unaffected by the
amendment. Subsequent spending is permitted only to the extent of subsequent
receipts. In effect, the default solution for the fiscal year as a whole consists of:
(1) existing revenues; (2) expenses actually paid prior to the debt ceiling crisis;
and (3) some portion of the remaining spending authorized by Congress but not
undertaken until after the debt ceiling is reached. Expenses paid earlier, therefore,
enjoy effective priority over those to be paid later.
There are several problems with such a "first-in-time" solution. First, it is
arbitrary. Amounts spent earlier will not necessarily be higher in policy priority
than those authorized to be spent later. Unless the process is manipulated, a
problem that will be discussed shortly, the choice of which spending to cut is
essentially random. Although elected leaders disagree about many things, they do
tend to agree, for example, that interest on the national debt should be paid before
funding is given to the National Endowment for the Arts. A process more
271. 1 recognize that a mathematically satisfactory definition of "contemporary democratic will" may
be problematic. See, e.g., JAMES M. BUCHANAN & GORDON TULLOCK, THE CALCULUS OF CONSENT:
LOGICAL FOUNDATIONS OF CONSTITUTIONAL DEMOCRACY 326-34 (1974) (exploring theoretical problems
of majority rule). I apply here its intuitive meaning, which is inexact but useful.
272. See supra text accompanying note 252.
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consistent with democratic theory would reflect legislative priorities to the greatest
extent possible. At the very least, it would attempt to exempt any spending
deemed essential.
Because of its random nature, actual implementation of a first-in-time
solution may be broadly unacceptable. It may, for example, require the
government to default on the national debt. In such an event, the amendment, in
effect, takes hostage some public interest perceived to be of overriding
importance. "Balance the budget," the amendment threatens, "or I will destroy the
U.S. economy. '27 3 This creates two undesirable possible dynamics. A legislative
minority 7 4 may be tempted to join in the hostage-taking, demanding passage
of measures not directly related to or, perhaps, contrary to the goal of budgetary
balance as a condition of permitting the supermajority vote necessary to waive the
limitation-measures that would not otherwise survive the legislative process. In
1996, for example, some members of the House threatened to prevent passage of
a debt ceiling increase unless the President agreed to Republican budget priorities
for the next seven years, including a major tax cut.275
The majority, of course, may not believe that the minority is serious. This
creates a second possible dynamic. To use hostage-taking effectively, the minority
may attempt to persuade the majority that it is more willing to risk the
unacceptable consequence than the majority, a tactic known to teenagers and
273. See S. REP. No. 104-5, at 16 (noting that under amendment. "'shene',er the Go emient exceeds,
the debt ceiling, it runs a theoretical risk of default, a powerful incentive for balancing the budget") There
is some uncertainty about the consequences of a default on the national debt. Compare Michael Carroll.
Containing Default, INSTITUTIONAL INVESTOR. Apr. I. 1996. at 50 (descnbing potential collapse of credit.
repo, municipal bond, and currency markets), and Jonathan Peterson. The Default Debate. Trrasur%. Fed
Differed on How to Plan for the 'Unthinkable", L.A. TIMES. Apr. 7. 1996. at DI (describing "meltdo. n
of the financial system"), and Martin Walker, U.S. Treasur) Threatened svit Default. Gt ARDIAN (London).
Sept. 26, 1995, at 17 (asserting that default "would make the 1929 Wall Street crash look like a tea party".
with James J. Angel, Looking Back at Debt Defaults in U.S. History. ClIt. TRIm. Fr-b I. 1996. at 21
(concluding that U.S. default "would not be the end of the world"). \Vith respect to this uncertaint). Louis
Crandall, chief economist at R.H. Wrightson. has stated: "To say that the global financial s:,Stem v.ilI
probably not collapse is a bit like saying that the odds of surviving Russian roulette are reall, quite high
The statement is true but irrelevant. The only point that matters is that pla),ing %%ith loaded guns is a bad
idea." Kevin Muehring, The Trader at Treasury. INSTITUTIONAL INVESTOR. Jan. 1. 1996. at 41
274. For these purposes. I use the term "minority'" to include any group that lacks the poser to enact
legislation on its own.
275. See, e.g., Heidi Glenn, Whire House. Budget Comnnittees Clash Oser Debt Ceiling Icrease. T.x
NOTES TODAY, Sept. 20, 1995, available in LEXIS. Taxana Librar). TNT File. 95 TNT 184-6 noting that
Reps. John Shadegg and Christopher Shays "warned that until President approseldl Congre'ss's Wscn-,car
balanced budget plan, they would vote against an, debt ceiling increabe"). Fred Stokeld. GOP Threatens
to Oppose Federal Debt Ceiling hicrease. TAX NOTES TODA . July 31. 1995. atuadable in LEXIS. Ta'ana
Library, TNT File, 95 TN T 148-3 (noting that Rep. Nick Smith and about 160 of his ltouse colleagues
pledged to vote against debt-ceiling increase until reconciliation bill became lau Member- .iiso attempted
to condition passage of the debt ceiling increase on abolition of the Commerce Department. see Jonathan
Peterson, Default Scenario Looms Larger as Budget War Rages. L.A. TIMES. No% 9, 1995, at A26. anti-
abortion provisions, see Eric Pianin, GOP Moves on Budget, Struggles with Debt Limit, WAS11 POST. No'
4, 1995, at A6, an amendment restricting political adsocac), by nonprofit groups that receie federal grants.
see id., and a provision to narrow the use of habeas corpus. see Maggie McNeil. Debt Liitt Increase kla%
Require Conditions, Dole Said, REUTERS N. AM. WIRE, No, 5. 1995. available us LEXIS. Ncs, Librar).
REUNA File.
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military theorists as the game of "chicken. ' 276 In effect, each side threatens to
let hostages die unless the other concedes; in the process, each may find it
tactically beneficial to persuade the other that it is more committed (and perhaps
less rational) than the other. Neither hostage-taking nor games of chicken belong
in our system of government.
A third possible problem is that any first-in-time solution, without more, in
effect grants impoundment power to the President. Knowing that a debt ceiling
crisis is imminent, the President may accelerate outlays he favors and delay
outlays he opposes.2 Once the debt ceiling is reached, in the absence of a
contrary statutory directive (which, of course, he may veto), the President will
then be asked to choose which outlays will be made out of the government's
continuing receipts and which will not.278
The committee report to the 1995-96 Senate Draft disavowed any intention
to grant such impoundment power. For this reason, the report suggested that
section 1 of the Draft, which prohibited outlays in excess of receipts, be
enforceable only as provided by Congress.279 The debt ceiling supermajority
rule of section 2, by contrast, was to be self-executing.28 I suggest that this
attempted distinction is futile. To the extent that they are self-executing, both
sections effectively authorize impoundment. The principal difference is that
section 1 requires presidential action as soon as outlays exceed receipts.2 s By
contrast, section 2 permits outlays in excess of receipts until the debt limit is
276. See, e.g., HERMAN KAHN, THINKING ABOUT THE UNTHINKABLE 44-50, 187-208 (1962)
(discussing game of "chicken" as useful analogy for modem political strategy); Carroll, supra note 273,
at 50 (discussing 1996 debt ceiling crisis); Alan Fram, Gingrich Eases Stand on Tar-Cut Package, NEW
ORLEANS TIMES-PICAYUNE, Feb. 2, 1996, at A3 (same); Get on with It, PROVIDENCE J.-BULL., Jan. 16,
1996, at B4 (same); Joanne Morrison, Deputy Treasury Secretary Says Congress Must Increase Debt Limit
to Avoid Default, BOND BUYER, Feb. 22, 1996, at 32 (discussing 1996 debt ceiling crisis); Muehring, supra
note 273, at 41 (discussing 1995 debt ceiling crisis); Playing Chicken with Government, PATRIOT LEDGER,
Jan. 31, 1996. at 10 (same); William Safire, 'Notorious Defaulter', N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 25, 1996, at A21
("You don't play a game of chicken with the U.S. dollar."); David E. Sanger, Feds Seeking to Avert a
Default, DENV. POST, Nov. 13, 1995, at Al (discussing nuclear war analogy); Marina V.N. Whitman,
Political Silly Season Promises Little Relief, DET. NEWS, June 2, 1996, at B7 (calling 1995 government
shutdowns games of chicken).
277. The Anti-Deficiency Act requires that appropriations be apportioned "to prevent obligation or
expenditure at a rate that would indicate a necessity for a deficiency or supplemental appropriation for the
period." 31 U.S.C. § 1512(a) (1994). In the face of an impending budgetary shortfall, however, it does not
appear that the Act would create any serious impediment to the substantial exercise of presidential
discretion as to how that shortfall should be allocated across the budget.
278. In so choosing, the President also has the power to determine which programs the amendment
takes hostage. For example, he may state that if Congress fails to pass requested legislation, he will (or,
more probably, "will be forced to") withhold payment of Social Security benefits. Strategic use of such
threats may give him substantial leverage, particularly if his party controls a blocking minority vote in
either house of Congress: A supermajority debt ceiling provision allows a minority in either house to
prevent passage of a debt ceiling increase. Again, such requested legislation may bear no relation to the
deficit. Since the President is democratically elected and subject to the same political forces that have led
to Congress's own failure to balance the budget, a transfer of power to the President will not necessarily
further purposes of the amendment.
279. See supra text accompanying notes 250-51.
280. See S. REP. No. 104-5, at 8, 16 (1995).
281. See S.J. Res. 1, 104th Cong. § 1 (1995), reprinted in Appendix.
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reached. It thereafter authorizes exactly the same kind of unilateral presidential
action.282 By relying on section 2 rather than section 1, the 1995-96 Senate
Draft merely deferred what it promised to avoid.2 3
Indeed, a self-enforcing section 1 would arguably be superior to section 2 in
at least two regards. First, it would catch the deficit problem earlier in the fiscal
year, permitting less spending arbitrarily to escape remedial cuts. To the extent
that presidential priorities reflect the contemporary democratic will, the resulting
solution would be preferable. Second, it is easier to argue that a modified, rather
than pure, cash method may be used in construing section 1; if so, section 1 may
be made less vulnerable to some of the circumvention techniques outlined in Part
II above. As noted there, use of the debt ceiling as an enforcement tool requires
the use of pure cash method accounting in defining the target, with all of the
avoidance potential of that method. In sum, reliance on a debt ceiling limitation
as the "principal enforcement mechanism" of a balanced budget amendment
seems profoundly unsatisfactory.
21
2. Predefined Default Solutions
A second type of default solution explicitly predefines the adjustments to be
made. The Gramm-Rudman-Hollings Act,2" for example, exempted certain
entitlement spending, interest on the national debt, and other limited items but
otherwise generally required across-the-board spending cuts within major
categories to the extent necessary to meet the target.8 A predefined default
solution may be specified either by statute or in the amendment itself. The
282. See id. § 2.
283. Senator Kennedy proposed to add language to the draft to the effect that. ""Inlothing in this
article shall authorize the President to impound funds appropriated by Congress b2 la v "' S RIo No 104.
5, at 27 (presenting additional views of Senator Biden in which he quote!. Senator Kenned)) his proposal
was defeated. See id. at 13. Even had it been adopted. howsever. the President ssould hase had cf'ecti'e
impoundment power under section 2. The Impoundment Control Act of 1974 requires that the President
submit a special message to Congress reporting any proposed rescission of budget authont,. see 2 U S C
§ 683(a) (1994), and prohibits such rescission unless Congress completes action on a rescission bill %%:thin
45 days, see id. § 683(b). The Comptroller General is authorized to bring a cisid action in the L, S District
Court for the District of Columbia to require that an, improperly rescinded authorit) be made aiailable
See 2 U.S.C.A. § 687 (West Supp. 1995). It seems unlikely, ho%%eser. that the Act uould be construed to
require the President to spend money that he does not hase.
284. See e.g., Prepared Statement by Alickev D. Levi. Chief Ecoannist. NattonsBanc Capital Markets
Inc., Before the House Committee on Banking and Financial Services PerspectisCes on the Federal Debt
Ceiling and Budget Policy, FED. NEWS SERV., Feb. 8. 1996 ("The federal debt ceiling is not an effectise
economic mechanism for achieving fiscal responsibility."). The hostage-taking potential of debt ceiling
limitations has even led some to urge that the debt ceiling be eliminated entirel) See. e g . Gingrich's
Game of Chicken Dangerous Sham, Useful Only for the Worst Political Purposes. It's Tune to Dump It.
FRESNO BEE, Oct. 22, 1995, at B6 (noting that Gingrich's oun budget office calls debt ceiling "'an
anachronism"); Peterson, supra note 273, at DI (noting that "growing number of economists" urge
eliminating debt ceiling altogether).
285. Balanced Budget and Emergency Deficit Control Act of 1985. Pub. L No 99.177. 99 Stat 1038
(codified as amended at 2 U.S.C. §§ 900-22 (1994)).
286. See H.R. CONF. REP. No. 99-433, at 78-95 (1985). reprinted in 1985 U.S C C A N 996-1013
(describing sequestration rules and procedures).
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principal advantage of such a solution is that it is less arbitrary than a first-in-time
outcome and therefore is less likely to be broadly unacceptable. This approach,
however, has at least three problems.
First, a predefined solution will not necessarily reflect the contemporary
democratic will; it will instead reflect the priorities and views of the legislature
in power at the time the solution was defined. The will of the people, as reflected
in their elected legislators at the time of the definition, may have changed by the
time the solution is invoked. Alternatively, circumstances may have changed.
There may, for example, be a higher need for military preparedness spending than
when the predefined solution was adopted. A predefined solution, therefore, is
likely to be less responsive, intelligent, or consistent with democratic theory than
a solution involving legislators currently in office.87
This problem is exacerbated if the predefined solution is hard to change; it
is most serious if the solution is set forth in the amendment itself. For example,
the balanced budget amendment proposed and passed by the House in 1995
included provisions that would have required a supermajority vote in each
chamber to enact any "revenue increase.288 While such a statement of priorities
may reflect the views of a majority today, based on today's needs, it will not
necessarily reflect the views of the same majority in changed circumstances. It
might be argued that Congress, understanding the operation of a balanced budget
amendment, would also understand the default solution such an amendment
would impose in the event of a deficit. Thus, in approving Budget A, violative
of the amendment, Congress might be aware that in fact it was approving Budget
B, the default solution imposed by the amendment in such circumstances. If so,
a predefined solution might well reflect the contemporary democratic will. There
are at least two problems with this argument. First, it assumes that a Budget B
reflecting the contemporary democratic will is always available under the
amendment. This may not be the case. For example, the contemporary democratic
will may favor tax increases rather than spending cuts; the amendment's
predefined solution may not permit tax increases. Second, it assumes that
members of Congress are well-informed about matters that come before them.
While this may be true in general, it is less likely to be true when the budget
"actually" under consideration is not the budget described in the law and reports
before them. Any predefined default solution should be amendable through
standard majoritarian processes.
A second problem is not so easily solved. Any balanced budget amendment
is based in part on the premise that enacting a balanced budget is politically
287. Assume, for example, a world in which Congress realistically has only three options: cutting
military preparedness spending, cutting Social Security, or raising taxes. Assume further that Social Security
remains sacrosanct. Many who would vote today to limit the federal government's power to tax might well
prefer tax increases to military cuts in this hypothetical but not entirely unrealistic world. To adopt a
predefined solution for all time requires either extraordinary prescience or extraordinary hubris.
288. See H.R. REP. NO. 104-3, at 1 (1995).
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difficult. But if Congress cannot make difficult decisions when confronted with
an actual deficit crisis, it may be unreasonably optimistic to expect Congress to
make the same difficult decisions in advance. Indeed, difficult decisions about
actual taxes and spending may produce actual budgetary balance, with a
corresponding possibility of political reward. Difficult decisions about predefined
solutions, by contrast, offer little in the way of offsetting reward.
A third, more technical, problem vastly complicates the predefinition of any
truly satisfactory default solution: The form in which spending is authorized does
not necessarily reflect Congress's priorities. Government spending takes many
different forms, some far more resistant to adjustment than others:
(i) Spending subject to annual appropriation is most vulnerable; in the
absence of congressional and presidential action, it simply stops. This
category includes most military spending, which cannot constitutionally
be appropriated for periods exceeding two years.2' Until recently, most
efforts to balance the budget focused on possible cuts in annual
appropriations, which currently average in excess of S500 billion per
year.
290
(ii) Spending subject to permanent appropriation is less vulnerable; in the
absence of congressional and presidential action, it continues. Since this
category averages roughly $1000 billion per year," ' its exclusion from
budget-cutting efforts has significantly compounded the difficulty of
those efforts. Nevertheless, even such "nondiscretionary" spending
requires cash outlays and may therefore be subject to limitations on
outlays or debt.
(iii) Both annual and permanent appropriations include some funds authorized
to meet existing contractual obligations. These appropriations are
substantially less vulnerable to budget-cutting measures since, as a
practical matter, the government cannot abrogate its contractual
obligations. So long as the obligation itself survives, a reduction of such
outlays in one year merely results in a corresponding increase in later
years, generally with interest. The government may terminate contracts,
but such terminations often trigger major buyout costs. " -
(iv) Under both current budgetary procedures and the 1995-96 Senate Draft,
spending by revolving funds to the extent of collections by those funds
is immune from cuts, since collections are treated as offsets to outlays,
not as receipts. A revolving fund whose spending does not exceed its
collections will report no outlays whatsoever; as a result, there is nothing
289. See U.S. CONST. art. I. § 8. cl. 12.
290. See DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASLRY. supra note 20. at 201-08
291. See id. at 211-12.
292. Indeed, the agency negotiating the contract may act'eIl) sck high contractual bu)out costs to
protect the agency's appropriations.
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to cut. Expenditures in this category currently average roughly $200
billion per year.293
(v) Tax expenditures are similarly excluded from outlays. Public finance
theory recognizes that the same subsidy may be given either as a cash
grant or as a targeted tax preference, of which the Internal Revenue Code
contains many. Tax expenditures, measured as "outlay equivalents,"
currently average in excess of $500 billion per year.2 4 Because such
expenditures are not treated as "outlays," but merely as reduced receipts,
they are immune from attempts to control "outlays." Indeed, under
proposals requiring a supermajority vote to "raise taxes," there is a
substantial risk that tax expenditures could not be adjusted without such
a vote.295
(vi) Finally, expenditures by off-budget, government-sponsored entities are
excluded from the budget entirely and are therefore immune from
budget-cutting efforts.296 Currently, gross outlays by such entities
average roughly $500 billion per year.29
I do not suggest that all such expenditures should be cut as part of any
default solution. That certain programs are permanently appropriated does
sometimes indicate higher standing. On the other hand, many considerations may
lead Congress to elect to make annual, rather than permanent, appropriations. As
has been noted, for example, military appropriations are constitutionally limited
to two years; 298 this does not necessarily indicate a preference that military
spending be cut first. Similarly, a decision to enter into contractual obligations
may result from pragmatic or business considerations, not from Congress's desire
to protect the program from possible budget cuts. The decision to structure a
program as a revolving fund presumably reflects an attempt to create a more-or-
less independent operation. Given a choice between avoiding default on the
national debt and building a new TVA dam, it seems unlikely that Congress
would choose to permit the default and build the dam-although section 2 of the
1995-96 Senate Draft apparently allows this to occur.2 Similarly, that a
subsidy is delivered in the form of a tax expenditure may reflect nothing more
293. See DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY, supra note 20, at 383-500 (aggregating "[sipending
authority from offsetting collections" for all revolving funds).
294. See id. at 70-72.
295. See, e.g., SATURNO, supra note 2, at 37-40 (arguing that "a limitation on increases in receipts
would limit Congress's ability to eliminate tax expenditures to achieve a balanced budget because
eliminating tax expenditures would increase receipts rather than reduce outlays, and thus increase the risk
of running afoul of such a limitation").
296. See supra note 206 and accompanying text.
297. See DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY, BUDGET OF THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT, FISCAL
YEAR 1997, app. 1129-45 (1996) (aggregating budget line 87.00, "outlays (gross)," for all reported off-
budget entities).
298. See supra text accompanying note 289.
299. See S.J. Res. 1, 104th Cong. § 2 (1995), reprinted in Appendix.
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than that its sponsor was a member of the House Ways and Means or Senate
Finance Committee rather than the relevant appropriations subcommittee. Ideally,
a default solution would be neutral as among these forms of spending and would
instead reflect conscious congressional choices based on the merits of each
program.
A nonneutral default solution may also distort congressional decisionmaking.
Consider, for example, an amendment that requires deficits to be met by spending
cuts, not tax increases. Such an amendment creates an incentive to structure
favored spending programs as tax expenditures. In the long run, such an
amendment might result in a badly distorted tax system.-
In sum, predefined default solutions are likely to be better than first-in-time
solutions. Any predefined solution, however, overrides to some extent the
contemporary democratic will. In addition, for both political and technical
reasons, Congress seems unlikely to adopt a comprehensive and fully considered
predefined default solution.
3. Process-Based Solutions
A third possibility is to invoke extraordinary decisionmaking processes
whenever the standard legislative process fails to meet the target; these
extraordinary processes may then be used to structure the default solution. The
principal advantage of a process-defined solution is that it can be drafted when
needed and may therefore better accommodate contemporary needs and the
contemporary democratic will.
The traditional approach to constitutional enforcement, the court-ordered
remedy, is perhaps the most obvious example of a process-defined solution. When
normal legislative processes fail, we may ask the courts, or a specially designated
court, to restructure federal appropriations, tax, and other related laws to comply
with the target. Courts have exercised quasilegislative powers in cases involving
schools, prisons, and municipalities. 0 ' As both Congress and commentators
have recognized, however, courts are not institutionally well-suited to decide
whether spending is to be cut, which spending programs to cut, or whom to tax,
300. This may be an acceptable result. In choosing a predefined solution that faors tax c pcnditures.,
however, Congress should be aware that it places significant stresses on the tax s. tem and ma, make it
politically far more difficult to effect thoroughgoing tax reform.
301. See, e.g., Lloyd C. Anderson, Inplementation of Consent Decrees ti Structural Reform LtVatin.
1986 U. ILL. L. REv. 725 (analyzing role of courts in implementation of consent decree.). Richard H
Fallon, Jr., Of Justiciability Remedies. and Public Law itigation: Notes on the Junsprudence of L),ons.
59 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1 (1984) (criticizing Supreme Court's efforts to limit public la%% litigation). Donald L
Horowitz, Decreeing Organizational Change: Judicial Superision of Public Insitutions. 1983 DL KE L J
1265 (examining problems of institutional litigation); Susan P Sturm. The Legacs and Future of
Corrections Litigation, 142 U. PA. L. REV. 639 (1993) (discussing court involsement in prison litigation).
Carl Tobias, Public Law Litigation and the Federal Rules of Citvl Procedure. 74 CORELL L REv 270
(1989) (describing procedural issues raised by institutional and other public la%% litigation)
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if taxes are to be raised.3" A court-ordered solution also effectively
disenfranchises the electorate. It is true that any amendment-imposed decision to
cut spending or increase taxes is necessarily countermajoritarian; we would prefer,
however, that which spending to cut and which taxes to raise reflect, to the extent
possible, the contemporary democratic will. Finally, were courts required to make
such decisions, they would inevitably be politicized and could thereby lose
credibility in their more traditional roles.3"3 These problems are serious enough
to preclude the court-ordered remedy as a possible default solution. The same
problems militate against giving any other nonpolitical body the power to
formulate a default solution. To perform its target definition and scorekeeping
tasks most effectively, an independent scorekeeper must be insulated to some
degree from political forces. This restriction, however, makes it incapable of
devising a default solution that reflects the contemporary democratic will.
Similarly, asking the scorekeeper to devise solutions would inevitably politicize
that body, undermining its credibility in target definition and scorekeeping.
This leaves the two political branches. If Congress fails to balance the budget,
some may be tempted to give the President the power to do so. We have already
examined one process-defined solution that transfers legislative power to the
President: the debt ceiling limitation approach implemented in section 2 of the
1995-96 Senate Draft, which effectively grants impoundment power to the
President.3°
There are at least two problems with giving the President the power to define
the default solution. The first is both technical and political. As has been noted,
spending takes many different forms. To give the President the power to make
considered choices among all such forms would require giving him the power, in
effect, to rule by decree on matters affecting taxation, spending, borrowing, and
control of the currency. We may limit that power-impoundment, for example,
is a limited form of rule by decree-but in doing so we are likely to reduce the
rationality of the resulting default solution, since we will necessarily be limiting
the President's power to make reasoned choices among alternatives. Although the
President is democratically elected, giving him the power to rule by decree
(whether limited or not) will trouble many. Separation of powers was originally
conceived as one of the Constitution's principal protections against tyranny.
305
302. See supra notes 234-38 and accompanying text.
303. The problem of politicization is greater, I suggest, in the case of federal spending and lax
decisions than, for example, in the case of school, prison, or municipal administration. Spending and tax
decisions are far more visible and generally far more contentious at the national level.
304. See supra notes 277-83 and accompanying text.
305. See THE FEDERALIST No. 51, at 335 (Alexander Hamilton or James Madison) (Edward Mead
Earle ed., 1937) (arguing for importance of "partition of power among several departments"); see also S.
REP. No. 104-5, at 27 (1995) (additional views of Sen. Biden) ("The founders also intended the power of
the purse to be one of the legislative branch's strongest bulwarks against incursions by the executive, and
the key to maintaining an enduring balance of powers.").
1524 [Vol. 106: 1449
Balanced Budget Amendment
The second problem is theoretical. Most arguments in favor of an amendment
to force a balanced budget imply, to some degree, that the political branches are
incapable of doing the job on their own. At least some arguments commonly
made about Congress's failings in this regard apply logically to the presidency as
well.306 Presidents who raise taxes or threaten Social Security feel the
electorate's wrath no less than members of Congress who do the same. It is
possible, therefore, that an amendment giving the President the power to rule by
decree in the event of a deficit would merely transfer power to the President
without any guarantee that he would use that power for the intended purpose.
4. Incentive-Based Solutions
Each of the foregoing approaches has been considered, in one form or
another, by Congress. A fourth possible approach, by contrast, has received
virtually no public consideration; nor do any persuasive exemplars exist. I
nevertheless raise the possibility of focusing on "incentive-based solutions"
because they are suggested by public choice theory, have intuitive appeal, 7 and
would avoid many of the problems discussed in connection with other
approaches.
Public choice theory suggests that Congress's failure to balance the budget
under current rules results from the inadequacy of existing legislative incentive
structures. °8 Advocates have generally used this premise to justify first-in-time
or process-based solutions;'09 they have not generally explored the possibility
of changing legislative incentives directly. As I define it, an incentive-based
solution would do just that: It would induce Congress to comply with the
budgetary target on its own.
The key to such an approach would be to ascertain what most strongly
motivates members of Congress. If members are motivated most strongly by a
desire for reelection, some dynamic based on this motivation probably leads
current members to vote for unbalanced budgets. Any attempted solution that
ignores this dynamic is likely to result in congressional efforts to circumvent,
rather than implement, the solution. A solution that correctly identifies and builds
upon members' motivations, however, may induce Congress to balance the budget
306. To the extent that Congress's budgetary failings are attributable to the fact that it is a collectie
body, assigning the task of developing a default solution to the President might sol'e the problem None
of the principal arguments generally made in favor of a consttutional amendment focus, on thi, aspect
of congressional decisionmaking. See supra Section I.B.
307. The concept for this Article developed out of a tax pohcN seminar that I taught t%%o year- ago
One of the tasks I assigned my students in connecion with a unit on the tax legislatse process %%as to draft
a balanced budget amendment. More than half the students submitted draft amendments cmplo)ing
incentive-based solutions. Although none of the techniques emplo~ed vould likely be taken seriousl, in
the public debate, the experience demonstrated the tntuiti'e appeal of approaches that attempt to adjust
legislative incentive structures directly.
308. See supra note 58.
309. See id.
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itself. For example, if we conclude that a desire for reelection most strongly
motivates the average member, an amendment employing an incentive-based
solution might offer an electoral advantage to all members of any Congress that
complies with the target or, conversely, impose an electoral disadvantage on all
members of any Congress that fails to comply.
There are obvious problems with such an approach. We may conclude that
members' motivations are too varied to permit generalization. Even if we
conclude that the average member is most strongly motivated by a desire for
reelection, we might be reluctant, for reasons having to do with the integrity of
the electoral process, to give incumbents any advantage or disadvantage. The fact
that no one has yet suggested a plausible exemplar of the approach, moreover,
may indicate that the approach is unworkable.
In theory, however, incentive-based solutions solve the major problems
inherent in other approaches. They do not require any shift in the balance of
powers. They leave to Congress all decisions about what spending to cut or which
taxes to raise. Indeed, if the incentive is applied to incumbents as a group, an
incentive-based solution might even lead members of different parties to
cooperate to meet the amendment's budgetary target. An incentive-based
solution-if one could be found-that shifts the market for legislation just enough
to lead Congress routinely to comply with targets set by an independent
scorekeeper might just solve our budgetary problems while preserving our basic
democratic structures.
5. Who Should Decide?
We may not be able to design a fully satisfactory process for the definition
of default solutions for some time to come. This leads to a further question:
Should we, in the meantime, authorize extraordinary processes for the
consideration and resolution of the process question itself? As has been noted, the
1995-96 Senate Draft may be interpreted to grant Congress superlegislative power
to experiment with enforcement procedures that might otherwise be
unconstitutional. Who should design an amendment's enforcement procedures:
Congress and the states through the amendment process? Congress by majority
vote? Or some other body or process?
A priori, one might not expect this to be an issue. Many, if not most of us,
would assume without question that at least the core enforcement procedures
should be defined in the amendment itself. The issue is raised, however, by
ambiguities in the 1995-96 Senate Draft. Given the political importance of that
draft, explicit consideration of the issue is required.
Section 6 of the 1995-96 Senate Draft specifies that: "The Congress shall
enforce and implement this article by appropriate legislation, which may rely on
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estimates of outlays and receipts." ' l Initially, this sentence might appear
routine and uninteresting. After all, many constitutional amendments have
contained language authorizing Congress to implement their substantive
provisions by statute.31 ' The problem here, however, is that Congress already
has complete authority to define its own budgetary procedures," 2 subject to
separation of powers and similar limitations. In other contexts, amendment
authors have had to deal with the problem that Congress is a legislature of
enumerated powers; implementing language was necessary to extend
Congress's authority to encompass the subject matter of the amendment in
question. Here, however, there is no need for such an extension. Unless the
first sentence is to be construed as surplusage, it must have some other
meaning.
An alternative construction is that the sentence gives Congress the power
to structure implementing procedures that would otherwise be unconstitutional:
in effect, that it amends Article V of the Constitution. The scope of this power,
however, is undefined in the text of the draft itself. Would the sentence permit
Congress to override Bowsher iv Synar,3'3 which held that reposing the
scorekeeping function in the Comptroller General violates the separation of
powers? Would it permit Congress to override the ordinary rule that
subsequent laws supersede prior laws?" 4 Would it authorize implementing
procedures that reverse the normal legislative process-permitting presidential
enactment subject to legislative veto? 315 Would it allow Congress to structure
incentive-based solutions by regulating eligibility or other terms for the
election of its own membership?
Some guidance was provided by the 1995 Senate committee report, which
seemed to focus on the word "shall." The report stated: 'This section makes
explicit what is implicit, that Congress has a positive obligation to fashion
legislation to enforce this article. 31 6 With respect to the scope of any possible
power to structure enforcement procedures that might otherwise be
unconstitutional, the report stated: "The provision precludes any interpretation
310. SJ. Res. I, 104th Cong. § 6 (1995), reprinted in Appendix
311. See U.S. CONsT. amend. XIII, § 2; id. amend. XIV. § 5; id. amend. XV. § 2. id amend XVIII.
§ 2; id. amend. XIX; id. amend. XXIII, § 2: id. amend. XXIV. § 2; id amend. XXVI. § 2
312. See S. REP. No. 104-5, at 9 (1995) ("The Constitution already emposcrs Congress v,:th such
authority.").
313. 478 U.S. 714 (1986).
314. See, e.g., Fisons Ltd. v. United States. 458 F.2d 1241. 1245 (7th Cir 1972) (holding that later
statute prevails); Ely v. Velde, 451 F.2d 1130. 1134 (4th Cir. 1971) (same): International Union of Elcc.
Radio & Mach. Workers v. NLRB, 289 F.2d 757 (D.C. Cir. 1960) (same). Etsenbcrg % Coming. 179 F2d
275, 277 (D.C. Cir. 1949) (same): United States v. Wrnghtwood Datr) Co.. 127 F2d 907. 912 17th Cir
1942) (same).
315. The Supreme Court has held that a one-house legislatie seto siolates the Article I requiremcnts
of bicameralism and presentment. See INS v. Chadha. 462 U S 919 (1983). The Court*, reasoning suggests
that all legislative vetos are constitutionally problematic. See. e g. Consumers Union v Federal Trade
Comm'n, 691 F.2d 575 (D.C. Cir. 1982) (finding two-house legislatt'e %cto unconstitutional). aff'd men..
463 U.S. 1216 (1983).
316. S. REP. No. 104-5, at 18.
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of the amendment that would result in a shift in the balance of powers among
the branches of government.,, 31 7 Unfortunately, this sentence-the only one
that addressed the possibility of superlegislative power-purported to limit
"interpretation," not implementation; it prohibited a "shift in the balance of
powers," perhaps a narrower concern than a violation of the separation of
powers; 318 and it was silent with respect to many other possible enforcement
techniques currently considered unconstitutional.
These interpretive problems are exacerbated by the second sentence of the
same section, which provides that "[tihe judicial power of the United States
shall not extend to any case or controversy arising under this Article" except with
Congress's express consent.1 9 The sentence thus purports to limit the first
sentence of Article III, Section 2 of the Constitution, which states in part that
"[t]he judicial Power shall extend to all Cases, in Law and Equity, arising under
this Constitution ' 320 and which in turn underlies the power of judicial review
articulated in Marbury v. Madison.
321
The scope of this limitation, however, is not clear. It depends largely on
the meaning of the phrase "arising under." Unfortunately, that phrase has at
least two well-established meanings; it is not clear which meaning (if either)
the 1995-96 Senate Draft is intended to invoke. For purposes of Article III,
Section 2 of the Constitution-the provision that the 1995-96 Senate Draft
purports to limit and therefore perhaps the most relevant-the Supreme Court has
adopted a broad construction of the phrase. In Osborn v. Bank of the United
States,322 the Court stated that a case would be treated as "arising under" the
Constitution if "the title or right set up by the party, may be defeated by one
construction of the constitution or law of the United States, and sustained by the
opposite construction. '3z Osborn was reaffirmed in 1983 in Verlinden B.V v.
Central Bank of Nigeria.324 Characterizing Osborn as "[t]he controlling decision
on the scope of Art. mII 'arising under' jurisdiction," the Court stated that Osborn
"reflects a broad conception of 'arising under' jurisdiction, according to which
Congress may confer on the federal courts jurisdiction over any case or
controversy that might call for the application of federal law.' 3  Were this
meaning to be adopted for purposes of section 6 of the 1995-96 Senate Draft, the
result would be to deprive federal courts of the power to review the
constitutionality of any legislation that might be sustained or defeated by any
317. Id.
318. Cf. id. at 15 ("Nothing in [section 1] either anticipates nor [sic] requires any alteration in the
balance of powers between the legislative and executive branches.").
319. S.J. Res. I, 104th Cong. § 6 (1995), reprinted in Appendix.
320. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2.
321. 5 U.S. (I Cranch) 137 (1803).
322. 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 738 (1824).
323. Id. at 822. See generally ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, FEDERAL JURISDICTION § 5.2.2, at 256-59 (2d
ed. 1994) (describing Osborn as seminal case interpreting federal question jurisdiction under Article 111).
324. 461 U.S. 480 (1983).
325. Id. at 492.
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construction of the draft itself, including, presumably, the first sentence of section
6. The effect would be to insulate from judicial review any legislation purporting
to be authorized by that sentence-a very broad exemption indeed.
This is not, of course, the only possible interpretation. The same phrase
has been given a narrower meaning for purposes of the federal question
jurisdiction statute, which states that "[t]he district courts shall have original
jurisdiction of all civil actions arising under the Constitution, laws, or treaties
of the United States. 326 In this context, "a case arises under federal law if
it is apparent from the face of the plaintiff's complaint either that the plaintiff's
cause of action was created by federal law; or . . . that a federal law that
creates a cause of action is an essential component of the plaintiff's
claim. ' 327 How such an interpretation might be applied to section 6 of the
1995-96 Senate Draft is not clear. The section might, however, be interpreted
to mean that no cause of action exists to enforce the amendment directly
except as explicitly provided by Congress.25 Under such an interpretation,
a plaintiff might still challenge laws enacted pursuant to that section as
violative of other parts of the Constitution.
The problem, therefore, is not that section 6 requires an overly broad
interpretation. The problem is rather that it plausibly permits one. At the extreme,
it may be construed to authorize Congress to enact otherwise unconstitutional
procedures to enforce the amendment and preclude judicial review of the
constitutionality of such enactments without any obvious limits to such
unreviewable superlegislative powers.
It may be objected that the evident purpose of the second sentence of section
6 was a narrow one: to address Senator Nunn's concern that courts would
themselves undertake to define the default solution. Although this may be true,
the relevance of legislative intent has been challenged in recent years, even in the
interpretation of statutes. 329 There is little reason to believe that Congress has
the power, through committee reports and statements on the floor, to control the
326. 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (1994).
327. See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 323. § 5.2.3. at 263
328. Such an interpretation would still leave open man), questions. Could the amendment be asserted
as a defense to a cause of action? Assume, for example, that the President impounds funds, ostensibly
pursuant to section I of the amendment. Members of Congress sue. asserting that such impoundment is
impermissible. Could the President plead the amendment in defense. notwithstanding section 6" It is also
unclear whether the amendment could be asserted affirmatiscl) as part of a cause of action authorized
pursuant to another provision of the Constitution. Consider. for example, a suit to enjoin the trustees of a
pension fund from purchasing U.S. bonds allegedly issued in %iolation of section 2 Such a suit %ould not
"arise under" the amendment under the narrowest possible interpretation of that phrase. nevertheless. suits
of this nature might well be structured to enforce very significant aspects of the amendment
329. See, e.g., Daniel A. Farber & Philip P. Fnckey. Leitslattse Intent and Paibhc Choice, 74 VA L
REv. 423 (1988) (examining public choice critique of use of legislatise intent in statutory construction).
Bradley C. Karkkainen, "Plain Meaning": Justice Scali's Jurisprigdence of Strit Stattion Constriction.
17 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 401 (1994) (discussing Justice Scalias view of irrelevance of legislative
intent); Kenneth A. Shepsle, Congress Is a "They; " Not an "It": Legislative Intent as O1sniorn. 12 I%-T'L
REV. L. & ECON. 239 (1992) (asserting that legislative intent has no meaning). But cf William N Eskndge.
Jr., Cycling Legislative Intent, 12 INT'L REV. L. & ECON. 260 (1992) (offenng critique of Shepsle)
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interpretation of any constitutional amendment over the next two hundred years,
let alone over the next decade.
Is it appropriate to give Congress superlegislative powers to structure
enforcement procedures for the amendment that would otherwise violate
existing constitutional principles? A thoroughgoing exploration of the problem
is beyond the scope of this Article. Three preliminary observations, however,
are worth making. First, Congress's failure to date to develop a satisfactory
approach to the problem of enforcement is attributable only partially to the
difficulty of the problem. Congress has been distracted by the politics of the
balanced budget problem. I remain optimistic that one or more satisfactory
solutions may be forthcoming in the not-too-distant future, provided that
serious and less partisan attention is given to the problem. There may be no
need to amend the amendment process. Second, if Congress has an institutional
bias in favor of unbalanced budgets, it seems unlikely that effective
enforcement provisions would long survive an arrangement under which
Congress has the power, by majority vote, to render such provisions
ineffective. It may be possible to gather briefly the political will to propose
and ratify an amendment containing effective enforcement provisions. It is far
less likely that the same level of vigilance can be maintained indefinitely. The
most likely long-term outcome, if Congress has the power to control
enforcement, is that enforcement will be spotty and ultimately ineffective.
Finally, even if it is concluded that giving Congress superlegislative powers is
appropriate in this context, any such grant of power should be explicit and
well-defined. Had the 1995-96 Senate Draft been proposed and ratified, its
proponents, particularly in the state legislatures, might have been unpleasantly
surprised by an interpretation that expanded, rather than restricted,
congressional power. The amendment process should not be amended without
full debate of the issues presented, and the scope of superlegislative powers
granted to Congress should be clearly defined in advance.
My suspicion is that section 6, in its current form, will not long survive
informed debate. Arguments in favor of putting the fox in charge of the
henhouse are suspect, particularly when the proposal is made by the fox. The
common intuition that enforcement procedures should be specified in the
amendment itself, not left to Congress, is probably correct.
C. Waiving the Amendment: Who, When, and How?
A final aspect of the enforcement problem is specifying when and how the
requirements of the amendment may be waived. It is impossible to predict all
circumstances in which waiver might be necessary. Some open-ended provision
for waiver therefore seems essential. If waiver is too easy, the amendment will
have no teeth. If it is too difficult, the nation may find itself unable to meet
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extraordinary challenges or take advantage of extraordinary opportunities. How,
then, should provisions for waiver be structured?
The simplest approach is to permit a waiver only upon a supermajority
vote of each house of Congress. A majority may make policy, but only a
supermajority may breach fiscal discipline. The 1995-96 Senate Draft, for
example, permits a waiver of the requirements of both section 1 and section
2 for any reason upon a sixty percent rolicall vote of each house."
Some have been troubled by the resulting infringement on majoritarian
rule.33' A supermajority waiver provision is ultimately no different in
concept, however, from the Article V requirement that a supermajority approve
constitutional amendments. Thus a balanced budget waiver can be viewed as
a temporary suspension of one portion of the Constitution. So viewed, the
supermajority requirement seems less objectionable.
Some have predicted that a supermajority waiver provision would trigger
further congressional gridlock.332 This outcome would certainly have been
true under the 1995-96 Senate Draft, which effectively authorized hostage-
taking.333 In an environment that rewards hostage-taking, supermajority
provisions merely exacerbate the problem. However, in an amendment relying
on some more rational enforcement mechanism-for example, one
incorporating an incentive-based solution-a supermajority waiver provision
would not necessarily create the same opportunities or incentives for
obstructionist legislative behavior.
No one has yet proposed an acceptable alternative to the supermajority
waiver requirement. Because extraordinary events likely to trigger a waiver
almost inevitably present political issues, the issue of waiver should be left to
the political branches. It would be inappropriate, for example, to permit an
unelected body to decide that the nation cannot incur debt to make the next
Louisiana Purchase if supermajorities in each house of Congress plus the
330. See S.J. Res. 1, 104th Cong. §§ 1-2 (1995). reprinted in Appendix
331. See. e.g., S. REP. No. 104-5. at 54-59 (1995) (minority stews of Sens Kenned). Leahy. and
Feingold); 1995 House Hearings, supra note 2, at 113 (statement of Alice N1. Ri.hn. Director. Office of
Management and Budget) (asserting that supermajority provisions infringe on majontanan rule). 1983-84
Senate Hearings, supra note 2, at 81 (statement of Professor Robert D Goldstein) (same). id at 121
(statement of Steven A. Reiss on behalf of Association of the Bar of the City of New York) (same).
1979-80 House Hearings, supra note 2. at 284 (statement of Rep UlIman) (same). ad at 378. 380
(statement of Rep. Giaimo) (same); id. at 423-24 (1979-80) (statement of Rep Mineta) (same). id at
496-97 (statement of Laurence Gold, Special Counsel. American Federation of Labor and Congrm of
Industrial Organizations) (same).
332. See, e.g., S. REP. NO. 104-5, at 32 (minority views of Sens. Kennedy. Leahy. and Fr-ingold). 1995
House Hearings, supra note 2. at 14. 16 (statement of Charles L. Schultzc. Senior Fellow. Brookings
Institution) (predicting greater gridlock); id. at 108 (statement of Rep Scott) (same); id at III. 113
(statement of Alice M. Rivlin, Director, Office of Management and Budget) (same). 1983-34 Senate
Hearings, supra note 2, at 79, 80 (statement of Professor Robert D. Goldstein) (same). id at 121 (statement
of Steven A. Reiss on behalf of Association of the Bar of the City of New York) (same). 1979-80 House
Hearings, supra note 2. at 101, 106 (statement of Charles L. Schultze. Chairman. Council of Economic
Advisers) (same).
333. See supra notes 273-75 and accompanying text
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President-as close to consensus as may be possible in a democratic society
short of a constitutional amendment-conclude that we should.
Two special situations merit separate consideration. First, some argue that
Congress should be permitted to waive the amendment by majority vote in the
event of adverse economic conditions.3" This proposition seems both unwise
and unnecessary. Although politicians often find it in their self-interest to find
fault with the national economy, it is not clear that elected representatives
bring any expertise or legitimacy to economic decisionmaking. To permit
waiver by majority vote whenever the economy is perceived to be performing
suboptimally would seriously threaten the enforceability of the amendment. In
addition, were an amendment to delegate the task of target setting to an
independent scorekeeper, as I have suggested, such a waiver would be
unnecessary.
It is also sometimes argued that Congress should be permitted to waive the
amendment by majority vote in the event of a declared war or other serious
military conflict. Section 5 of the 1995-96 Senate Draft, for example, provides:
The Congress may waive the provisions of this article for any fiscal
year in which a declaration of war is in effect. The provisions of this
article may be waived for any fiscal year in which the United States
is engaged in military conflict which causes an imminent and serious
military threat to national security and is so declared by a joint
resolution, adopted by a majority of the whole number of each House,
which becomes law.
335
Under this provision, the 1995 Senate committee report argued, "Congress will
retain maximum flexibility in responding to clear national security crises such
as a declared war or imminent military threat to national security. '336
At first glance, these national security arguments are inherently appealing.
Upon further consideration, however, they may actually be less compelling.
The question is not whether a supermajority vote should be required for the
United States to defend itself. The question is rather whether involvement in
a military conflict should permit a bare majority to authorize a collapse of
334. For example, Representative Owens proposed an amendment to the 1995 House draft that "would
have permitted Congress to waive the provisions by law any year for which the President notified Congress
and Congress adopted a joint resolution affirming that the national unemployment rate was projected to
exceed four percent." 141 CONG. REc. D95-96 (daily ed. Jan. 26, 1995). The Owens amendment was
defeated by a vote of 363 to 64. See id. Representative Wise similarly proposed an amendment to the 1995
House draft that would have permitted Congress to waive the amendment in times of recession as declared
by law; the Wise amendment was defeated by a vote of 291 to 138. See id. In the Senate, Sen. Nunn
proposed an amendment to the 1995-96 Senate Draft that would have permitted waiver for any fiscal year
"if, with respect to that fiscal year, the Senate and the House of Representatives agree to a concurrent
resolution stating, in substance, that a national emergency requires the suspension of the application of this
article for that fiscal year." 141 CONG. REC. S2970 (daily ed. Feb. 22, 1995). This proposal was tabled by
a vote of 61 to 39. See 141 CONG. REC. D254 (daily ed. Feb. 28, 1995).
335. S.J. Res. 1, 104th Cong. § 5 (1995), reprinted in Appendix.
336. S. REP. No. 104-5, at 17.
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fiscal discipline for an entire fiscal year on "national security" grounds. The
potential for abuse is large. The 1995 Senate committee report implies that
section 5 is intended to give Congress wide latitude. The phrase "imminent and
serious military threat to national security," the report states "is intended to
define those situations in which Congress, in order to respond to urgent
national security crises with additional outlays for the defense of the Nation,
needs more flexibility than the three-fifths vote requirement in section 1 would
provide.'33 7 In other words, in a dangerous world, a majority vote waiver is
available whenever Congress needs it.
Perhaps the most authoritative views on the scope of such a waiver
provision are those of Senator Heflin, the author and principal advocate of the
above-quoted section 5. In a statement appended to the 1995 Senate committee
report, the Senator noted that in the 220 years of this nation's history, there
were some "200 instances in which the United States has used military forces
abroad in situations of conflict,''338 raising the disquieting possibility that all
or many of such conflicts might have justified a waiver. Among the conflicts
he implied were sufficiently serious were the seizure of the Mayaguez by
North Korea in 1975, the U.S. intervention in the Dominican Republic in 1965,
the U.S. intervention in Lebanon in 1958, and the confrontation in the Formosa
Straits in 1955. 339 While these events were serious in their own way, their
inclusion in his statement means that the phrase "imminent and serious military
threat to national security" is less restrictive than some might expect. The past
several years have seen comparable or greater U.S. military involvement in
Bosnia, Haiti, Somalia, the Persian Gulf, Panama, and Grenada. One may
wonder whether, under such a provision, waiver might become the rule rather
than the exception.
At the same time, waiver by majority vote may not be sufficient to protect
national security interests. Most spending to prepare for military crises occurs
well in advance of any intervention, and could not be deficit-financed under
the 1995-96 Senate Draft without a supermajority waiver which, in the
absence of an immediate danger, may be difficult to achieve 40 Only longer-
term military conflicts require spending increases that cannot be accommodated
with relatively minor budgetary adjustments; it is precisely those commitments,
however, that most clearly require responsible financing.:
337. Id. at 18.
338. Id. at 71 (additional views of Sen. Heflin).
339. See id. at 71-72.
340. See id. at 17 ("The committee intends that ordinary and prudent preparations for a .ar perceied
by Congress to be imminent would be funded fully within the linitations impo5.ed by the amendment.
although Congress could establish higher levels of spending or deficits for these or an) other purposes
under section 1.").
341. There is a further serious problem with a rule that permits waier by majority 'otc only in the
event of military conflict: Such a rule creates a constitutional bias in faor of ,,ar Consider. for example.
the Louisiana Purchase. In 1803, sentiment to take the lower Mississippi by force %as running high The
United States had a choice; it could either go to war or acquire the temtory peacefull See. e g. HE.NRY
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The problem is a difficult one. While the solution adopted by the 1995-96
Senate Draft is not entirely satisfactory, it is not clear that a better solution is
yet at hand.
IV. CONCLUSION
This Article has deliberately taken no position as to whether a
constitutional amendment to require a balanced federal budget is a good idea;
in fact, I am agnostic on this issue. What I do assert is that if we are going to
adopt such an amendment, it should be well-drafted. Proposal and ratification
of a poorly drafted amendment will likely do more harm than good, even if we
conclude that such an amendment is, in concept, a good idea. The 1995-96
Senate Draft, the draft balanced budget amendment twice considered and twice
defeated by the 104th Congress, was, I suggest, severely flawed.
Of the many issues I have raised, three are most important. First is the
problem of circumvention. The cash method of accounting invoked by the
1995-96 Senate Draft is too porous and too primitive to be effective. I have
outlined a number of circumvention techniques that take advantage of
deficiencies in the cash method. My examples are merely illustrative; many
more exist. Control over the scope of the amendment is also essential to
effective enforcement, but the line drawn by the 1995-96 Senate Draft would
leave this within Congress's control. Congress would continue to be free to
spend and incur debt beyond the amendment's parameters while claiming
nominal compliance with the amendment's requirements.
For these and other reasons, I have suggested that effective enforcement
of a balanced budget amendment requires an independent scorekeeper. Such
a scorekeeper could define accounting rules that implement the values
underlying the amendment. It could police attempts to move spending and debt
off-budget. It could, in sum, minimize the possibility that a balanced budget
amendment would merely provide political cover for continued "blue smoke
and mirrors" budgeting. Such a scorekeeper would not necessarily have any
power to enforce. Credible scorekeeping, however, is an essential first step.
A second important practical problem is the macroeconomic impact of a
balanced budget amendment. No effective formulaic solution has been found
ADAMS, HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA DURING THE ADMINISTRATIONS OF THOMAS
JEFFERSON 177-93 (1967) (detailing history of crisis leading to Louisiana Treaty of 1803); DUMAS
MALONE, JEFFERSON THE PRESIDENT FIRST TERM 1801-1805, at 239-310 (1970) (same). Under section
5 of the 1995-96 Senate Draft, the military option would have required only a majority vote, see S.J. Res.
I, 104th Cong. § 5 (1995), reprinted in Appendix; whereas the peaceful solution would require a
supermajority vote in each house, see id. § I. International relations often present such choices. Should we
negotiate or send the gunboats? Should we intervene or merely prepare to do so? If we are already
involved, when should we make peace and on what terms? Any provision that allows Congress and the
President to avoid the electoral pain of financial responsibility by provoking or continuing military
engagement is quite dangerous.
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to this problem; congressional waiver by majority vote seems ill-advised. I
have suggested that the amendment be drafted to define its target by reference
to values rather than numeric tests. The scorekeeper would then be charged
with setting the actual numeric tests from time to time, taking issues of
macroeconomic impact into consideration.
Finally, there is the problem of imposing a remedy when Congress fails
to comply voluntarily. The use of debt ceiling limitations, the 1995-96 Senate
Draft's principal enforcement mechanism, is profoundly unsatisfactory. There
is no guarantee that debt ceiling limitations will actually lead to reduced
deficits; they are likely to lead to hostage-taking behavior by congressional
minorities. Moreover, there is a real risk that they may lead to a default on the
national debt-a risk that is simply unacceptable.
Proponents of a balanced budget amendment have become increasingly
impatient. Impatience is sometimes a virtue. This is one context, however, in
which a sound result is more important than a quick one. My message to
Congress and the states is simply this: If you are going to do it, do it right.
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APPENDIX
Senate Joint Resolution 1, as amended and defeated March 2, 1995, and defeated on reconsideration on
June 6, 1996 ("1995-96 Senate Draft")
"SECTION 1. Total outlays for any fiscal year shall not exceed total receipts for that fiscal year, unless
three-fifths of the whole number of each House of Congress shall provide by law for a specific excess
of outlays over receipts by a rollcall vote.
"SECTION 2. The limit on the debt of the United States held by the public shall not be increased, unless
three-fifths of the whole number of each House shall provide by law for such an increase by a rollcall
vote.
"SECTION 3. Prior to each fiscal year, the President shall transmit to the Congress a proposed budget
for the United States Government for that fiscal year, in which total outlays do not exceed total receipts.
"SECTION 4. No bill to increase revenue shall become law unless approved by a majority of the whole
number of each House by a rolicall vote.
"SECTION 5. The Congress may waive the provisions of this article for any fiscal year in which a
declaration of war is in effect. The provisions of this article may be waived for any fiscal year in which
the United States is engaged in military conflict which causes an imminent and serious military threat
to national security and is so declared by a joint resolution, adopted by a majority of the whole number
of each House, which becomes law.
"SECTION 6. The Congress shall enforce and implement this article by appropriate legislation, which
may rely on estimates of outlays and receipts. The judicial power of the United States shall not extend
to any case or controversy arising under this Article except as may be specifically authorized by
legislation adopted pursuant to this section.
"SECTION 7. Total receipts shall include all receipts of the United States Government except those
derived from borrowing. Total outlays shall include all outlays of the United States Government except
for those for repayment of debt principal.
"SECTION 8. This article shall take effect beginning with fiscal year 2002 or with the second fiscal year
beginning after its ratification, whichever is later."
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